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Abstract 
Compulsory third party motor insurance was introduced in 1930 to ensure that 
compensation was paid to innocent third party victims of road traffic accidents, 
subject to certain limitations. Throughout the past century, the legislature has found 
difficulty in balancing the freedom of insurers to insert standard terms into policies, 
and the victims’ right to receive compensation. The Motor Insurers’ Bureau 
(henceforth ‘MIB’) was introduced to mitigate this as a fund of last resort, to 
compensate when an accident was caused by an uninsured or untraced driver. The 
role of the MIB is disputed due to conflicting European Union (henceforth ‘EU’) and 
United Kingdom (henceforth ‘UK’) law.   
This thesis examines the regulation behind exclusion clauses and their use in third 
party motor insurance policies. The thesis answers three key questions. First, to 
what extent are exclusion clauses valid in third party motor insurance policies 
against third parties? Second, what is the effect of the use of exclusion clauses on 
third party claims? Third how should the law in this area be reformed? It further 
examines the effect on exclusion clauses of general contractual and insurance 
contract regulation on third party victims. Finally, the thesis will examine the role of 
the MIB and whether it provides adequate protection as a ‘fund of last resort’.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Third party motor insurance policies are contractual in nature. They follow similar 
rules in the creation of the policy as contracts, including the requirement of an offer, 
acceptance, consideration, invitation to treat, and intention to create legal 
relations.1 Likewise, most rules specific to insurance contracts are also followed, 
such as insurable interest,2 and the duty of utmost good faith.3 What sets motor 
insurance aside from areas of both contract and many types of insurance contract, 
is their compulsory4 and protective nature. Motor insurance is the most substantial 
classification of insurance in terms of numbers involved, with over 36 million 
registered motor vehicles on the road in the United Kingdom (henceforth ‘UK’), the 
majority insured against third party risks.5 
Any person who uses (or causes or permits any other person to use6) a vehicle on 
a road or public place in the UK without requisite insurance is committing a criminal 
offence.7 This is necessary to ensure that the third party ‘victim’ of road traffic 
accidents will receive compensation. Compulsory insurance provides that where 
someone who is injured from an accident which was not their fault,8 instead of 
relying on the driver to compensate (which would be impossible if they are 
financially unable to pay), claims can be made against the insurer of the 
                                                          
1 For further discussion on requirements of a contract see Hugh Beale et al, Chitty on Contracts, (32nd 
edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 2015, Volume 1 Part 2). 
2 Insurable interest is to prevent someone from insuring on something that they do not have a legal 
interest in, which effectively amounts to gambling. 
3 The duty of utmost good faith is upon both the insured and the insurer originally found in the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906. The Insurance Act 2015 removed avoidance as a remedy for this duty, although 
it continues to exist today. This is limited slightly in relation to third parties in Motor Insurance through 
Section 152 RTA 1988 but does exist. For more information on Insurable Interest and the duty of 
utmost good faith, see Professor Robert Merkin, Colinvaux and Merkin’s Insurance Contract Law, 
(11th edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 2016). 
4 Note there are other areas of insurance law which are compulsory. For example, horse riding 
establishments must insure for hire and use of their horses. Recent regulations amending Nuclear 
Installations Act 1965, also shipping cases. For other areas of compulsory insurance. See British 
Insurance Law Association, “BILA Response to AIDA World Congress 2010 Questionnaire: 
'Mandatory Insurance-Legal and Economic Myths and Realities' 
www.aida.org.uk/docs/United%20Kingdom.docx [Accessed 2nd August 2017].      
5 Department for Transport, “Vehicle Licensing Statistics: Quarter 1 January to March 2017” 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/619078/vehicle-
licensing-january-to-march-2017.pdf [Accessed 15th June 2017]. 
6 Section 143 (b) Road Traffic Act 1988. 
7 Section 143 Road Traffic Act 1988. 
8 In the UK, there is a fault based system and therefore third party insurance is not designed to 
compensate for those who are at fault, although comprehensive policies can be bought for damage 
caused by drivers who are not at fault as an addition, these are not compulsory. 
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responsible driver.9 However, as with any type of contract, both parties (the insurer 
and the insured) have contractual autonomy, so long as the policy complies with 
the requirements of the RTA 1988.10  
Due to being the stronger party to the contract, the policy will usually be on the 
insurers’ standard terms, whilst allowing the insured some flexibility to cater the 
policy to their needs, and potentially pay less in their premiums. This freedom 
conflicts directly with the purpose of third party insurance, in attempting to provide 
protection to the third party when they are injured or have their property damaged. 
The law has attempted to manage this conflict through express legislation at both 
EU and UK level.11 Moreover, legislation affects this area indirectly, for example in 
relation to exclusion clauses and insurance law generally.12 
Safeguards are in place to protect the third party victim if claims fall outside of the 
legislation. An extra-statutory Agreement made between the MIB, a body 
consisting of every practising motor insurer in the UK, and the Secretary of State 
for Transport (henceforth ‘SoSFT’), provides compensation to be paid to the third 
party as a measure of last resort. The MIB Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 
(henceforth ‘UDA’)13 and Untraced Drivers’ Agreement (henceforth ‘UtDA’),14 are 
arguably not failsafe, as they themselves are contracts, meaning, some gaps 
inevitably exist.   
Due to the amount of obscure and outdated legislation, EU Directives, and Court 
of Justice of the European Union (henceforth ‘CJEU’) decisions, this area is of law 
is confused. There is an absence of clarity as to whether exclusion clauses could 
potentially hinder compensation to third parties. This thesis will therefore examine 
                                                          
9 Professor Merkin notes that insurance ‘underpins’ tort. See Robert Merkin, “Tort and Insurance: 
Some Perspectives”, (2010), Journal of Professional Negligence, 208. 
10 See requirements of policies within Section 145 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. 
11 The Road Traffic Act 1988 and the Sixth Consolidated Motor Insurance Directive. 
12 Particularly, the Insurance Act 2015, Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 
2012, and Consumer Rights Act 2015. 
13 The Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 2015 can be found here 
<https://www.mib.org.uk/media/166917/2015-uninsured-drivers-agreement-england-scotland-
wales.pdf> [Accessed 28th August 2017]. 
14 The Untraced Drivers’ Agreement is beyond the scope of this thesis, as the thesis is concerned 
where a driver is made uninsured due to breach of an exclusion. By their nature, the policy of an 
untraced driver is not known. The Untraced Drivers’ Agreement 2017 can be found here 
<https://www.mib.org.uk/media/355104/amended-2017-untraced-drivers-agreement-england-
scotland-and-wales_v10.pdf> [Accessed 24th August 2017]. 
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the validity15 and effect of exclusion clauses in third party motor insurance policies 
on third party claims.  
Research Questions 
This thesis seeks to answer three research questions to combine both theoretical 
and practical knowledge. First, to what extent are exclusion clauses valid in third 
party motor insurance policies against third parties? Second, what is the effect of 
the use of exclusion clauses on third party claims? Third, how should the law in this 
area be reformed? 
Methodology 
This thesis is largely doctrinal in nature. The question as to the validity of exclusion 
clauses will be answered by the examination of primary sources, including and 
legislation and case law. Moreover, secondary material will be utilised such as; 
consultations, reports, news articles, travaux preparatoires, along with 
parliamentary debates, and academic comment. This question is also answered in 
the use of comparative law, through occasional reference to other jurisdictions, 
including the Bahamas and Singapore. These jurisdictions have identical motor 
insurance legislation to the UK, meaning that although cases from these 
jurisdictions are not binding, they are highly instructive.   
Moreover, there is significant comparative analysis with EU law, particularly in 
Chapters Four and Five. The EU remains supreme until the UK’s official departure, 
and therefore continues to have a significant impact. The examination of EU Law 
will be through the six Motor Insurance Directives and interpreting ECJ and CJEU 
case law, and ways in which third parties could enforce their EU law rights through 
direct effect, indirect effect, and state liability, will also be examined.  
                                                          
15 This thesis will utilise the words ‘invalid’ or ‘void’ in relation to exclusion clauses interchangeably 
and will be taken to have the same meaning, that the exclusion cannot be used against a third party 
but it is still permissible against the first party. This is similar to the courts’ and legislatures 
interchangeable approach. For example Ward LJ in Bristol Alliance Partnership v Williams and 
another [2012] EWCA Civ 1267 [51] uses the word ‘void’ and Jay J in Delaney v Secretary of State for 
Transport [2014] EWHC 1785 (QB) used the words ‘valid’ [36] and ‘void’ [17] (albeit this case was 
examining validity of clauses in the MIB Agreements). Moreover, Section 148 RTA 1988 is titled 
‘Avoidance of certain exceptions to policies or securities’ but within the provision itself uses the term 
‘matters...be of no effect’ (Section 148 (1)). This shows the clear interchangeable approach used by 
the courts and legislature which will therefore be followed in this thesis to avoid uncertainty.  
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The second question involving the effect of exclusion clauses on third party claims 
will be answered largely based on the same method as above. However, qualitative 
empirical research will also be undertaken in the form of a face-to-face recorded 
interview with two representatives of the MIB (at the MIB’s headquarters), and then 
by sending follow-up questions via email to those representatives. 
Empirical research will be undertaken to fill significant gaps in relation to the 
interpretation and policy behind the MIB Agreements. This is due to the absence 
of impartial literature surrounding the MIB.  
Whilst there is literature in relation to the MIB in books16 and  journal literature, 
these are not neutral. In personal injury law, there are two opposing lobbies which 
represent either the claimant or the insurer. Insurers are represented by the 
Association of British Insurers, a body formed of insurers which represents their 
views. These, alongside practitioners who represent the insurance industry, often 
present pro-MIB views in literature.17 Organisations often represent claimant’s 
interests such as the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, the Motor Accidents 
Solicitors Society, and claimant practitioners,18 these present negative views of the 
MIB in literature.19 Consequently, gaining views which are completely neutral of the 
MIB is problematic. Whilst some literature is critical but clearly unbiased,20 this is 
aimed preliminarily at providing practical guidance to victims and practitioners, as 
to how to make a claim against the MIB. There is no known literature which 
                                                          
16 These, along with journal literature are cited below.  
17 See for example the article by Andrew Baker “Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 2015” (2016) Personal 
Injury Law Brief Update Journal, available at <http://www.pibriefupdate.com/content/law-journal-
summaries/news-category-2/3560-uninsured-drivers-agreement-2015-andrew-baker-horwich-farrelly-
solicitors> [Accessed 16th August 2017]. Also, Association of British Insurers “Memorandum from the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI) (CMI 13)” House of Commons Committee Evidence 591 into the 
Cost of Motor Insurance.  
18 Practitioners are often members of these organisations.  
19 See for example the book by Andrew Ritchie QC, Apil Guide to MIB Claims (Jordan’s Publishing 
Limited, 2016). Also, several pieces in the Journal of Personal Injury Law, which is the journal 
attached to APIL and consequently represents their views. Also see the works of Dr Nicholas Bevan 
who is very prevalent in this area, Nicholas publishes frequently on issues to do with the MIB and is 
heavily involved in a Judicial Review involving the MIB Agreements, this Judicial Review is discussed 
on pages 175-176 and 245-246. Works of Dr Bevan include Nick Bevan “Putting Wrongs to the 
Rights: Part 1” (2016) New Law Journal 166 (7700), 17-18 and Nick Bevan “Tinkering at the Edges” 
(2015) Journal of Personal Injury Law, 3, 138-148. 
20 See for example, Donald Williams and Malcolm Johnson, Guide to Motor Insurers’ Bureau Claims, 
(The Law Society, 10th edition, 2012). 
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combines both critical but unbiased perspectives, alongside perspectives from the 
MIB.  
The interviews therefore seek to gain policy perspectives from the MIB, which 
alongside the examination of the UDA and interpreting case law, will give a clear 
view as to how the MIB Agreements work in practice and the effect on third parties. 
The use of the MIB for interviews, rather than the insurance industry is important, 
as the MIB provides the fund of last resort and its’ Agreements are relied upon by 
insurers where an exclusion clause is breached. Consequently, they will be in the 
best position to provide answers as to policy behind their Agreements which will 
aide in answering the second research question. Moreover, understanding the 
positions of every motor insurer in the country is unfeasible and the MIB can 
provide an overall outlook. Interest is in the numbers of claims which are received 
by the MIB and those that are denied, this will seek to inform the thesis as to 
whether protection is given to third party claims, as if a number of claims are denied 
for minor procedural infractions, it would connote that the MIB were seeking to 
avoid paying third parties.  
The interview was undertaken March 2015, where several questions were asked 
to representatives of the MIB. However, this was before the introduction of the UDA 
2015, and the UK public voted to leave the EU21 in June 2016, therefore, although 
the interview was deemed to be of some relevance, it was slightly outdated. 
Consequently, questions were sent to the MIB in July 2017 which were later 
answered via email. These questions, added to the previous questions by enquiring 
about changes to the MIB Agreements as well as Brexit. As mentioned above, the 
questions used were aimed at gaining policy perspectives from the MIB, asking for 
their opinions on exclusion clause use, their Agreements and protection offered to 
the third party.  
The third question will be answered in the conclusion by bringing together the 
conclusions made as a result of the research undertaken to consider where the law 
could be reformed, particularly in light of Brexit.   
                                                          
21 This will be referred to as ‘Brexit’. 
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Originality 
Motor insurance law, until recently, has received little attention, either through 
practise or academically. Several recent developments from both the UK and EU, 
along with alterations in the MIB Agreements, have increased attention 
significantly, with articles having been produced by a handful of authors,22 along 
with Professor Merkin’s ‘Law of Motor Insurance’ books.23 Moreover, this author 
has published and presented works during the research and writing of this thesis, 
the work relates mainly to other areas of motor insurance law.24  
This thesis shows originality throughout. The UK’s main legislation in relation to 
exclusion clauses (Road Traffic Act 198825) is identical to one of the earliest 
pieces of legislation in relation to motor insurance (Road Traffic Act 193426). 
Whilst the RTA 1988 is often subject to scrutiny,27 the RTA 1934’s evaluation is 
sporadic, and there is no known literature amalgamating commentary and critique.  
The thesis will uncover and evaluate significant amounts of material, thereby 
evaluating the rationale behind the list of prohibited exclusion clauses in the RTAs 
1934 and 1988, and why other exclusion clauses are permitted. This includes a 
recently released cabinet document, news articles from the time, academic 
commentary (much of which has not been discussed previously), and judicial 
opinions.28 Bringing this together, for the first time, the rationale behind prohibited 
                                                          
22 See for example the Articles produced by Dr Nick Bevan (n 19). Also see Margaret Hemsworth, 
“Insurance obligations, the Road Traffic Act 1988 and deliberately caused damage” (2013) J.B.L, 3, 
354-361. Also, Jenny Papettas, “Insurers' liability under policies of compulsory third party motor 
insurance” (2013) P.N, 29(3), 200-204. 
23 Robert Merkin and Margaret Hemsworth, The Law of Motor Insurance (2nd Edition, Sweet and 
Maxwell, 2015). 
24 A piece was presented by the author to the Association Internationale De Droit Des Assurances 
(AIDA) Motor Insurance Working Party but was unpublished, the piece was awarded an AIDA 
academic prize.  Matthew Channon, ‘Does the EU and UK correctly balance the interests of the 
consumer and third party victim in Motor Insurance?’ (Unpublished, Presented to the AIDA Motor 
Insurance Working Party, Vienna, November 2016). This was focussed on two core areas of motor 
insurance law, compensating ‘blameworthy and criminal passengers’ and on ‘scope’. Also see 
Matthew Channon and Robert Merkin “Boris Johnson and EU Law” 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/matthew-channon/boris-johnson-and-eu-law_b_13977998.html 
[Accessed 29th March 2017] and Matthew Channon, ‘Time to Motor on With Reform’ Personal Injury 
Law Brief Update Journal <http://www.pibriefupdate.com/content/law-journal-summaries/news-
category-2/3418-time-to-motor-on-with-reform-matthew-channon> [Accessed 04/09/2017]. 
25 RTA 1988. 
26 RTA 1934. 
27 See sources as noted in (n 23 and n 19). 
28 These include opinions in cases which are not available on the usual case-law databases such as 
Westlaw. The author has found these decisions through newspaper archives, such as the Manchester 
Guardian, where some commentary was written on decisions.  
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exclusions in the RTA 1988 will be clearer, alongside the historical interpretation of 
these exclusions. 
Moreover, evidence to the Cassel Committee, established at the time, inter alia, to 
address the issue of exclusion clauses, will be uncovered for the first time.29 There 
is no known literature which has examined the evidence submitted to the 
Committee, providing insight as to the rationale behind the RTA 1934’s inclusion 
of certain prohibited exclusion clauses, and the need to price them into risk. Further, 
the interpretation of the list of prohibited exclusions has only been examined briefly 
and sporadically. This thesis will bring together literature, current and historical, to 
interpret these exclusion clauses and further examine whether the list is 
exhaustive.  
This thesis will add to literature from Dr Nicholas Bevan and more recently Marson 
et al,30 which have previously focussed on the relationship between UK and EU 
law, but in a much more broad-brush way. By focussing specifically on the area of 
exclusion clauses, this thesis will provide an in-depth evaluation of the UK’s 
relationship to the EU in relation to exclusion clauses. 
Moreover, this thesis will go further than previous literature regarding the evaluation 
of Ward LJ’s judgment Bristol Alliance v Williams, (henceforth ‘Bristol Alliance’)31 
a case which overlooks the importance of EU law. By evaluating the rationale 
behind Ward LJ’s judgment and unpicking the dictum of Ward LJ, the thesis intends 
to assess exactly where Ward LJ is incorrect.  
The thesis, for the first time, will provide a detailed outlook of other legislation and 
instruments which have some, albeit indirect effect, on exclusion clauses. 
Professor Merkin’s book on Motor Insurance discusses briefly the Consumer 
Insurance (Disclosure and Representation) Act 2012 (henceforth ‘CIDRA’), 
Insurance Act 2015, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (henceforth ‘CRA 2015’), 
and their relation to motor insurance. However, this is of limited depth and before 
                                                          
29 This evidence was gained through the National Archives, the author visited the archives and 
searched through 1000’s of pages of evidence to find relevant material. 
30 Nicholas Bevan (n 19) and James Marson et al, “Motor Vehicle Insurance Law: Ignoring the 
Lessons from King Rex”, (2017) Business Law Review (in print) and James Marson et al ‘. 
Irreconcilable differences? The Road Traffic Act and the European Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives 
(2017) J.B.L., 1, 51-70. 
31 [2012] EWCA Civ 1267. A case that is very significant in exclusion clauses and will be discussed 
throughout this thesis.  
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much of the academic commentary was introduced on the Insurance Act 2015. 
This thesis brings together this commentary, and applies it to exclusion clauses, 
along with the primary sources.  
Whilst these parts of the thesis are clearly original, the thesis altogether is also 
original through the introduction of analysis on the effect of all legislation from the 
EU and UK which would influence exclusion clauses. The question as to the validity 
of exclusion clauses in motor insurance policies has never been sufficiently 
answered, considering UK and EU law including the most recent legislation and 
case law.  
As discussed in relation to methodology, the thesis will also utilise both doctrinal 
and empirical research to uncover the effect of exclusion clause use on a third 
party. This makes this chapter original as an examination of MIB Agreements, 
alongside information gained from the MIB on policy, has not been undertaken 
previously.  
This thesis, in chapters and altogether, presents an original analysis of the validity 
and effect of exclusion clause use against third parties. 
Limitations 
The coverage of this thesis has some limitations. It will not examine exclusion 
clauses in relation to first party claims. First party (also known as ‘comprehensive’32 
or ‘fire and theft’33) policies are not compulsory and are for the insured to protect 
themselves or their property if they are at fault for an accident (the not at fault driver 
is already protected by the at fault driver’s policy). These polices are not regulated 
under the RTA 1988 or EU law, but rather by the principles of contract and 
insurance law.34 Consequently they do not confer the same controversy as third 
                                                          
32 Full coverage of the insured which would be the same as the third party, although this is subject to 
some limitations and first party protection falls outside of the RTA 1988. 
33 Where the insurer will cover the insured for fire and theft damage only, but will pay the third party 
the same as in any third party policy. 
34 Chapter Six will examine the Insurance Act 2015 and the Consumer Rights Act 2015 which are 
aimed primarily at first parties. However, these will be examined in relation to their effect on third party 
claims.  
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party insurance as it is the first party who breaches35 the exclusion clause and 
whom are deemed responsible.  
Whilst it is inevitable that some areas of tort will be discussed, due to the intertwined 
nature of tort and insurance law,36 the thesis is primarily concerned with insurance 
law. When an accident occurs in the UK, liability is first determined. The UK has a 
‘fault’ based system with regards to motor accidents, therefore an insurer is only 
required to pay a claim once liability is determined, and a judgment in relation to 
that liability has been given.37 Of course, the insurer is involved from the beginning, 
despite claims being in the insured’s name, meaning that there is some overlap.38 
However, this will be kept mainly to insurance law rules to provide a more focussed 
discussion. 
Moreover, this thesis is not concerned with the differences between exclusion 
clauses such as whether a term is a warranty, condition precedent, or innominate 
term, and these will fall within the same definition of exclusion clause throughout 
the thesis (unless expressly stated). This is because the two core statutory 
instruments regulating motor insurance, the RTA 1988, and the Sixth 
Consolidated Motor Insurance Directive, (henceforth the ‘Sixth Directive’)39 do 
not distinguish between these.40 
                                                          
35 This thesis uses the word ‘breach’ throughout for consistency reasons. It is evident that not all 
exclusions can be ‘breached’ per se, they may be merely limitations on insurance coverage and not 
exclusions that can be in the technical sense ‘breached’. For example, if a term describes the risk as 
being in relation to ‘social, domestic, and pleasure purposes’ then although there is no exclusion 
clause to breach here (as the policy may not expressly exclude other uses) the use of the vehicle still 
falls outside of the terms of the policy and is nevertheless equivalent to a ‘breach’. The use of ‘breach’ 
in these scenarios ensures that a consistent approach is taken, as the result would still be the same 
even if a term is not technically ‘breached’.  
36 For a greater examination of this, see the leading text, Robert Merkin and Jenny Steele, Insurance 
and the Law of Obligations (Oxford University Press, 2013). Moreover, see Robert Merkin, “Tort, 
Insurance, and Ideology: Further Thoughts”, (2012), M.L.R, 75(3), 301-323. Also see James Davey, 
“A compulsory diet of chickens and eggs: the EU motor insurance directives as a shadow tort regime” 
in Paula Giliker, Research Handbook on EU Tort Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, October 2017). 
37 See Section 151 (1) which requires a “judgment to be obtained”. 
38 See Ibid.  
39 Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 
relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement 
of the obligation to insure against such liability. 
40 Also note that the term ‘exclusion clause’ is often referred to in different ways. For example, Ward 
LJ in the significant Bristol Alliance (n 15) case does not distinguish the terms ‘exclusions’ and 
‘exclusion clauses’. Professor Merkin in ‘The Law of Motor Insurance’ often uses the phrase ‘policy 
terms’ in relation to exclusion clauses. 
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Definition of ‘Victim’ 
For clarity, this thesis will utilise a broad meaning of ‘victim’ throughout, and will 
include those who are not at fault for the accident, and have had damages reduced 
through contributory negligence. It will further include the driver who is not at-fault 
for the accident (if another driver is involved). This is because although the driver 
would have a potential claim under their own insurance (if they have 
‘comprehensive insurance’), and therefore would not remain uncompensated, they 
would usually claim against the at-fault driver’s insurance. Furthermore, the 
definition of victim, also includes those who would not normally be a victim, such 
as a business, or  where an insurer is claiming against another through 
subrogation.41 This follows the judgments in both the High Court42 and Court of 
Appeal43 in the key exclusion clause case of Bristol Alliance. In the High Court, 
Tugendhat J stated:  
“There is nothing to justify a definition of victim which excludes third 
parties who have suffered personal injury or damage to property, but 
who are also insured, and whose insurers exercise their rights of 
subrogation. On the contrary, such a limitation of the definition of 
victim appears to be inconsistent with the principle of subrogation”.44 
   Consequently, the term victim will connote a wide meaning.  
Structure 
The thesis contains six substantive chapters.  
Part I of Chapter Two will examine the background and history behind exclusion 
clauses in motor insurance policies. It will critically examine the controversial 
RTA’s 1930 and 1934 and interpreting case law to understand the laws’ origins 
and development along with policy approaches. Part II of Chapter Two will examine 
early reform discussion in relation to exclusion clauses.  It will examine evidence 
to the Cassel Committee, a Committee which was introduced to reform motor 
                                                          
41 Subrogation occurs where the insurer will pay damages to their own insured, then recover the costs 
from the at fault party or their insurers.  
42 [2011] EWHC 1657 (QB). 
43 Bristol Alliance (n 15). 
44 Ibid, [83]. 
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insurance, as well as the Committee’s recommendations. It will then examine 
academic commentary relating to this report.  
Chapter Three will examine UK law relating to exclusion clauses with emphasis on 
the RTA 1988 and its interpretive case law. The Chapter is divided into three.  First 
to examine the lists of prohibited exclusion clauses within Section 148 and Section 
151 RTA 1988, and subsequent interpretation through case law and textbooks. 
Second to examine whether these are exhaustive of prohibited exclusion clauses. 
Finally, the Chapter will examine which other exclusion clauses are permitted.  
Chapter Four will analyse EU law and its effect on the validity of exclusion clauses. 
It will examine the six Motor Insurance Directives and subsequent decisions from 
the then European Court of Justice (ECJ) and CJEU which have significantly 
shaped the law through wide interpretation of the Directives.  
Chapter Five will examine the UK’s interpretation of EU law through numerous 
conflicting cases. It will examine these conflicts between cases and decisions. 
Moreover, it will look at the potential effect of UK exiting the EU and the effect of 
this on the UK’s implementation. Finally, the Chapter will examine whether the UK 
is open to state liability due to its non-compliance with EU law.  
Chapter Six will look at the effect of other regulation in the UK on exclusion clauses, 
particularly general contract laws on unfair terms, as well as regulation of general 
insurance laws from CIDRA and the Insurance Act 2015. 
Chapter Seven will examine the MIB and the impact on use of exclusion clauses 
for third parties. It will utilise both doctrinal and empirical research to determine 
whether the MIB provides an effective backup. Part I of this Chapter will examine 
the MIB and its role alongside the UDA 2015 and restrictions within it. Part II will 
examine the defence of illegality and whether it can be used by the MIB deny 
claims. Finally, Part III will examine overall whether the MIB provides adequate 
protection, by utilising the previous material along with statistics from the MIB and 
will further examine the future of the MIB.  
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Chapter Two: Early Reform to Exclusion Clauses in Motor 
Insurance 
 
Introduction 
Current regulation of the validity of exclusion clauses against third party road 
accident victims (within the UK) is primarily contained in the RTA 1988, a 
descendent of the original controversial legislation enacted in 1930 and 1934.45  
Most of the changes which have followed between the RTA 1988 and earlier Acts, 
were made primarily to comply with EU law harmonisation.46 Nevertheless, the list 
of exclusion clauses in the RTA 1988 is identical to that contained in the RTA 1934.  
It is therefore important to look behind the legislation to see how the current position 
was formed and the policy behind this.  
This Chapter will provide a background to the thesis, understanding as to how the 
law has evolved, and the policy behind it. It will examine the exclusion clause 
provisions of the previous RTA’s 1930 and 1934 as well as the rationale behind 
them and the criticism that they have faced. The Chapter will moreover examine 
the Cassel Report which proposed reform to the law relating to exclusion clauses, 
and will examine the key debate surrounding the regulation of exclusion clauses.  
Part I: Introduction of Compulsory Insurance 
Pre-1930: Pressure to Legislate 
After the First World War, between 1919 and 1930, the number of motor vehicles 
on the road increased significantly, along with a ‘staggering’ rise in the number of 
road deaths.47 It became the customary practice of vehicle owners to insure 
voluntarily against the risk of injuring other road users, including pedestrians. Risk 
of accidents, at this stage, were high, as licencing for road users was not in force 
and driving standards were low. There was only limited restriction on the use of 
vehicles. Although approximately 99 percent of vehicles on the road were 
                                                          
45 The Road Traffic Acts 1930 and 1934. 
46 This will be discussed throughout Chapters Three and Four.  
47 From 4886 in the year 1926, to 7305 in the year 1930. See Peter Bartrip, “Pedestrians, Motorists 
and No-Fault Compensation for Road Accidents in 1930s Britain” (2010), Journal of Legal History, 31 
(1), pp45-60, 46. 
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voluntarily insured,48 uninsured drivers were often responsible for serious hardship 
caused to injured victims. This is because the drivers responsible for an accident 
were devoid of the means to pay (the so-called ‘man of straw’49) for the hardship 
that they were responsible and liable for. Consequently, a victim would often spend 
significant sums in enforcing their tort law rights in gaining a judgment against the 
driver responsible, which could not be paid, because the driver responsible for the 
accident had limited means. Earl Russell in the House of Lord’s stated:  
“The majority of us have enough common sense to insure our cars 
and ourselves against all eventualities, but some risk the chance in 
order to save their pockets, often knowing full well that they are but 
men of straw and perfectly incapable of being made to pay for any 
damage they may do…innumerable instances are already on 
record”.50  
Although Parliament was coming under increased pressure to introduce greater 
protection for accident victims, there was ambiguity as to the form that this would 
take. The insurance industry was sceptical of the introduction of compulsory motor 
insurance, due to concerns that the impression would be given that victims of road 
accidents would always be compensated regardless of liability or contract.51 They 
argued, therefore, that the introduction of compulsory insurance would erode the 
freedom of contract and insurers’ ability to restrict liability, restricting insurers’ 
limitation of risk and  provision of cost-effective premiums.52 Arguments were made 
by the insurance industry in attempting to doubt the need for compulsory insurance 
in the first place. As stated by W F Todd (in the Charted Insurance Institute):  
                                                          
48 There was difficulty in finding an exact figure as statistics were not available. See Earl Russel’s Bill, 
Motor Vehicles Compulsory Insurance Bill House of Lords Debate, 15 July 1925, Volume 62, CC76-
88, 87. 
49 Ibid, 76. 
50 Ibid. 
51 See some scepticism from the Insurance Industry from W.F. Todd ‘Motor Insurance’ (1926) a paper 
read before the Insurance Institute of Yorkshire. Also in Royal Commission “The Control of Traffic on 
the Roads” Parliamentary Paper, 1929-1930 (Cmd 3365). 
52 Ibid. 
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“Because of these road casualties we have also heard of a demand 
for compulsory third party insurance… (you) may have smacked 
your lips, but I suggest to you that we do not need it”.53  
Against the will of the insurance companies and much of the public,54 a system of 
compulsory insurance was introduced through the RTA 1930 and was later 
amended by the RTA 1934. These Acts have been fiercely criticised by many, 
especially in relation to loopholes which allowed insurance companies to insert 
exclusion clauses into their policies.  
Road Traffic Act 1930 
After a lengthy parliamentary debate,55 a Royal Commission Report,56 and 
numerous proposals,57 compulsory third party motor insurance was introduced in 
Part Two of the RTA 1930, with the aim of removing ‘the intolerable injustice’58 
often faced by third parties due to the absence of compensation. This would be 
achieved by ensuring that nobody other than certain exempted persons could drive 
a motor vehicle on a road, unless they were insured against certain liabilities which 
they may have incurred to a limited class of third parties.59 
The Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 1930 (henceforth ‘TPRAI’) was 
further introduced to protect third parties against the insured’s bankruptcy or 
insurance company’s liquidation. Several cases materialised before 1930 where 
the insolvency of the insured driver meant that there was no route to compensation 
for the victim, as the insurer could use the defence of privity against the third party. 
Consequently, due to the TPRAI 1930, victims were assigned the insured’s rights 
                                                          
53 Ibid. 
54 There were some concerns particularly about the fact that those who have bad driving records may 
not be able to gain insurance, due to being ‘uninsurable’. See Earl Russel’s Bill (n 46). 
55 See for example questions from Morris MP in HC Debates 26 July 1926 volume 198 c1696. 
56 Royal Commission “The Control of Traffic on the Roads” Parliamentary Paper, 1929-1930 (Cmd 
3365). 
57 Proposals were brought through the House of Lords through Earl Russel’s compulsory insurance 
bill see HL Deb 15 July 1925 volume 62 cc76-88. 
58 Minister of Transport (Mr. Herbert Morrison) in the debate during the second reading of the 
Road Traffic Bill on February 18, 1930.  Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 5th Series, 
Volume 235, 1203. 
59 Christopher Shawcross, The Law of Motor Insurance (1st edition, Butterworth Publishing, 1935), 
166. 
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against the insurer to allow them to claim directly. This, therefore, signalled the 
legislature’s intention to protect the accident victim rather than the insured.60 
Road Traffic Act Provisions 
In addition to the above, Section 35 RTA 1930 made it compulsory for any user of 
a motor vehicle on a road61 to obtain insurance, issued by an authorised insurer, 
covering the use of the vehicle.62 This, prima facie, would mean that victims of road 
traffic accidents would be guaranteed compensation, because the insurer would 
compensate for damage and injury caused by the negligent or blameworthy insured 
driver, therefore removing potential hardship to third parties. 
However, it became evident that hardship was not always prevented, as no 
provision was made for compensation in relation to victims of uninsured or untraced 
drivers. Moreover, insurers could continue to repudiate liability in cases of non-
disclosure or misrepresentation by the insured.63 Furthermore, and most 
importantly for this thesis, there was only partial limitation in the RTA 1930, 
regarding insurers’ use of exclusion clauses against third parties.64 The only 
limitation of exclusion clauses came in the form of Section 38 of the Act, which 
stated: 
“Any condition in a policy or security issued or given for the purposes 
of this Part of this Act, providing that no liability shall arise under the 
policy or security or that any liability so arising shall cease, in the 
event of some specified thing being done or omitted to be done after 
the happening of the event giving rise to a claim under the 
policy or security, shall be of no effect”.65 
                                                          
60 Matthew Dyson, Unravelling Tort and Crime (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 31. 
61 Road defined as any highway or other road to which the public has access, including bridges. 
Section 121 RTA 1930. 
62 Definition under Section 36 (3) “"authorised insurer" means an assurance company or an 
underwriter in whose case the requirements of the Assurance Companies Act, 1909, as amended by 
this Act, with respect to deposits by assurance companies and deposits and guarantees by 
underwriters are complied with”. 
63 Non-Disclosure and Misrepresentation were not touched by the RTA 1930 and continued to be 
regulated under the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (Sections 17 and 18). 
64 See Section 36 (5) RTA “A policy shall be of no effect …unless...there is…delivered by the 
insurer…a certificate…in the prescribed form and containing such particulars of any conditions 
subject to which the policy is issued”. 
65 emphasis added. 
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This Section limited the insurers’ reliance on exclusion clauses relating to third 
parties66 where the insured did or omitted to do something after the accident had 
occurred. An example of a prevalent clause utilised consistently by insurers pre-
1930, which was later prohibited by Section 38, is the ‘notice clause’, requiring the 
insured to give notice to the insurer or guarantor, within a specified time limit. As 
stated by Greer J, obiter, in Re McCormick:67 
“Section 38 means this: If there are any provisions in the policy that 
there shall be no liability on the insurance company if notice is not 
given by the insured within, say, a week or ten days-whatever the 
period may be…that although it may be a good answer to a claim 
by the insured, it is not to be an answer to a claim made by a 
third party against an insurance company”..68  
Hence, Section 38 did not prohibit the use of clauses by the insurer in relation to 
the insured, but stated that exclusion clauses shall be of no effect in relation to 
claims made by third parties, consequently retaining freedom of contract in relation 
to the insured. 
It is notable that although Section 38 was predominantly aimed at removing the 
reliance on notice clauses against third parties, it extended to instances with the 
insured admitting liability without the insurers’ permission. An example of this can 
be seen in the pre-1930 case of Tustin v Arnold,69 where the insured admitted 
liability for the accident despite a clause in the policy restricting the insured from 
doing this.  
Further restrictions included where the insured refused to allow the insurer to have 
control of any court proceedings. Moreover, as stated by Dodson, other instances 
encompassed where the insured might have done something which prejudiced the 
interests of the insurers, or failed to secure evidence which might have helped a 
                                                          
66 The provision does not affect claims by the insured and therefore these clauses can still be utilised 
in policies. 
67 [1934] 49 Ll L Rep 361. 
68 Ibid emphasis added. Cases in which a clause requiring notice was utilised by an insurer pre-1930 
include Verelst's Administratrix v Motor Union Insurance Co Ltd [1925] 2 K.B. 137 where the insurer 
repudiated liability because notice was not given ‘as soon as possible’ after the accident. Also see 
Revel v London General Insurance Co (1934) 50 Ll. L. Rep. 114 where Section 38 allowed the third 
party to avoid a clause because action was not taken 3 months after the accident.  
69 (1915) 31 T.L.R. 368. 
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jury or judge in the case of a trial.70 Section 38 therefore removed the unjust 
situation of third party non-compensation where risk was unaffected, and was more 
of a way of escaping the obligation to pay claims.  
It is arguable that by not restricting the insured post-accident, it would potentially 
prejudice the insurer when making investigations and throughout the claims 
process, especially if liability was admitted or if the insured refused to give 
evidence. Unlike exclusion clauses relating to the accident itself or pre-accident 
disclosure, it is unlikely that insurers would have priced the risk of post-accident 
compliance failure into their premiums. Any pricing of these post-accident ‘risks’ 
would have minimal impact, and therefore their prohibition was an easy target for 
the legislature.  
However, despite numerous instances caught by Section 38, profound limitations 
of the RTA 1930 soon became apparent due to complaints from third parties. To 
protect themselves from unscrupulous drivers, insurers created a system of 
different types of policies depending on the material risks involved.71 This meant 
that there were substantially different rates of premium depending on the type of 
vehicle insured, the use to which it was put, the number of insured drivers, and 
drivers’ previous records.72 This provided more affordable insurance, allowing 
drivers with limited means to obtain an insurance policy and cater it to their needs.  
Insurers found it essential that if premiums were to be kept to a minimum, so as 
not to discourage the ‘man of straw’73 from driving uninsured, the risk insured 
against was required to be fully understood by the driver, and the vehicle should 
be utilised in a way which was stated in the proposal form.74 Consequently, 
stringent conditions were imposed on the insured. Accordingly, it was inevitable 
that insurers would utilise exclusion clauses and conditions when breached, 
allowing the legal evasion of liability by insurers under the policy, leaving the injured 
                                                          
70 Robert Pentland Mahaffy, Mahaffy and Dodson’s Road Traffic Acts and Orders (2nd Edition, 
Butterworth & Co, 1936). 
71 See the nine types of policy set out in Christopher Shawcross, The Law of Motor Insurance (2nd 
Edition Butterworth & Co, London, 1947), 271.at lxxxiv. 
72 Ibid. 
73 See the discussion earlier in this Chapter relating to the ‘man of straw’ at page 34. 
74 Shawcross (n 74).  
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third party with nowhere to claim compensation. Law-makers evidently failed to 
appreciate this when introducing legislation as can be seen below.75 
In Bright v Ashfold (henceforth ‘Bright’),76 the insurer repudiated liability against 
a third party because a condition in the policy was broken by the insured which 
excluded the use of a motorbike without a side-car being attached. The third party 
contended that this would fall within the Section 38 prohibition, which, they argued, 
did not solely preclude exclusion clauses in relation to actions that occur after the 
event.77 Lord Hewart C.J. stated that the case was ‘too clear for argument’,78 as 
the exclusion clause fell outside of Section 38. Likewise, in Gray v Blackmore 
(henceforth ‘Gray’),79 an exclusion clause inserted into the policy excluding 
coverage for use other than for ‘private purposes’, was deemed to fall outside of 
Section 38. This was despite claimant’s contentions that Section 38 should be 
reinterpreted to include all exclusion clauses. Branson J stated, having concluded 
the vehicle was not being used for the purpose that was permitted under the policy: 
 “there is nothing in the Road Traffic Act which enables the insured, 
the plaintiff to say, ‘Notwithstanding that I was using this car in the 
way in which the policy says, not that I was not to use it, but that I 
could not use it and retain my cover, you are still liable to pay me 
under the policy’”.80 
Although it was clear that the introduction of compulsory insurance in the RTA 1930 
was as a step forward in the protection of third parties,81 the gaps in protection 
made clear in both Bright82 and Gray83 were criticised by authors and academics. 
Sebag Cohen stated in the Law Times (now the New Law Journal) that, ‘there is 
                                                          
75 Ibid. 
76 [1932] 2 K.B. 153.  
77 A similar argument was made and dismissed in Greenlees v Port of Manchester Co 1933 S.C. 383, 
where Lord Moncrieff stated at 390  :” I read that section, which excludes in a question with third 
parties injured a defence by the insurers founded on conditions in the policy limiting their liability in 
respect of what may shortly be described as “subsequent” acts or omissions, as by inference affirming 
the validity of such limiting conditions in so far as these are made dependent upon “antecedent” 
events. A false statement by the applicant for a policy before the policy is granted is of course an 
antecedent and not a subsequent event, and as such is not within the limiting operation of the 
subsection”.  
78 Bright (n 79), 158. 
79 [1934] 1 K.B. 95. 
80 Ibid, 108. 
81 Shawcross (n 74), 164. 
82 Bright (n 79). 
83 Gray (n 82). 
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little doubt that Parliament cannot have appreciated the full effect of the limitations 
placed on Sect 38’.84 Cohen suggested that there were a variety of defences 
available to insurers, and even a seriously injured third party through the negligent 
actions of the driver, ‘might well be unable to obtain any damages whatever’.85 
Furthermore, Cohen noted that there was only limited consultation from Parliament 
on the use of exclusion clauses, therefore rushing legislation without prior thought 
to the consequences of permitting insurers to repudiate claims to third parties. 
Finally, Cohen was concerned that many claimants would continue to suffer 
hardship resulting from these exclusion clauses, clearly contrary to the intentions 
of the Act.  
The courts were also very critical of the RTA 1930. For example, Goddard J in 
Zurich General Accident & Liability Insurance Co Ltd v Morrison86 (henceforth 
‘Zurich v Morrison’) stated:  
“The Road Traffic Act, 1934, was passed to remedy a state of affairs 
that became apparent soon after the principle of compulsory 
insurance against third party risks had been established. That Act 
and the Third Parties' (Rights against Insurers) Act, passed in the 
same year, would naturally have led the public, at least those who 
were neither lawyers nor connected with the business of insurance, 
to believe that if…through no fault of their own, injured or killed by a 
motor car they or their dependants would be certain of recovering 
damages, even though the wrong-doer was an impecunious person. 
How wrong they were quickly appeared. Insurance was left in the 
hands of companies and underwriters who could impose what terms 
and conditions they chose. Nor was there any standard form of 
policy, and any…insurer could hedge round the policies with so 
many warranties and conditions that no one advising an injured 
person could say with any certainty whether, if damages were 
                                                          
84 Sebag Cohen, “Defects in the law relating to insurance against third party risks for motor vehicles” 
(1934) Paper Presented to The Law Society Annual Provincial Meeting, entered in the Law Times, 
Volume 231, 237. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Zurich General Accident & Liability Insurance Co Ltd v Morrison [1942] 2 K.B. 53. 
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recovered against the driver of the car, there was a prospect of 
recovering against the insurers”.87 
Goddard J was clearly frustrated that insurers were exploiting the limitations of 
Section 38. Furthermore, policies were complex due to different coverage, making 
it difficult for third parties to know their position. As mentioned previously on page 
23, the insurance industry introduced different types of policy depending on the 
insured’s requirements, thereby essentially allowing the insured to cater the policy 
to their needs, whilst ensuring lower premiums. This, therefore, meant that there 
were no standard forms of policy and even similar types of policy contained 
different exclusion clauses to cater to the individual. It is submitted that this 
highlights the difficulty in balancing the interest of the consumer, to have lower 
premiums and being able to cater their policy to their needs, and the interest of the 
third party by providing clarity and compensation.  
Goddard J further illustrates the difficulty of public perception with regards to 
compensation, and follows the warnings by Lloyds’ of London, in consultation for 
the RTA 1930, that the public, ‘would get the idea’ that they would always be able 
to recover from the driver.88 
Moreover, to expand the previous point relating to clauses in similar types of policy, 
it was clear that these exclusion clauses were going too far, and were often 
exploited by the insurance industry. For example, some insurers inserted 
discriminatory clauses randomly in policies restricting use by, ‘Jews and 
foreigners’,89 increasing the potential for insurers to repudiate liability. This follows 
the dictum of Lord Moulton in Joel v. Law Union & Crown Insurance Co,90 a pre-
1930 case concerning non-disclosure in fire policies which was cited by Goddard J 
in Zurich v Morrison,91 as being relevant to policy terms:   
                                                          
87 Ibid, [61]. 
88 Lloyds of London evidence to Royal Commission on Transport for “Control of Traffic on the Roads” 
(1929) (Cmd 3365): Minutes of Evidence: 278. 
89 Richards v Port of Manchester(1934) 50 Ll. L. Rep. 132 
90 [1908] 2 K.B. 863. 
91 Zurich (n 89). 
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“I am satisfied that few of those who insure have any idea how 
completely they leave themselves in the hands of the insurers 
should the latter wish to dispute the policy when it falls in”.92                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Hence, the failure of the RTA 1930 to substantially restrict exclusion clauses 
sustained a very one-sided situation, whereby insurers could easily repudiate 
liability against third party claimants, despite the third party not being a party to the 
contract. Shawcross further argued that Section 38 had little or no effect on the 
construction of policies, as they continued in the same form, and with exclusion 
clauses which had become customary.93 Shawcross claimed, therefore, that 
policies had complied with the RTA 1930 on one hand, but on the other it had 
manifestly defeated the object of it.94 
It is submitted that the Act sought to limit insurers’ liability to appease any concerns 
within the insurance industry. It was clear in the Royal Commission’s consultation 
that insurers were sceptical of the introduction of compulsory insurance despite the 
expanded and compulsory nature of the market that it gave them. There was a 
belief that it would begin to erode insurers’ freedom of contract and would force 
them to insure less desirable drivers, with little protection if an exclusion clause was 
breached. Thus, the legislature allowed the industry almost complete contractual 
freedom,95 allowing a means of escape from policies, although without proper 
comprehension of the effect that it would have on the third party victim.  
It is evident overall that the aim of the RTA 1930 to remove, ‘the intolerable 
injustice’96 towards third parties had failed.97 Parliament was under pressure to 
reform this inadequate situation and consulted widely to find a solution through the 
introduction more legislation.  
                                                          
92 Joel (n 93), 884. 
93 Shawcross (n 74), 271 
94 Ibid. 
95 JS Steer, ‘The Romance of Accident Insurance’, (1939) Chartered Insurance Institute Journal, 
Volume 42, 277. 
96 Minister of Transport (Mr. Herbert Morrison) in the debate during the second reading of the 
Road Traffic Bill on February 18, 1930. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 5th Series, 
Volume 235, 1203. 
97 Hughes argued that there was no doubt that the 1930 Act had failed to achieve its object, see 
Hector Hughes, Road Users Rights, Liabilities, and Insurance, (Sweet and Maxwell, 1938), 143. 
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The Road Traffic Act 1934 
The RTA 1934 approached the issue of compulsory insurance from another angle, 
by not enlarging the statutory duty of compulsory insurance, but rather by endowing 
third parties with greater rights against insurance companies.98 The Act attempted 
to enhance the rights of innocent victims in two ways. First by providing  insurers 
with a duty to satisfy judgments against third parties under Section 10.99 This duty 
allowed the third party to directly sue the insurer for any damages, even where the 
insured was solvent. Further, the insurer was obliged to satisfy the judgment if a 
certificate was delivered and the claim fell within the terms of the policy.100 The 
second reform of third party rights was the direct prohibition of certain exclusion 
clauses, alongside post-accident clauses already prohibited under Section 38.101 
Section 12 RTA 1934 listed certain exclusion clauses which were prohibited 
against third parties, these were: 
“ 
(a) the age, physical or mental condition of the persons driving the 
vehicle; or 
(b) the condition of the vehicle; or  
(c) the number of persons that the vehicle carries; or  
(d) the weight or physical characteristics of the goods that the vehicle 
carries; or  
(e) the times at which or the areas within which the vehicle is used; or 
(f) the horsepower or the value of the vehicle; or  
(g) the carrying on the vehicle of any particular apparatus; or  
                                                          
98 Ibid, 136. 
99 Subject to Section 10 (3) RTA 1934 which permitted the insurer to seek a Court declaration that it 
could avoid the policy due to misrepresentation or non-disclosure. 
100 This is where some cases involving exclusion clauses have fallen down as the insurer argues that 
the claim was outside the terms of the policy. See later discussion in the next Chapter and the case of 
Bristol Alliance Partnership v Williams (n 15). 
101 RTA 1930. Again, this was in relation to clauses being used against third parties, there was 
nothing in Section 38 to prevent the insurer from relying on exclusion against the driver.  
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(h) the carrying on the vehicle of any particular means of identification 
other than any means of identification required to be carried by or 
under the Roads Act 1920”   
To allow some recompense for the insurer if one of these terms was breached, the 
insurer could recover from the insured (under Section 12) any payment it made to 
the victim. This, however, was not always straightforward, as the insured was often 
financially unable to meet any claim. Some uncertainty exists surrounding why 
these specific clauses were prohibited, and other potentially more prohibitive 
exclusion clauses were omitted. Discussions prior to the Act shows great anxiety 
amongst senior politicians and ministers surrounding insurers’ continued reliance 
on certain exclusion clauses.  
For example, a recently released Cabinet document emphasised concern from the 
Minister of Transport in 1934, in relation to clauses which allowed the insurer to 
repudiate liability in cases of unroadworthy or poorly maintained vehicles. The 
Minster in the Cabinet Document stated:  
“Most motor policies contain a condition to the effect that the 
company shall not be liable if the motor vehicle is driven in an unsafe 
or damaged condition i.e. if the vehicle has not been properly 
maintained and is not roadworthy. Cases of repudiation have been 
brought to my notice where defective maintenance has been put 
forward as a reason of repudiation though the particular defect 
in maintenance may have no bearing on the accident”.102 
The Minister was predominantly concerned with cases whereby the insurer was 
attempting to escape the policy utilising the roadworthiness exclusion clause 
against third parties, despite roadworthiness not being the overall cause or even 
contributing to the accident.  
An example of a roadworthiness exclusion clause being used in this instance can 
be seen in the pre-1930 case Jones and James v Provincial Insurance 
Company,103 where the insurer repudiated liability for damages due to breach of 
                                                          
102 Cabinet Document “Memorandum by the Minister of Transport” The National Archives Catalogue 
Ref CAB/24/247 CP4.34, 1934, 2. emphasis added. 
103 (1929) 35 Ll. L. Rep. 135. 
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an ‘efficient vehicle condition’ exclusion. However, the cause of the accident was 
thought to be due to incompetence of the driver rather than an ineffective footbrake, 
as the vehicle’s handbrake was working effectively enough to stop the vehicle. The 
Court held that the insurers were not liable to compensate the third party because, 
‘the greatest possible disasters would follow if people should think they might driver 
motor cars without brakes and were protected…by insurers’.104 The Court therefore 
permitted the clause to be used as a deterrent against the use of unroadworthy 
vehicles. This, however, is controversial because unless the driver of the vehicle 
can afford to pay damages to the third party victim, the victim would be left without 
compensation, despite not being responsible for the unroadworthy state of the 
vehicle. There is little deterrence in allowing roadworthiness exclusion clauses 
against third parties, unless they are passengers. This therefore signifies that in 
cases where the breach of exclusion clause was not the cause of the accident, the 
Courts were willing to permit the clause to be used . As this was a situation clearly 
needing to be addressed, exclusion clauses relating to ‘condition of the vehicle’ 
were prohibited under Section 12 (b) RTA 1934. 
In relation to the other clauses prohibited by Section 12, Shawcross stated that 
Section 12 was drafted, ‘with one eye continually looking at a motor 
policy…containing the terms and conditions commonly used by insurers in 
1934’.105 This corresponds with the evidence to the Cassel Committee, which 
stated that these were conditions most successfully pleaded by insurers in 
practice.106 It is further evident that Section 12 was drafted by examining previous 
case law also. For example, in Bright v Ashfold,107 involving breach of an 
exclusion clause because of an attached trailer. Similarly, cases involving 
roadworthiness,108 and cases including Farr v Mutual Motor Traders’ Mutual 
Insurance Society,109 involving times where the vehicle can be used. 
                                                          
104 Ibid. 
105 Shawcross (n 74), 277.   
106 This will be discussed later in this Chapter. Moreover, see Board of Trade “Report of the 
Committee on Compulsory Insurance” (1937) Cmd. 5528, 51. 
107 Bright (n 79). 
108 Crossley v Road Transport and General Insurance Co (1925) Ll.L.R.219. 
109 Farr v Mutual Motor Traders’ Mutual Insurance Society [1920] 3 K.B. 669. 
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The decision, however, to include only some prohibited exclusions, seemingly 
connotes that any other exclusion clauses are valid.110 This rather limited approach 
was immediately criticised by many. For example, Cohen argued that although the 
introduction of a partial prohibition of exclusion clauses: ‘goes a considerable way 
towards remedying the main defects that existed under the 1930 Act as regards 
third parties’ ,111 it is a pity: 
 “the legislature…did not decide on a policy of “all in” insurance 
(and)...having gone so far, Parliament should have had the courage 
to go further and give adequate protection to innocent third 
parties”.112 
Cohen noted that numerous restrictions continued which were utilised to defeat 
third party claims, and suggested that Parliament did not have the resolution to 
stand up to the insurance industry and powerful motoring lobbies. Comparably, 
O’Brien stated that the gaps in the RTA 1930 will therefore not, ‘guarantee 
whatever that a person who is seriously and permanently disabled owing to the 
negligence of a driver…will, in fact, receive any compensation whatsoever’.113 
Some appellate judges also decided to speak out about the failure of the RTA 1934. 
For example, Judge McCleary stated that insurers should not be permitted to 
repudiate liability against an innocent third party, when the breach of an exclusion 
clause was beyond the third parties’ control. Judge McCleary stated:  
“It not infrequently happens that a third party who has been seriously 
injured as a result of an accident…is left the judgment of 
a…considerable sum which is not worth the cost of the paper it is 
written on, this is not a fanciful picture….It should be made 
impossible for any insurance company to repudiate liability by 
reason of any matter which is between them and their insured 
driver in which the third party has no control…There can be no 
doubt that as the law stands at present , it does not provide that 
                                                          
110 This will be examined in greater depth in the next Chapter. 
111 Sebag Cohen (n 87), 237. 
112 Ibid. 
113 O’Brien B, “The Road Traffic Acts, 1930-1934” (1934) The Law Society Annual Provincial Meeting, 
The Law Times, Volume 178, 232. 
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protection to injured third parties which was intended by the RTA…It 
should be settled by Parliamentary counsel that no 
company…should be allowed to pleas any defence affecting a claim 
by an innocent third party”.114 
The issue of control is important and will be examined in greater depth later in this 
Chapter.115 However, this is a theme with criticism of exclusion clause use, third 
parties were being penalised for something outside of their control. It is submitted 
that this is comparable to a lottery, not unlike the situation pre-1930, where it was 
down to chance as to whether the victim was hit by a person driving within their 
policy and would therefore gain compensation. This emphasises a clear absence 
of control for the victim.  
Moreover, many cases were difficult for judges due to the lengths insurers were 
willing to go to avoid payment to third parties. For example, in Richards116 an 
exclusion clause was successfully utilised which prohibited the use of the vehicle 
by: ‘Jews, Air Force Officers, actors, actresses, Turf commission agents, 
undergraduates or foreigners’. The High Court accepted that these exclusion 
clauses were valid under the Act, because they were not expressly prohibited under 
Section 12. Consequently, the insurer only needed to prove that the driver was in 
fact Jewish to avoid the claim against the third party, although failed to do so in this 
case. Another unreported case, albeit criminal prosecution case, went before the 
Manchester Magistrates Court  due to the use of a vehicle without insurance as a 
result of exclusion clause breach . The clause excluded, ‘Jews, foreigners, music-
hall artists, theatrical agents, and bookmakers’.117 Like Richards, the user of the 
vehicle was purported to be Jewish and these terms were deemed to be outside 
the limits of Section 12. Finally, in Carlton v R&J Park Ltd,118 the insured failed 
to disclose that he was a Romanian subject. The case was decided on other 
                                                          
114__ “Insurance of Motorists: Third party claims that are not met, a judge’s suggestions”, Manchester 
Guardian, April 3, 1935. emphasis added 
115 Page 52. 
116 Richards (n 92). 
117 “Car Insurance and Jews: “Hitlerism Comment’”, Manchester Guardian, September 14, 1934, 12. 
118 (1922), 10, LL. L. R. 818. This was found in Shawcross (n 74), 431. Although this may well be a 
case concerning non-disclosure rather than an express exclusion, it highlights that insurers were 
willing to go to lengths to refuse claims based on nationality.  
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grounds, but Sankey J (as he then was) stated that this should have been 
disclosed.  
Unusual and discriminatory terms aside, many terms which were more regularly 
used by insurers were also beyond the limits of Section 12. For example, the most 
commonly used exclusion clauses limiting driving to ‘social domestic and pleasure 
purposes’ or to ‘business use’ did not fall within Section 12. Cases continued to go 
through the Courts whereby a limitation was used involving ‘social, domestic and 
pleasure’ and were deemed valid against third parties.119 Of course, it was argued 
below, in the Cassel Committee’s consultation discussions,120 that these exclusion 
clauses are vital for rating purposes.  
Another major criticism of the RTA 1934 and Section 12 was the assumption  that 
motor insurance policies and standard terms would not change over time. 
Consequently, these commonly used exclusion clauses listed in the Act would 
eventually become obsolete,121 as insurers update their policies and rely on 
different clauses and find different ways to repudiate liability. Consequently, to be 
effective against new commonly used policy terms, the Act would need to be 
regularly updated. 
The above cases show that the RTA 1934 permitted many forms of exclusion 
clause to be utilised against third parties, often leaving victims of road accidents 
without compensation. As stated by Shawcross, it is: 
 “Impossible to avoid the feeling that the framers of the Act never 
intended to permit these gaping holes in the system of compulsory 
insurance. Nevertheless the language in the Act permitted them, and 
it was inevitable that insurers should take advantage of them”.122 
It is difficult to understand the intention of the legislature when creating the RTAs 
without examining documents of meetings, and only one Cabinet Document is 
available (as noted above). However, it seems from the House of Commons 
                                                          
119 See Bonham v Zurich General Accident & Liability Insurance Co Ltd [1945] K.B. 292. It is also 
important to note that SDP purposes continue to cause confusion which will be examined in the next 
Chapter. 
120 Page 51. 
121 Shawcross (n 74), 277. 
122 Ibid. 
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statement made by Minister of Transport, that the RTA 1934 was never going to fill 
all the gaps which were left from the RTA 1930 that its aim was to enhance victims’ 
protection to a certain extent by removing certain exclusion clauses.123 Moreover, 
comparable to the RTA 1930, it is evident that the legislature was wary of 
controversy within the insurance industry about the potential infringement of their 
right to freedom of contract. Further, from policy holders and powerful motoring 
organisations who represented them,124 due to the potential for vast premium 
increases (as seen in the BIA evidence on pages 51-55). 
An example of the government’s wariness of powerful motoring organisations can 
be found in their handling of the Road Trafﬁc (Compensation for Accidents) Bill 
1932 (henceforth ‘RTCAB’). Lord Danesford introduced the Bill in the House of 
Lords, proposing the introduction of a system no-fault liability on UK roads, 
reverting from the system of fault based liability. This would have signified a 
guarantee of compensation for those involved in road traffic accidents, regardless 
of fault. The Government had originally ‘shown sympathy’125 to the objectives of 
the Bill. Furthermore, a Select Committee, established to scrutinise this area, 
supported the Bill, finding that it would not have a substantial effect on motorists, 
as the cost would be shared amongst all drivers through their insurance 
premiums.126 However, motoring organisations including the Automobile 
Association (henceforth ‘AA’) were against the Bill, and stated that it was, ‘very tired 
of legislation against the motorist; we have had our ﬁll of it you know’.127 This 
statement from the AA clearly related to the introduction of the RTA 1930, forcing 
motorists to insure their vehicles. After significant critique from groups, the 
Government later backtracked and refused to support the Bill. Bartrip stated that 
the rationale behind this was that:  
                                                          
123 Stanley stated: “there have been disclosed certain gaps which can be remedied within the 
framework of the existing schemes, and hon. Members will find in I some attempt to do so emphasis 
added” see House of Common’s Debate, 10 April 1934, Volume l, 288 cc167-294 ,177. 
124 See Daily Mail article which stated that a new RTA would be enough to “stir them (motoring 
organisations) into cyclonic activity” Sir Malcolm Campbell “Motoring Organisations Must Defend 
Themselves Against the Traffic Act”, Daily Mail Friday, September 14, 1934; page 4; Issue 11978. 
125 See PW Bartrip (n 48), 55.  
126 Ibid, 56.  
127 Select Committee on the Road Trafﬁc (Compensation for Accidents) Bill: Minutes of Evidence, 
London, 1933, 35–45; Cited in Ibid, 56.  
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“Most motorists were income tax and rate payers; many belonged 
either to the AA, whose membership passed half a million in August 
1933, or RAC. On these grounds government needed to treat them 
with ‘great delicacy’ rather than brand them pariahs or subject them 
to excessive regulation”.128 
It is evident, therefore, that a very cautious approach was taken by the Government 
in both the RTCAB and the RTAs due to lobbying from significantly populated 
motoring organisations concerned about premiums and excessive regulation. The 
Government attempted to balance competing pressures, between ensuring victims 
were compensated, whilst ensuring that premiums were kept low.  
Furthermore, in addition to motoring organisations, motor insurance was still 
relatively new, and the requirement of compulsory insurance was unheard of, 
therefore undoubtedly increasing caution amongst the insurance industry. Overall, 
it was clear that more reform was needed and the Cassel Committee was 
established precisely to examine and propose reform of the area of compulsory 
insurance. With the protection of third parties at the core of this, part of this 
Committee’s consultation was focused on the balance between third party rights 
and lower premiums.  
Part II: Proposed Reform to Exclusion Clauses 
Cassel Committee Evidence 
Part II of this Chapter will examine the Cassel Committee evidence and subsequent 
recommendations relating to exclusion clauses. The evidence is informative in 
respect of the rationale behind insurer’s use of exclusion clauses, and why certain 
clauses are permitted under the RTA 1934.129  Moreover, the report was significant 
due to its recommendations, and is often cited in recent key case law.130 
On 6th February 1936 the Cassel Committee, under the leadership of Sir Felix 
Cassel K.C, and consisting of representatives from insurance companies and 
                                                          
128 Ibid, 58-59.  
129 RTAs 1934 and 1988. 
130 See for example by Ward LJ in Bristol Alliance (n 15). 
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Lloyds’ of London, was appointed by the Board of Trade, a Committee of the Privy 
Council, to:  
 “consider and report whether any, and if so what, changes in the 
existing law relating to the carrying on of the business of insurance 
are desirable in the light of statutory provisions relating to 
compulsory insurance against third party risks”.131 
The Committee was formed to address significant hardship which had fallen upon 
many victims of road traffic accidents, arising from the failure of the previous Acts 
in ensuring that insurers were meeting their commitments to third parties. This was 
either because of insurer insolvency or the insertion of exclusion clauses within 
policies. 
The Committee sought evidence from organisations including the Minister of 
Transport, the British Insurance Association (henceforth ‘BIA’), and the 
Pedestrians’ Association. In addition, the Committee heard oral evidence and 
questioned consultees. A sub-committee was set up, led by Sir Felix Cassel K.C to 
examine, ‘defences by insurers and failure to insure’.132 
The BIA submitted lengthy memoranda in which they examined the issue of 
exclusion clauses and further justified the use of certain exclusion clauses against 
innocent third parties.133 The BIA were predominantly sceptical about the possibility 
of an overall prohibition of exclusion clauses, and feared that the whole insurance 
rating system would be undermined if these clauses could not be utilised. 
Furthermore, that it would be impossible to rate risks equitably in the interests of 
the public.134 To reinforce this point, the BIA examined and justified the use of 
common exclusions. Their examination was divided into two. First, conditions and 
exclusion clauses referring to the person driving the vehicle, and second, in relation 
to the use to which the vehicle is put.  
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Regarding the person driving the vehicle, the BIA found five clauses, if prohibited, 
would cause an overall negative effect on the insurance industry, the driver (usually 
limited to the policyholder), or the public.135 First, they argued that clauses 
restricting driving to one named person (i.e. the insured, chauffeur, or other person) 
were crucial due to a substantial premium discount as a result of lowering risk.136 
Consequently, the BIA argued, that there would be, ‘great dissatisfaction’137 
amongst drivers if these were prohibited. Second, in relation to clauses restricting 
driving to individuals with permission of the insured, the BIA stated that although 
these have limited restrictive effect, they are nevertheless important due to 
providing a , ‘real safeguard to the insurer’, particularly in cases in which the vehicle 
has been stolen.138 Third, the BIA attached significant importance to clauses which 
restricted driving to the insured or their employee. The BIA stated that these 
exclusion clauses are customarily found in many Commercial Vehicle Policies 
especially when the vehicle may be hired. The BIA argued that if this clause was 
prohibited, then the policy holder would have no control over, and further that the 
insurer would have no knowledge of, the sort of person that may drive the vehicle. 
Thus, the BIA argued, that special terms including this are needed to prevent 
certain ‘undesirable persons’ from driving.139 
The fourth exclusion clause was in relation to excluding an individual named 
person, the BIA argued that this prevents drivers whose accident or conviction 
record clearly shows them to be a bad driver. Consequently, they stated that this 
exclusion clause is more about ensuring road safety and protecting the public 
rather than providing the insurer with an escape route,140 they further argued that 
there might be cases where the insurers would decline to grant insurance which 
could be dealt with better by permitting them to exclude a named person.141  
Finally, the BIA examined clauses which limit the driving to licensed persons. They 
argued that although clauses of this type might not be deemed important to 
insurers, their prohibition would result in an increase in driving by unlicensed 
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persons, and even those prohibited from holding a licence by the Court due to 
intoxication or dangerous driving.142 Consequently, the BIA argued, the number of 
road accidents would almost certainly increase without the use of these exclusion 
clauses.143 
Accordingly, the above exclusion clauses seem to have two rationales. First, in the 
protection of the public by preventing and deterring certain undesirable or 
dangerous people from driving, whilst protecting the interests of the insurer by 
reducing the potential risk of an accident. Second, by permitting the driver of the 
vehicle to have a substantially lower premium by, substantially lowering the risk to 
the insurer and therefore the premium that they would charge. The first rationale is 
particularly difficult, as the third party (unless a passenger), will have little 
knowledge in terms of those driving the vehicle. Of course, in cases where the 
insured has the means to pay third parties independent of insurance, exclusions 
would provide a deterrent, as the insured would compensate instead of the insurer. 
However, where the insured has no means to pay, there would be little deterrence 
in excluding third parties.  
In relation to exclusion clauses involving uses to which the vehicle is put, the BIA 
divided the issue depending on whether the vehicle was: a private car, a goods 
vehicle, a public service vehicle, or a motor trade vehicle. The BIA stated that 
policies involving private cars are commonly either restricted to use for, ‘social 
domestic or pleasure purposes’ or for ‘business use’ only, and144 if these 
restrictions were to be removed then it would, on average, add 50 percent to 
premiums.145 Moreover, if the use for hire was included then premiums would 
almost certainly double.146 They therefore contended, from the wide variations in 
premiums, that those who insure their vehicle for limited purposes would feel 
prejudiced if they were grouped for rating purposes with drivers whose premiums 
are usually greater.147   
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The BIA therefore argued that clauses defining the use and potential users were 
clearly important to drivers as well as the insurance industry, due to the potential 
of having a significant adjustment of premiums, as well as providing some 
protection for the insurer. They stated that clauses are undoubtedly fully observed 
and voluntarily accepted by the insured, therefore, by removing these clauses there 
would be a ‘genuine grievance’ within the driver community.148 There was, 
however, a noticeable omission in the BIA’s memoranda in relation to the potential 
hardship of the third party by use of these exclusion clauses, whether the insured 
accepts the use of these clauses is less important than the protection offered to the 
third party victim, who will not be compensated if an exclusion clause was used 
against them. Of course, it would be expected that this evidence would carry a 
significant amount of bias as this was an organisation representing the interests of 
insurers, rather than the victims of a road traffic accident.  
The BIA suggested, however, that there were possible ways in which the position 
could be improved to ensure that victims, in the majority of circumstances, were 
compensated. They proposed that Section 12 should be amended to permit only 
specified restrictions rather than referring to prohibited exclusion clauses.149 These 
specified restrictions, the BIA argued, should be determined after a consultation 
between vehicle users, insurers, and the public.150 
The Ministry of Transport (henceforth ‘MoT’) also submitted lengthy memoranda in 
relation to exclusion clauses. They gave a list of 27 cases of the most common 
complaints the Ministry received,151 because the vehicle was used outside the 
terms of the policy. These included several cases where the vehicle was unfit for 
use (such as where the tyres or brakes were defective or in a poor condition). 
Moreover, cases where the purpose of travel was not within terms of the policy 
(such as where the vehicle was used for pleasure but was only insured for business 
purposes or vice versa). Furthermore, cases where the vehicle should not carry a 
pillion passenger or passenger under a certain age, and finally, cases where the 
driver of the vehicle had no licence. There was also a clause relating to a driver 
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who had ‘entered an insane asylum’.152 The MoT stated that the list is by no means 
exhaustive of the provisions that have been used by the insurer. They stated, 
however, that, ‘For the most part, these cases would be ruled out of Section 12 of 
the (Road Traffic) Act 1934’.153 In fact, it was agreed in the consultation that less 
than half (13) of the cases in the evidence would be ruled out by Section 12. The 
majority of these related to the carrying of a passenger (prohibited by Section 12 
(c)), the vehicle’s condition, (Section 12 (b)) and the age and mental condition of 
the driver (Section 12 (a)).  
Moreover, in their memorandum, the MoT defended the decision to only list certain 
prohibited exclusion clauses in the RTA 1934 and stated beliefs that compensation 
should not be guaranteed, the MoT stated: 
“The scheme of protection for third parties embodied in the Road 
Traffic Acts was not put forward with the idea that it would secure 
compensation to third parties in every case”.154 
This can be supported by the preparatory documents to the original RTA 1930, as 
well as the MoT statement in the House of Commons.155 In preparation for the RTA 
1930, the MoT recognised that there would be a, ‘minority of cases which would 
not be covered (by insurance)’,156 such as those where the insurer can rely on 
certain exclusion clauses. 
In relation to criticism that insurers often had the propensity to deny claims unfairly, 
the MoT defended the insurance industry, by stating that it is ‘invariable practice’ 
for insurers to negotiate settlements with third parties.157 Moreover, it is evident that 
in the majority of circumstances these ex gratia settlements are fair.158 The MoT 
further stated that as insurers are not under any direct obligation to compensate, it 
is unfair to criticise them for failing to meet a claim outside the scope of their 
policy.159 This is because their freedom of contract was only partially limited under 
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the RTA 1934. This accords with the reasoning of Hector Hughes KC, (whose 
paper will be discussed below on pages 60-63), Hughes stated:  
“If the third party is entitled to damages and the wrongdoer has an 
insurance policy, he will get his damages by direct right from the 
insurer, provided the general basis of the policy covers the 
circumstances of the injury. No matter if the policy is avoidable: no 
matter if the insured has broken contractual obligations into which 
he freely entered; no matter if the insurers have been tricked and 
defrauded; the third party will get his damages. That is the position 
in fact”.160 
These comments from Hughes and the MoT are conflicting with the comments 
made by Barry O’Brien. As can be recalled, O’Brien stated that although insurers 
were often willing to negotiate settlements, despite absence of legal obligations, 
these settlements were usually minimal. This is because the insurer would often 
strongly negotiate any settlement which was outside the terms of the policy, 
knowing that they had the right to refuse to compensate if a settlement in their best 
interests was not achieved.161 
Moreover, whilst insurers would often give ex gratia payments. Opinions from 
judges, such as Goddard J show a different picture where insurers would refuse to 
compensate in a ‘disturbing number of cases’. It is submitted that whilst many 
insurers were willing to negotiate, many would use the exclusion clauses as 
leverage in negotiations, and in a minority of cases would refuse to pay claims. 
Little is known about these cases, apart from where judges such as Goddard J 
have spoken. It is possible that in some circumstances insurers utilised exclusion 
clauses where they suspected fraud but could not prove it, or had other issues with 
the claim. As noted by Professor Merkin, it is clear in insurance law generally, that 
the, ‘reason given for not paying a claim is rarely the reason for not paying the 
claim’.162  
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The MoT was questioned, at length, by the Cassel Committee on their evidence, 
particularly where the terms used for repudiation were abnormal. The MoT 
defended the use of abnormal exclusion clauses, such as those relating to use by 
‘airmen’ (which was utilised in Richards163), by stating: 
“There is no doubt that some insurance companies will not accept 
certain classes of people like airmen at ordinary rates, and we 
occasionally get complaints about that but our reply is that you can 
go to some other company”.164 
It is submitted that although it would be reasonable to exclude compensation to an 
airman who himself drives the vehicle, because the airman knowingly entered 
themselves into the contract. It seems unreasonable to exclude compensation to a 
third party because of the airman’s decision. This shows a contradiction between 
contractual freedom and third party compensation because the third party simply 
cannot ‘find another insurer’. 
It is clear from the evidence of both the BIA and the MoT, that whilst there were 
cases where some exclusion clauses should not have been used, exclusion 
clauses are important from both rating and safety purposes. It is apparent that the 
emphasis was put on keeping the premiums lower, rather than providing 
guaranteed protection for third parties. This is compatible with the discussion 
earlier in this chapter relating to RTCAB, where pressure was coming from the 
motoring lobbies to keep premiums down.  
The Cassel Committee’s Recommendations 
On July 1937, the Cassel Committee released their report named: ‘Report of the 
Committee on Compulsory Insurance’ with recommendations to address this 
‘gaping hole’ in third party coverage.165 The exclusion clause chapter of the report 
began by comparing the prohibition of certain clauses within the 1934 RTA, with 
the Air Navigation Act 1920 (henceforth ‘ANA’). The ANA prohibited all exclusion 
clauses in relation to third parties, in cases of aviation accidents, except exclusion 
clauses which were expressly permitted rather than expressly prohibited exclusion 
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clauses as in the RTA 1934. The Committee stated that it would be preferable to 
follow the ANA by expressly permitting some exclusion clauses and prohibiting the 
rest. They stated that the permitted exclusion clauses listed must be ‘indispensable’ 
for the insurer or motorist in relation to pricing risks.166 
The Committee further reinforced the argument made earlier by the BIA that this 
was the preferred option rather than a blanket prohibition because, ‘such a 
suggestion would render a differentiation of risks practically impossible and would 
deprive many motorists of the benefit of reduced premiums’.167 The Committee 
further thought that parity was needed between cases involving exclusion clauses 
and those involving misrepresentation and non-disclosure. Under the 1934 RTA, 
the insurer needed to obtain a declaration from the Court to avoid the policy, the 
Committee stated a similar process should be followed when an exclusion clause 
is breached to ensure parity. 
Numerous suggestions were made in evidence to the Committee, mainly from the 
BIA, as to clauses deemed fundamental to the insurance industry, drivers, and the 
public. These clauses would usually materially affect the risk and ensure lower 
premiums. The Cassel Committee took this on board when drafting the new 
proposed provision and further divided the proposed permitted exclusion clauses 
into two, first in relation to limitations of vehicle use, and second, exclusion clauses 
in relation to the driver of the vehicle. In relation to vehicle use, the Committee’s 
proposed provision stated that the following exclusion clauses should be permitted: 
 “ 
(1) Use for Business purposes except by the insurer (or some named 
individual) in person 
(2) Use for Business Purposes other than the business purposes of the 
insured 
(3) Use for the carriage of goods of samples in connection with any trade 
for business 
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(4) Use for hire or reward 
(5) Use for organised racing and speed testing  
(6) Use, in the case of a public service or goods-carrying vehicle for a 
purpose not permitted by the licence under which the vehicle is 
operated  
(7) Use of a motor cycle without side car being attached 168“ 
The second proposed provision relating to the driver of the vehicle 
stated: “ 
(1) Limiting driving to:- 
(a) The insured or any person driving with the permission of the insured, 
permission being assumed if it can be inferred in the circumstances 
(b) The insured or persons employed by the insured; 
(c) Named persons  
(2) Excluding driving by:-  
(a) A named person or persons  
(b) A person whose driving licence has been suspended (during the 
period of suspension) or a person who is disqualified from attaining 
a driving licence”.169 
These exclusion clauses are therefore analogous to ‘use’ exclusion clauses in the 
BIA evidence170 deemed integral for insurers to control their premiums, as well as 
for consumers who benefited from cheaper rates, by being able to personalise their 
policies to their needs. 
The Committee further thought that it was necessary to provide protection to 
insurers on the occurrence of extreme events which could lead to many expensive 
claims, potentially leading to financial issues for insurers. Consequently, the 
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Committee recommended that conditions should continue to be permitted relating 
to ‘war, civil war, riot or commotion’.171 These terms were inserted into many 
different types of insurance policies, especially after the First World War and were 
frequently challenged in the courts.172 
The Committee finally recommended that a Central Insurance Fund should be 
established as a ‘second line of defence’.173 The Committee was particularly 
concerned with the insolvency of major insurance companies which would often 
leave the victim with no compensation. Consequently, the Central Fund would pay 
when the insurer was insolvent. The unjust absence of compensation for third 
parties when an exclusion clause was breached was also recognised,174 and 
therefore in the event of a declaration being made by the insurer that a breach was 
established, the injured victim could recover from the central fund. Moreover, to 
ensure deterrence against the breach of an exclusion clause, it was recommended 
that the Central Fund could recover any compensation from the insured, this would 
also be positive in keeping premiums lower, as ultimate burden of paying would not 
be on the average motorist who pay for the Central Fund in their premiums.  
Reaction to Cassel: The Hughes-Chorley Debate 
The Committee’s report stirred up a major debate which was played out in the 
Modern Law Review. Hector Hughes K.C. in his article titled ‘The Position of the 
Injured Third Party’ was particularly sceptical of the Cassel Committee’s report and 
proposals. Hughes stated that the proposals in relation to exclusion clauses 
constituted; ‘a series of important interferences with the contractual freedom of 
insurers in the name of third parties’.175 Hughes further argued that if the 
recommendations in relation to exclusion clauses were implemented then it would; 
‘go far to impairing the bases upon which the insurance contract is built at 
present’.176 He focussed particularly on the business side of compulsory insurance 
and stated: 
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“(The Insurance Contract) as a business agreement…essentially 
rests on a variety of facts, without the incorporation of which it would 
be impossible to carry on insurance business at all. To pursue the 
interests of third parties in total disregard of these important features 
would have defeated its own purpose”.177 
Hughes’ argument is that motor insurance contracts are unique, because they are 
assessed on the basis as to which the vehicle is used, and the person driving it. By 
removing these variants, Hughes believes that the purpose of the insurance 
contract would be defeated, and was further critical of the shifting of the burden to 
the insurer to prove that an exclusion clause was breached.178 Whereas with the 
RTA 1934, the onus fell on the victim to prove that the accident was within the 
insurers’ policy, the Committee proposed that the burden should put on the insurer 
to prove that the claim was outside the scope of the policy. Hughes stated that this 
would impair the ability of the insurers to avoid a contract. Finally, Hughes was 
sceptical of the proposed Central Fund and argued that it would ‘open up a sea of 
litigation’, encouraging a greater number of claims from ‘victims’ knowing that they 
would be guaranteed compensation.179 Hughes’ overall argument therefore is in 
providing a balance between ensuring that compensation is paid to the innocent 
victim, whilst also not penalising the insurer and average motorist who would 
ultimately be forced to pay higher premiums.  
Hughes’ comments provoked a large amount of scepticism and with the Editor of 
the Modern Law Review, Professor Chorley (as he then was).180 Professor Chorley 
challenged Hughes on both narrow and wider grounds, and asserted that the 
burden put on insurers to pay was ‘superficial’, because the financial cost would be 
borne by the motorist through higher premiums. Moreover, Professor Chorley 
argued that it was likely that the majority of injured third parties were likely to be 
motorists themselves and therefore the proposed provisions would benefit all 
parties.  
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Professor Chorley further opined that ‘strictures’ such as those made by Hughes 
were common when a new piece of social legislation was introduced and are 
eventually met with positivity. An example of employment legislation in the 
Workman’s Compensation Act 1906 was used to justify this, which gained 
severe criticism from many but was eventually deemed to be a successful and vital 
piece of legislation in the protection of employees.181 Finally, Professor Chorley 
stated that insurance companies are often met with ‘undue tenderness’,182 since 
they were able to use a variety of defences to avoid payment of a claim, and this 
substantially weakened the protective effect of the RTA 1930. 
Hector Hughes was then granted leave to reply to Professor Chorley’s comments 
and introduced another article in the Modern Law Review.183 Hughes stated in 
relation to Professor Chorley’s argument, that if exclusion clauses were introduced, 
insurers could just increase their premiums:  
“Does Professor Chorley know that the motor insurance rating 
system is anything but nicely calculated? Does he know that insurers 
are not making profits out of home motor insurance?  Does he know 
that intense competition by one hundred insurance companies and 
Lloyd’s prohibits any general increase of premiums until years of 
loss have been traversed? And does he know that the necessity of 
maintaining their position and of absorbing their overhead charges 
dis-enables insurers from refusing to underwrite business which 
turns unprofitable?”184 
According to Hughes motor insurance is unprofitable for insurers, and due to the 
competitiveness of the industry, it is not easy to increase the premium for motorists 
if exclusion clauses are prohibited. Hughes went a step further and stated that if 
the law went further and prohibited the insurers’ right to repudiate liability then it 
would, ‘destroy the bases upon which insurers at present seek to gauge their risks 
and calculate premiums’.185 Furthermore, Hughes stated that: 
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 “In addition to an aggregate increase of premium charges, all 
pretence of making the premium commensurate with the risk would 
fall away, and numerous individual hardships would result”.186 
Hughes argued that the removal of exclusion clauses would result in significant 
hardship to the innocent motorist. He argues, similarly to the BIA, that if exclusion 
clauses were prohibited then it would be impossible to differentiate between risks. 
Hughes did not answer any of Chorley’s remarks on the wider sociological aspects 
of this and stated that there could be no comparisons between previous social 
legislation and the law relating to running down.  
The above articles show that there were two very contrasting views relating to the 
insurers’ right to repudiate liability against third parties. There was a clear divide 
between those who thought that the victim should be protected in all cases, and 
those who thought that the freedom of contract between the insured and the insurer 
should be maintained. Evidently, third party motor insurance is not as 
straightforward as compensating all victims, as previous academic commentary 
advocated. Insurers are primarily a (profitable) business and traditionally rely on 
freedom of contract to enable them to avoid liability, as well as offer premiums 
prices based on risk, which is fundamental to the insurance practice. Consequently, 
by removing this differentiation of risk through removing exclusion clauses, 
insurance practice would be substantially different and unprofitable. This, it is 
submitted, is contradictory to the purpose of third party insurance which is to ensure 
that the innocent victim is compensated.  
 Implementation of the Cassel Committee’s Recommendations 
Some of the Committee’s proposals, involving the extension of the deposit system, 
were implemented immediately. However, due to the distraction of the Second 
World War, it was not until 1946 that the Committee’s most significant proposals 
were revisited.187 In 1946, the MoT met with major insurance companies to form 
the MIB. This was due to pressure on the insurance industry to ensure that a last 
resort was in place if the insurer decided to repudiate liability against third parties. 
An agreement was formed to implement the Cassel Committee recommendations, 
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to provide victims of an accident with compensation when the driver could not be 
identified, had no insurance, or the insurance was not effective due to a clause in 
the policy. The Bureau consists of every insurance company in the UK and is 
funded by them and therefore indirectly funded through the premiums of the 
motorist.188 
Because of the MIB’s role in ensuring that victims are guaranteed compensation, 
the Government did not think of it as a priority to reform the law on exclusion 
clauses as the injustice caused to the innocent third party victim was supposedly 
removed by creating a backup compensation scheme,189 although this ignored the 
fact that the Cassel Committee had proposed to reform exclusion clauses also. 
Consequently, Section 12 continues in existence today under Section 148 RTA 
1988 with all exclusion clauses in the original Section 12 (albeit with occasionally 
slight changes in wording) continuing to be prohibited.  
Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has emphasised that although the RTA 1930 was a significant step 
forward for the rights of victims, it failed to address the insurers’ right to exclude 
claims due to exclusion clauses. The RTA 1934 was a further substantial step 
forward, but continued to leave a substantial gap. The list of prohibited exclusion 
clauses within the RTA 1934 were introduced to help meet the needs of the 
innocent victim of the time, by removing the most commonly used exclusion 
clauses and it seems that this did not go far enough.  
Further emphasis in this Chapter was placed on the regulatory challenges faced 
by attempting to balance the need to ensure compensation for the most vulnerable, 
whilst ensuring that the insurance rating system and public protection were not 
undermined, although there is uncertainty as to the effect of exclusion clause use 
on public protection, through attempting to provide a deterrent. It is submitted that 
the regulator went too far in protecting the insurer, rather than providing adequate 
third party protection. Pre-1946 victims were left without compensation, and 
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insurers could go further by repudiating liability in situations which had little to do 
with rating. Moreover, it is apparent that insurers utilised exclusion clauses as 
bargaining chips, allowing the reduction of compensation.  Pre-1946 victims were 
left without any compensation, and insurers were often able to go further by 
repudiating liability in situations which had little to do with rating. Moreover, it is 
apparent that insurers utilised exclusion clauses as bargaining chips, which 
allowed them to reduce compensation payments.   
This Chapter has examined the Cassel Committee’s recommendations to reverse 
exclusion clauses from prohibited to permitted, which attempted to effectively 
balance the interests of the insurance industry, the insured, and the vulnerable 
victim. It is not clear whether the reversal of exclusion clauses would have been 
effective. Although some indication of effectiveness can be found in Chapter Four, 
as this is an approach partially taken by the EU. The enacted Cassel Committee 
recommendation to introduce the MIB has certainly increased the protection 
offered to third parties, although the extent of this will be discussed on Chapter 
Seven. 
Overall therefore this Chapter has significantly contributed to this thesis through 
providing an analysis of the difficulties faced through the introduction of the original 
legislation, which clearly struggled to regulate exclusion clauses effectively. 
Moreover, this Chapter emphasises the conflicts arising from the provision of lower 
premiums and the protection of third parties in the Cassel Committee consultations 
and subsequent debate. 
With background examined, it is important to consider the approach taken by the 
UK currently, in the RTA 1988. It is important to understand how the list of 
prohibited exclusion clauses in the RTA 1988 have been interpreted and the extent 
to which exclusion clauses are permitted beyond those.  
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Chapter Three: Exclusion Clauses under the Road 
Traffic Act 1988 
 
Introduction 
The most substantial regulation of motor insurance exclusion clauses is in the RTA 
1988 and the interpreting case law. The Act remains fundamentally the same as its 
predecessor, the 1934 RTA. However, it is clear from recent cases, that the 
exclusion clause provisions within current legislation are the ongoing subject of 
debate. The list of prohibited exclusion clauses in Section 148 RTA 1988 is 
identical to those found in Section 12 of the 1934 Act, although an additional list of 
prohibited exclusion clauses can be found in Section 151 RTA. 
It is, however, questioned in the absence of an exhaustive list from the legislature, 
whether these lists of prohibited exclusion clauses are exhaustive, and the extent 
to which other exclusion clauses are permitted under the RTA 1988. This subject 
has only been dealt with on few occasions due to the role of the UK MIB, who 
frequently pay third party claims when an exclusion clause is breached.190 
In Part I, this Chapter will examine the interpretation of each of the prohibited 
exclusion clauses contained within the RTA 1988.  Part II of this Chapter will then 
examine whether the exclusion clauses in Sections 148 and 151 are exhaustive. 
This will be through examining lines of case law which have examined both the 
RTA itself but also the conflicting policies behind the Act. Finally, Part III of this 
Chapter will assess potentially permitted exclusion clauses by examining dictum 
which have permitted certain exclusion clauses.  
Part I: Prohibited Exclusion clauses under the Road Traffic Act 
1988 
 
As stated above on this page the prohibited exclusion clauses contained within the 
original RTA 1934 have not changed, and are currently contained within the RTA 
1988. These are: the age or physical or mental condition of persons driving the 
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vehicle,191 the condition of the vehicle,192 the number of persons that the vehicle 
carries,193 the weight or physical characteristics of the goods that the vehicle 
carries,194 the time at which or the areas within which the vehicle is used,195 the 
horsepower or cylinder capacity or value of the vehicle,196 the carrying on the 
vehicle of any particular apparatus,197 or the carrying on the vehicle of any 
particular means of identification, other than any means of identification required to 
be carried by or under the Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994.198 
In addition, exclusion clauses relating to liability due to action that the insured 
should or should not have taken after the happening of the accident, which were 
restricted under the 1930 RTA,199 remain invalid under Section 148 (5) RTA.200 
Moreover, the insurer can continue to recover from the insured for any damages 
paid due to breach of an exclusion under Section 151 (8) RTA.201 Prohibited 
clauses within Section 148 have rarely been examined by the courts or academics 
because of the MIB acting as last resort. Consequently, in interpreting these 
exclusion clauses, early case law will be relied upon alongside the Shawcross ‘Law 
of Motor Insurance’ editions, Hughes’ 1937 Book,202 and Professor Merkin’s recent 
‘Law of Motor Insurance’ edition.  
Section 148 
The Age, Physical or Mental Condition of Persons Driving 
Insurers must not utilise clauses relating to the age of the person driving the 
vehicle, even if the driver is below the legal age to drive. The age prohibition was 
introduced since it was one of the most criticised exclusion clauses, especially 
when used in relation to drivers under the age of 21, who were often restricted from 
driving within policies due to concerns about their level of skill or experience.203 
                                                          
191 Section 148 (2) (a) RTA.  
192 Section 148 (2) (b) RTA. 
193 Section 148 (2) (c) RTA. 
194 Section 148 (2) (d) RTA. 
195 Section 148 (2) (e) RTA. 
196 Section 148 (2) (f) RTA. 
197 Section 148 (2) (g) RTA. 
198 Section 148 (2) (h) RTA. 
199 Section 38. 
200 A discussion of these can be found in the previous Chapter on pages 37-39. 
201 This interpretation of this clause can be found in the next Chapter on pages 139-140. 
202 See Hughes H (n 100). 
203 See previous Chapter and Department for Transport’s consultation with Cassel on pages 54-57. 
 68 
  
Consequently, the provision prohibits the insurer from using this clause and 
restrictions where the driver incorrectly states their age on a proposal form.204 
Attempts have been made to extend this condition to all drivers irrespective of their 
age, physical or mental condition, however this was rejected recently in Sahin v 
Harvard205 (henceforth ‘Sahin’) by Longmore LJ who stated that this was ‘obviously 
wrong’.206 
Although it has not been interpreted as all encompassing, the courts have 
interpreted the phrase ‘mental condition’ widely. It is apparent that this would 
almost certainly involve clauses in relation to the driver being intoxicated through 
either drink or drugs. In Louden v British Merchants Insurance Co,207 when 
examining whether an intoxication clause could be used against a first party, the 
Court reaffirmed previous case law208 that intoxication ‘disturbs the balance of a 
man's mind’.209 This was relied upon in the Singaporean case of Tan Ryan v Lua 
Ming Feng Alvin (henceforth ‘Tan Ryan’).210 This is highly persuasive authority, 
as the Singaporean Motor Vehicles (Third Party Risks and Compensation) Act 
1960 is based on the English RTA 1988 with the same prohibited exclusion 
clauses. The Court in Tan Ryan held that intoxication would clearly affect the 
drivers ‘mental condition’ and comparably that the, ‘contamination of a person’s 
bloodstream by a foreign substance (such as alcohol) seemed …to be eminently a 
matter of that person’s “physical… condition”’.211 The Court further held that the 
driver’s intoxication falls alongside the other exclusion clauses most commonly 
used by insurers and therefore were intended to fall within the prohibited exclusion 
clauses.212 
An argument reinforcing the restriction of driving in relation to intoxicated drivers is 
that they are expressly prohibited in EU Law under Article 13 of the Sixth 
                                                          
204 See Merchants and Manufacturers v Hunt and Thorne [1941] K.B. 295. 
205 Sahin v Harvard [2016] EWCA Civ 1202. 
206 Ibid, [22]. 
207 [1961] 1 W.L.R. 798. 
208 Mair v Railway Passengers Assurance Company Ltd (1877) 37 LT 356. 
209 Louden (n 210), 157. 
210 Tan Ryan v Lua Ming Feng Alvin [2011] SGHC 151. 
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Directive,213 due to their consistent use against third parties throughout the EU.214 
The UK have used Section 148 (2) to show compliance with that provision. 
Consequently, there is little doubt that exclusion clauses relating to intoxicated 
drivers are prohibited. 
However, in National Farmers’ Union Mutual Insurance Society Ltd v 
Dawson,215 the High Court held that this provision does not extend to a condition 
requiring the insured to employ only steady and sober drivers. Viscount Caldecote 
C.J. noted that, at most, the exclusion clause relating to employing drivers who are 
sober purports to restrict the insurance from applying to cases where the insured 
has not used all care and diligence, to do the things specified in the condition. His 
Lordship stated that is very different from a restriction which refers to the physical 
or mental condition of persons driving the vehicle.  
Moreover, mental condition would also include clauses involving those who are 
mentally incapable, such as clauses highlighted in the Cassel Committee 
consultation, involving those who had entered an ‘insane asylum’. Although it would 
be improbable that this clause would ever be utilised today. Similarly, with those 
who are physically unable or impaired to drive due to a disability.  
The Condition of the Vehicle 
As stated in the previous Chapter on page 44, significant concerns were raised 
about the use of exclusion clauses involving the condition of the vehicle, especially 
when vehicle condition had not contributed to the accident. Consequently, Section 
148 (3) RTA 1988 prohibits exclusion clauses in relation to vehicle condition and 
roadworthiness, even where poor vehicle condition was partially or wholly 
responsible for the accident. Generally, the exclusion clause used is that, ‘the 
vehicle should be maintained in a roadworthy condition’ but the prohibition also 
extends to clauses involving maintaining the vehicle in an ‘efficient’ or ‘safe’ 
condition. This, however, does not extend to clauses in relation to the age, make, 
                                                          
213 Also see Bernáldez [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 889 from the ECJ which will be discussed on pages 118-
124. 
214 Further see the case of Candolin v VahinkovakuutuMoTakeyhtio Pohjola (C-537/03) [2005] E.C.R. 
I-5745 where compensation in Finland was denied to the passengers due to intoxication.  
215 [1941] 2 K.B. 424. 
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type or carrying capacity of the vehicle as this would clearly go beyond the intention 
of the provision.216 
Moreover, clauses relating to the roadworthiness of the user of the vehicle, such 
as through inexperience, do not fall within this prohibition.217 Likewise, use of the 
vehicle without lights at night, due to the fault of the road user, is also not prohibited, 
as well as clauses relating to the weight of the vehicle.218 It is unclear whether 
overloading of a vehicle would fall under the condition of the vehicle. For example, 
Clarke v National Insurance and Guarantee Corp,219 held that carrying too many 
passengers made the vehicle unroadworthy. In contrast, A P Salmon Contractors 
Ltd v Monksfield220 (henceforth ‘Salmon’) held that faulty loading did not make the 
vehicle unroadworthy, the vehicle itself was not faulty. This it is submitted, is a clear 
distinction to be made.   
Although overloading has only been discussed in determining if an exclusion 
clause had been breached, this can also determine whether an exclusion clause is 
prohibited. It is submitted that overloading of a vehicle would fall within this 
prohibited exclusion clause, as this has the potential to make a vehicle 
unroadworthy. In Salmon,221 it was not the overloading but rather method of 
loading that caused the accident. Whereas in Clarke,222 the overloading caused 
the vehicle to be unroadworthy. It is clear though, that overloading could also fall 
within the prohibited exclusion clause in Sections 148 (c) in relation to passengers 
and Section 148 (d) in relation to goods, showing that these prohibitions do often 
overlap.  
It is notable that the prohibition of the roadworthiness exclusion clause satisfies 
one of the prohibited exclusion requirements in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive 
which prohibits insurers from using exclusion clauses relating to the safety of the 
vehicle.223 
                                                          
216 Shawcross (n 74). 
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The Number of Persons that the Vehicle Carries 
This provision prevents the use of exclusion clauses in relation to the number of 
persons being carried in or on the vehicle. Although this was seemingly a prevalent 
exclusion clause used by insurers’ pre-1934, there is little evidence of use or 
interpretation of this exclusion clause through case law. A clause of this type was 
examined in Bright v Ashfold224 which involved a clause prohibiting a motor cycle 
from carrying a pillion passenger; the case was decided before the introduction of 
the RTA 1934, and it is submitted, would almost certainly fall within this prohibition. 
It is important to note that this clause only refers to the number of passengers and 
does not include the weight of the vehicle due to passenger overloading which is 
highlighted in the judgment of Lord Denning in Houghton v Trafalgar Insurance 
Co.225 Consequently, a ‘Houghton’ clause can be used under the RTA 1988 as far 
as it applies to the carrying of people but not when it applies to goods (as shown 
directly below).226 
The weight or physical characteristics of the goods that the  
vehicle carries 
 
This clause prevents the insurer from relying on policy terms related to the weight 
of the vehicle or the physical characteristics of the goods which are carried by the 
vehicle. This, it seems, does not cover the quantity of goods carried, but rather their 
weight. For example, as noted by Shawcross, a clause which limited a milk lorry to 
a certain number of milk churns would continue to be valid even if this went beyond 
the lorry’s capacity.227 It is clear, however, that this prohibited exclusion clause is 
rather limited in its’ effect. For example, in Jones v Welsh Insurance Corporation 
Limited,228 an insurer utilised an exclusion clause limiting the use of the vehicle to 
‘social, domestic or pleasure purposes’, although the insured’s brother used the 
vehicle to carry sheep as part of his business. The plaintiff argued that this 
exclusion clause could not be used under Section 12 (2) (d) because the exclusion 
related to the physical characteristics of the goods. Goddard J rejected this 
                                                          
respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such 
liability. 
224 Bright (n 79). 
225 Houghton v Trafalgar Insurance Co Ltd [1954] 1 Q.B. 247. 
226 Robert Merkin Colinvaux (n 3), 1395 
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argument and stated that in this case, the question was not as to the nature of the 
goods or their characteristics, but rather the nature of the journey. For example, 
whether the vehicle was used for domestic purposes or whether the goods carried, 
whatever their nature, were carried in connection with business. This, it is 
submitted, is an important distinction, as exclusion clauses involving, ‘social, 
domestic and pleasure purposes’ are used in the majority of policies to define the 
risk.  
By essentially equating the characteristics of goods with the purpose of travel, 
insurers would be deprived of using an exclusion clause which they deem essential 
to limit risk. It is submitted that Judge Goddard is correct in this distinction, as the 
exclusion clause was not based on the physical characteristics of the goods, but 
rather that they were carried for a specific purpose, the insurer would not have 
repudiated liability if the goods were carried for social purposes.  
Time and Area of Use 
This clause refers to the time and area of use; including prohibiting exclusion 
clauses relating to the use of a vehicle within certain hours. An example can be 
found in Farr v Motor Traders Mutual Insurance,229 where a taxi cab could not 
be driven more than once in 24 hours. The exclusion clause further prohibits 
clauses relating to use of a vehicle on certain days or within certain areas and 
geographical locations such as in Palmer v Cornhill Insurance Co Ltd.230 
The Horsepower or Cylinder Capacity or Value of the Vehicle 
Shawcross noted that the introduction of a prohibited exclusion clause in the RTA 
1934 in relation to the horsepower or cylinder capacity (added by Finance (no.2) 
Act 1945, Section 5 (2) (c)) of the vehicle seems to doubt that the list of prohibited 
exclusion clauses in Section 12 were limited to exclusion clauses, and did not 
include misrepresentation or non-disclosure. The main reference to the horse 
power and value of the vehicle are in the proposal form and not the policy itself. 
This, therefore, is still a valid observation to make presently, as proposal forms 
usually ask for this data and it is not included within the actual terms of the policy.   
                                                          
229 Farr (n 112). 
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This provision, however, is rather limited, as although it touches some of the major 
defining characteristics of the vehicle, it does not touch other significant 
characteristics which could increase risk. These include the age or model of the 
vehicle or its alterations.  
The Carrying on the Vehicle of any Particular Apparatus 
This prohibited clause relates to the carrying of certain apparatus which is either 
prohibited or necessary under the policy. Prohibited apparatus can include 
substances such as the carrying of any radioactive or potentially explosive material 
on the vehicle; this would also apply to bulk transportation of liquefied petroleum, 
gasoline or any inflammable liquid. It can also include, apparatus carried for a 
purpose. It is submitted, however, that this does not include apparatus which 
substantially changes the character of the vehicle such as the adding of a side-car 
to the vehicle or making it amphibious, as this does not restrict the insurance but 
rather defines it.231 Moreover, it is evident that this prohibition does not apply to 
clauses which restrict the carrying of goods completely.232 Finally, Hector Hughes 
notes that a borderline case is where a clause is found in a private motor car policy 
in the description of use, which prohibits, ‘carriage of goods or samples in 
connection with any trade or business’233. This prohibits carriage of goods of a 
description and does not prevent the carrying of goods in general. Consequently, 
it seems to refer to the ‘characteristics of goods’ albeit the circumstantial 
characteristics, as the same goods could be carried with different vehicle uses. 
Accordingly, Hughes submits that this is not an exclusion clause which falls under 
the prohibition.234 
Necessary apparatus can include the carrying of fire extinguishers, mirrors, and 
headlights, although it is unlikely to find exclusion clause in a private motor vehicle 
for fire extinguishers’, and this provision rather relates so some vehicles carrying 
potentially flammable material.   
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Carrying of Identification 
This provision prohibits the insurer from utilising an exclusion clause relating to the 
means of identification other than identification required to be carried by or under 
the Vehicles Excise and Registration Act (VERA) 1994. As it is no longer a legal 
requirement to carry a tax disk (VERA), it seems that nearly all exclusion clauses 
relating to carrying identification are invalid against third parties. Moreover, it is 
unlikely that such exclusion clause would ever be used currently as there is no legal 
requirement to carry a licence or an insurance certificate.  
Liability Required to be Covered 
It is finally important to note that the eight named prohibited exclusion clauses in 
Section 148 only apply in relation to ‘Liabilities which are required to be covered 
by a policy in Section 145 RTA’. Section 145 (3) (a) requires all liability to be 
covered, ‘in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to 
property, caused by, or arising out of, the use of a vehicle on a road’. Consequently, 
if the vehicle is being used outside of the requirements for compulsory insurance 
within Section 145, then a prohibited exclusion clause within Section 148 could 
be used against a third party.  
There are certain areas where the vehicle is being used outside of Section 145. 
For example, in relation to the term ‘vehicle’ which is defined within Section 185 
(1) RTA 1988, ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on 
roads (and other public places)’. This definition therefore excludes vehicles which 
are only intended to be used on private land. 
Similarly, the use of any vehicle on private land does not require insurance 
coverage according to the RTA 1988, insurance is only required for roads or ‘other 
public places’ (Section 143 (1) (a)). Public places are defined as places in which 
the public have access, which is largely unrestricted, and open to the public in 
general.235 Whether land is deemed ‘public’ for compulsory insurance purposes is 
decided on a case by case basis. It is worth noting, however, that due to the recent 
CJEU decision in Vnuk,236 the distinction between public and private land does not 
exist at EU level, as insurers must cover for use of a vehicle on both. Furthermore, 
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any vehicle must be covered if its use is consistent with the ‘normal function of that 
vehicle’. There is little doubt that due to the differences in approaches, the UK is 
currently infringing EU Law in this regard.237 However, with the UK negotiating to 
leave the EU (which will be discussed in the next chapter on page 177) and EU 
reform imminent, there is difficulty in determining exactly what the law will be in the 
future.   
Moreover, with the likelihood that all vehicles and types of land will not require 
coverage in the future, this provision of Section 148, essentially permits the insurer 
to use any exclusion clause against a third party in these instances. The practical 
consequence of this is minimal, as the insurer would be repudiating liability anyway, 
due to the circumstances of the accident being outside of the scope of their cover.  
Prohibited Exclusion Clauses in Section 151 
Section 151 (3) of the RTA 1988 contains a prohibited exclusion relating to the 
use of the vehicle by an unlicensed driver. This clause evidently provides an 
important inroad in the insurers’ utilisation of exclusions,238 as exclusion clauses 
relating to unlicensed drivers were prevalent in earlier policies and deemed vital by 
the insurance industry.239 It seems that this was a clause which was forced to be 
prohibited by EU law as it comes within one of the prohibited exclusion clauses in 
Article 13 (1). Consequently, victims of accidents relating to unlicensed drivers can 
claim back directly from the insurer for any losses.  
Moreover, since the UK’s implementation of Article 13 (1), through Section 151 
(2) (b) RTA 1988, the insurer cannot repudiate liability due to an unauthorised 
person using a vehicle, and must satisfy a judgment.  
 
Part II: Are Exclusion Clauses Completely Prohibited under the 
RTA? 
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238 Merkin (n 23), [5-198]. 
239 See evidence to Cassel in the previous Chapter. 
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Whether exclusion clauses can be used against a third party in UK law, other than 
the prohibited exclusion clauses in Section 148, has rarely been discussed in the 
Courts. This is because of its’ limited importance to the majority of third parties or 
insurers, as the insurer would usually need to handle the claim and pay 
compensation anyway due to Article 79 of the MIB Uninsured Driver’s 
Agreement. In fact, only four cases have dealt with this directly, with the most 
thorough examination by Ward LJ in Bristol Alliance.240  
Bristol Alliance Partnership v Williams 
In Bristol Alliance241 the driver of the motor vehicle, when attempting to commit 
suicide, deliberately drove into a House of Fraser Store in Cabot Circus, Bristol 
causing over £200,000 damage with no personal injury caused. The driver’s 
insurance policy contained the following exclusion clause: 
“We will not pay…any loss, damage, death or injury arising as a 
result of a ‘road rage’ incident or deliberate act caused by you or any 
driver insured to drive your car”.242 
The shop recovered reparation costs from their property insurers, and the property 
insurers therefore applied to subrogate the claim to the motor insurers, who refused 
to refund the property insurers. This was due to the clear breach, by the driver, of 
the exclusion clause in his policy. Consequently, the shop received compensation 
to fix the damage caused by the driver, with the losses remaining with the property 
insurers, who took the matter against the motor insurers to the High Court. What 
followed, therefore, was a dispute between two insurers as to the payment of 
damages. It is notable that, whereas a third party victim, if refused compensation 
due to breach of a policy term, could potentially claim compensation under the 
MIB’s UDA, insurers could not, as the UDA does not allow subrogated claims.243 
Subsequently, the property insurers could only claim, under the insureds’ name, 
directly from the motor insurers under the standard avenue given to third party 
victims through Section 151 RTA. 
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Clauses which exclude ‘deliberately caused damage’ are not listed under Section 
148 RTA, and therefore the courts were asked to decide whether the list of 
prohibited exclusion clauses was exhaustive. If Section 148 RTA was not 
exhaustive, then the property insurers could not recover, whereas if other exclusion 
clauses were prohibited also, the property insurers could potentially recover 
against the motor insurers. Both Tugendhat J in the High Court Queen’s Bench 
Division,244 and then Ward LJ in the Court of Appeal, examined UK and EU law in 
determining the outcome.245 In relation to UK law, the judges paid attention to a 
line of cases which concentrated on the issue of public policy which prohibits 
payment of compensation for illegal acts (ex turpi causa non oritur action 
(henceforth ‘ex turpi causa’246)), and its’ relationship with the duty to provide 
compensation to all injured third parties of road accidents under the RTA 1988. 
These cases will now be examined.247 
 Unlimited Duty to Provide Compensation? 
In Hardy v Motor Insurers’ Bureau248 (henceforth ‘Hardy’), a security officer was 
injured after the driver of a vehicle drove away with the officer partially inside the 
vehicle. The driver was convicted under the Offences against the Persons Act 
1861 for maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm on the officer. The driver was 
uninsured and therefore the security officer claimed to the MIB. Under the UDA, 
the MIB would only pay when the liability was one which, ‘is required to be covered 
by a policy of insurance’249 within the RTA 1960. The MIB argued that they were 
not required to compensate the officer due to a line of authority establishing that a 
contract of insurance, to cover the performance of a deliberate criminal act, is 
unenforceable as being contrary to public policy which does not cover illegal acts. 
Whereas the plaintiff argued that the RTA, through its requirement in Section 145 
that the insured is covered for ‘any liability’ which may be incurred by the driver, as 
well as the victim’s direct right of action in Section 151, intended that third parties 
                                                          
244 Bristol Alliance Ltd Partnership v Williams [2011] EWHC 1657 (QB). 
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should always be entitled to recover even in cases of the insured’s illegal 
activities.250 
Lord Denning M.R stated that it is based on the rule of public policy that no person 
can claim indemnity for his own wilful crime; however, the obstacle which is 
attached to the driver is also not attached to the third party claimant who can 
continue to make a claim. Lord Denning further stated that the policy of insurance 
which a motorist is required by statute to take out must cover, ‘any liability which 
may be incurred by him (the driver of the vehicle) arising out of the use of the 
vehicle by him’, including, ‘any use by him of the vehicle, be it an innocent use or 
a criminal use, or be it a murderous use or a playful use’.251 Liability arising from 
deliberate misconduct must be insured in the same way as negligence, and, 
consequently, the victim should be able to recover. The issue was again examined 
by Pearson LJ who gave three potential consequences of deliberate running down 
on an insurance policy:  
(1) a wide implied exception under the policy, the effect of which was 
that the policy would not cover liability arising from an intentional 
criminal use of the vehicle; (2) a narrower implied provision that a 
policy complying with the legislation would cover liability, but that 
the wrongdoer himself and his personal representative could 
never recover; (3) the policy covered full liability, but with a 
personal ban preventing the wrongdoer and his personal 
representative from recovering”.252 
Pearson LJ excluded the first possibility that the policy would not cover intentional 
criminal use by citing Fry LJ in Cleaver v Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, 
(henceforth ‘Cleaver’)253 a case concerning life insurance, who stated that, ‘The 
rule of public policy should be applied so as to exclude from benefit the criminal 
and all claiming under her, but not so as to exclude alternative or independent 
rights’.254 However, Pearson LJ did not distinguish between the other two 
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possibilities as to whether there was an implied exception or just personal ban and 
left this open to future Courts to examine.    
Finally, Diplock LJ in Hardy stated that the scheme of the motor insurance 
legislation is not to affect a statutory assignment of the insured's rights under his 
contract of insurance, but to confer on a third party, a direct right of action against 
the insurers.255 Additionally, the judgment which gives rise to the direct liability of 
the insurers to the third party under Section 207 RTA 1960 must be a judgment in 
respect of a liability of the insured covered by the terms of the contract of insurance. 
The Court of Appeal, therefore unanimously held that because there was no 
contract to construe, despite the driver’s illegal act and although the driver could 
not recover from his own insurers, the victim was entitled to recover from the 
driver’s insurers as a separate cause of action. Consequently, the Court of Appeal 
considered that the public policy of the RTAs, which is fundamentally aimed at 
protecting the innocent victim by ensuring that they receive compensation, 
overrides the public policy from previous case law, in relation to the non-
compensation of illegal acts. 
Hardy was then challenged before the House of Lords in Gardner v Moore256 
(henceforth ‘Gardner’), with facts resembling Hardy whereby a car was deliberately 
driven into a pedestrian causing severe injuries. Lord Hailsham in Gardner 
confirmed the Hardy judgment was correct by reiterating the words of Lord 
Denning, that although the insured may not be able to recover, the innocent victim 
should be able to recover from the insurers.257 Lord Hailsham also relied on 
Cleaver, that a personal bar on the insured did not automatically rule out a later 
claim by an injured party. It is clear therefore that the restricted relationship of both 
Hardy and Gardner is that all accidents on a road and public place are required to 
be insured and adequately compensated. The Courts were not required to resolve 
the further question of whether the Section confers a right of action in favour of the 
victim, even though the insured is personally barred from recovering, although it is 
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evident that in both cases there were powerful dictum in favour of the potential 
occurrence of such an action.258 
The Court of Appeal in Charlton v Fisher (henceforth ‘Charlton’) 259 then examined 
the issue, although this was obiter. In Charlton, a passenger of a vehicle was 
seriously injured when another vehicle deliberately reversed into her vehicle in a 
private car park. As a private car park falls outside the RTA’s compulsory coverage 
of ‘a road or public place’,260 the passenger could not recover any damages. 
However, it was left to the Court of Appeal to decide, obiter, whether the passenger 
could have claimed damages if the accident had in fact occurred on a road or public 
place.  
Both Kennedy LJ and Laws LJ followed previous dictum in Hardy and Gardner by 
stating that although the driver of the vehicle was prohibited from claiming from the 
insurer, the third party was not.261 Rix LJ, however, took a different approach, by 
stating that despite there being a ‘respectable’ argument in allowing the third party 
to recover, technically the cause of action upon which the third party sues is the 
insured's cause of action, albeit transferred into the hands of the third party.262 
Consequently, the policy approach that third parties should always be 
compensated is largely irrelevant. Further, the third party cannot take the rights 
under a contract separately from its defences and is therefore tainted with the 
disability given to the insured. Tugendhat J in Bristol Alliance agreed with Laws 
LJ in Charlton and stated that Laws LJ’s judgment is: 
“consistent with earlier dicta … and it gives effect to the policy of the 
legislation that innocent third parties should be protected so far as 
money can to it from the harm that may be inflicted by dangerous 
and criminal drivers”.263 
Hence, Tugendhat J stated, the insurer must cover the third parties’ loss despite 
breach of an exclusion clause, because innocent parties must be protected. The 
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honourable judge stated that this overrides the insurers’ right to utilise an exclusion 
clause to repudiate liability. It is, however, unclear whether Tugendhat J declared 
that all exclusion clauses under the RTA 1988 are invalid or whether protection 
should only be given to third parties in cases of ‘dangerous and criminal drivers’. 
Ward LJ in Bristol Alliance, however, disagreed with Tugendhat J, and stated that 
Hardy and Gardner were cases involving the principle of public policy, with no 
exclusion clauses to interpret, and that the interpretations given in Charlton were 
obiter. Overall, despite Ward LJ’s and Rix LJ’s dictum to the contrary, it is evident 
that the consensus is that public policy does not automatically restrict the third party 
from claiming. Although, as Ward LJ stated, this is not directly relevant to exclusion 
clauses, it is an important issue indirectly. This is because if public policy prevented 
the third party from claiming, this would arguably reinforce that the third parties’ 
right to gain damages under the RTA 1988, is not absolute. Further, that insurers 
can avoid policies through exclusion clauses. This issue, however, is not settled; 
there is a clear judicial divide between arguments as to whether victims should be 
entitled to damages, or whether public policy prevails in relation to the drivers’ 
criminal and dangerous acts.  
The next issue to be examined is the interpretation of policy terms. This has rarely 
been discussed by the courts, as when a collision occurs and exclusion clause has 
been breached, the MIB will usually compensate the victim.264 Although in 
Charlton the Court was not obliged to deal with an exclusion clause per se, the 
Court had to examine the policy term ‘accident’, and the consequences if the 
collision fell outside of this term.  
Meaning of ‘Accident’ in Charlton v Fisher 
In Charlton,265 the judges, obiter, were interpreting the meaning of the term 
‘accident’, commonly used in motor insurance policies, and the extension of this to 
incorporate deliberate acts. If the term was interpreted widely then all collisions 
including deliberate damage would be covered under the policy and further terms 
could be manipulated by the Courts to ensure compensation for third parties. 
Kennedy LJ in Charlton stated that ‘accident’ could be interpreted widely and 
                                                          
264 Whether the MIB provides adequate protection will be discussed in Chapter Seven.  
265 Charlton v Fisher (n 262). 
 82 
  
consistently to include acts caused deliberately. The honourable judge further 
stated that due to the background of Section 151, which is ultimately to secure 
compensation for third party victims, the RTA 1988 covers any use of the vehicle 
even if seemingly outside of the terms of the policy. Laws LJ agreed and stated 
that if ‘accident’ was constrained by the need to ensure that deliberate conduct was 
not compensated, it would undermine the purpose and utility266 of Section 151. 
This is to ensure that the victim of the RTA 1988 has a direct right of action to 
receive compensation from the insurer.   
Alternatively, Rix LJ stated that deliberate conduct would not come within the 
meaning of ‘accident’. His Lordship further relied on judgments from general 
insurance cases such as Gray v Barr,267 involving property insurance, where Lord 
Denning stated that: ‘the word 'accidents' does not include injury which is caused 
deliberately or intentionally’268 and relied on leading textbooks269  reinforcing this. 
Rix LJ further differentiated purposeful damage to cases of speeding, intoxicated 
driving, or wilful negligence such as in the pre-1930 cases of Tinline v White 
Cross Insurance Association Ltd (henceforth ‘Tinline’)270 and James v British 
General Insurance Co Ltd (henceforth ‘James’).271 In Tinline, Bailhache J stated 
that in cases of manslaughter where the driver is driving at excessive speed, the 
victim of the accident should always be entitled to recover. However, in cases of 
murder and the deliberate running down, this could not be classed as an accident 
and insurance would not cover the victims loses.272 
Rix LJ was seemingly persuaded by the reality that the insured would undoubtedly 
not be covered for deliberately damaging his own vehicle as this would not be 
classed as an accident. This means that the same term would be interpreted 
differently in certain scenarios and in different parts of the policy. Consequently, 
Rix LJ argued that this interpretation would allow the courts to ‘manipulate’ the 
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policy depending on the circumstances of the case and would render the 
introduction of the term ‘accident’ in third party policies meaningless.273 
It is submitted that Rix LJ’s interpretation of the word ‘accident’ is correct. 
Historically the term connotes fortuitous and unforeseen events, this is the 
interpretation of early motor insurance textbooks,274 and case law as mentioned 
above. To construe it any other way, as stated by Rix LJ in Charlton, is to 
manipulate the policy beyond the will of the legislature, to ensure that a third party 
gains compensation. 
It appears, therefore, that similar to the issue of public policy, the judge’s arguments 
depend on either a literal and substantive law based interpretation of the RTA 1988, 
or a purposed and principled based approach by ensuring that the third party 
receives compensation. Unlike Bristol Alliance, this discussion involved third 
party compensation, rather than loss of a subrogated right by an insurer. The cases 
show that the Courts are reluctant to allow an insurer to refuse compensation to a 
third party. Of course, this is only obiter discussion in which the Court was not 
required to give confirmation. The above examination has been preliminarily about 
the exclusion clause relating to ‘deliberately caused damage’ and whether 
deliberate acts, in general, would allow third party compensation. Moreover, as well 
as the individual exclusion clause, the Courts  have been required to examine 
whether the scheme in general is to allow exclusion clauses to be used.  
Moreover, there is a significant issue here in balancing the rights of third parties to 
receive compensation, and attempting to ensure that premiums are kept lower. A 
wide interpretation of ‘accident’, it is submitted, would almost certainly increase 
premiums as it significantly increases the risk to the insurer. Additionally, it would 
certainly increase potential fraud by incentivising deliberate damage for the third 
party.   
Interpreting All Exclusion clauses under the RTA 
Both Rix LJ and Ward LJ’s judgments came down to the question as to whether a 
different approach to interpreting exclusion clauses was needed under the RTA 
1988, compared to the interpretation of other forms of contract and insurance, 
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which do not completely invalidate exclusion clauses. There were three possible 
outcomes.  First, the complete prohibition of use of all exclusion clauses against 
third parties limiting or invalidating third party coverage;275 second, a strict 
exclusion clause interpretation, which would not be a complete ban but rather a 
limitation on the use of types of policy term. Finally, allowing the insurer to limit their 
policy in any way except for the prohibited exclusion clauses in Sections 148 and 
151 RTA. In deciding this, both Ward LJ in Bristol Alliance and Rix LJ in Charlton 
v Fisher, focused on the wording of the RTA 1988, and the obligations that it 
imposes upon both the insured and insurers.  
 Insured’s Duty 
In Charlton, Rix LJ first and most crucially notes that the, ‘statutory duty to comply 
with the requirements in respect of compulsory insurance is upon the driver, not 
the insurer’.276 Consequently, it is the driver rather than the insurer who carries the 
obligation to comply with the compulsory insurance requirements within the RTA, 
the insurer is not under a correlative duty to provide insurance. Rix LJ noted this 
by stating that the insurers’ duty, under Section 151, to meet a judgment obtained 
against a person in respect of third party liability, is something separate. 
Consequently, although the user is obliged to obtain a policy of insurance which 
covers him for whatever use he puts his vehicle, statute requires him to be insured 
for it in respect of third party risks, there is not a similar obligation on the insurer to 
cover him in respect of any and every use to which the user may put his car.277 
This is crucial because if there was a duty on the insurer to cover every use rather 
than the driver, then exclusion clauses would be prohibited due to the insurers’ 
unlimited duty. Ward LJ in Bristol Alliance agreed with Rix LJ’s dictum in 
Charlton, and stated: 
 “The important words in section 143 are “in relation to the use of the 
vehicle”. In other words the user's duty (and no one else's) is to 
ensure that insurance cover is in place whenever and however he 
                                                          
275 Therefore, policy terms could still be used in the contract against the insured.  
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uses the vehicle. If the use is not covered then he is not insured 
and criminal sanctions will follow that illegal use”.278 
This accords with the judgment of Branson J in Gray279 who stated that, ‘if the 
insured takes the car upon the road in breach of those conditions, it cannot thereby 
throw a greater obligation upon the underwriter’.280 This is in contrast with the 
approach of Lord Hailsham in the House of Lords in Gardner,281 who stated that 
there is a duty on the insured to cover for the use of the vehicle reinforced by 
criminal sanction. Overall, however, the honourable judge treated the primary 
obligation to cover for all uses as one which falls upon the insurer to cover, rather 
than the insured.282 This is contrary to the cases mentioned above, as well as the 
dictum of Lord Denning in Hardy,283 who stated:  
“The policy of insurance which the motorist is required by statute to 
take out must cover any liability which may be incurred by him arising 
out of the use of the vehicle by him…for it is a liability which the 
motorist, under the statute, was required to cover”.284 
It seems the consensus, therefore, is to follow Lord Denning, Rix LJ, and Branson 
J, that the duty to comply with the requirements is one which rests upon the insured 
and not the insurer.  
Implications within the Current Law 
Another powerful argument made by both Rix LJ and Ward LJ was that Section 
148, through giving a list of prohibited exclusion clauses, implies that other 
exclusion clauses are valid. This is an interesting argument, as it is a general rule 
that when there is a list of invalid exclusion clauses, anything that is not on that list 
is valid. However, it is arguable that this is not always the case. For example, 
Article 13 of the Sixth Directive comparably gives a list of invalid exclusion 
clauses, however, these are not deemed as exhaustive by the CJEU,285 and other 
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exclusion clauses have later been regarded as prohibited. It is difficult to establish, 
therefore, whether this is also the case for Section 148, as case law, other than 
mentioned in this chapter, has not questioned its exhaustiveness.286 
Unfortunately, little exists historically which aides the interpretation of Section 148, 
although all evidence points to Section 148 being exhaustive of prohibited 
exclusion clauses. For example, the leading motor insurance text in the 1930’s 
written by Shawcross simply differentiates between the listed clauses which he 
argues are prohibited and those which are not listed, which he argues are permitted 
exclusion clauses.287 Similarly, in the Cassel Committee consultation (as examined 
on pages 50-57) a list of commonly used exclusion clauses was provided which 
were again divided between clauses which were valid and those which were invalid 
based on whether they were included within Section 148.288 
The issue is not completely clear, as Section 148 remains fundamentally 
unchanged from the originally enacted Section in the RTA 1934 with little clarity or 
interpretation. Prohibited terms listed within the Act were the most commonly used 
exclusions against third parties in the 1930’s. Consequently, as policies have 
changed drastically since then, it is arguable, that other terms could be added into 
Section 148, or possibly implied into Section 148 by the Courts where they are 
used most often. This would seemingly satisfy the original intention of the 
legislature and would further suggest that the UK follows a comparable route to the 
EU which introduced a limited list of exclusion clauses in Article 13. The Article 
would be expanded later by the courts or through another Directive. Of course, this 
issue has been overlooked, as exclusion clauses have not been added by either 
the courts or Legislature in the UK, because of the limited practical importance due 
to the role of the MIB.289 
Another implication within the current legislative regime utilised by Ward LJ in 
Bristol Alliance, can be found in the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Risks) 
Regulations 1972, which prescribed the form of a certificate of insurance required 
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287 Shawcross (n 74), 316. 
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to be issued by the authorised insurer. Regulation 5 (1) of the 1972 Regulations 
states:  
“A company shall issue to every holder of a security or of a policy 
other than a covering note issued by the company…in the case of a 
policy…relating to one or more specified vehicles a certificate of 
insurance in Form A” 
‘Form A’ requires the following information to be given within the certificate:  
 “Certificate number…policy number…Registration mark of 
vehicle...Name of policy holder…Effective date of commencement 
of insurance for the purposes of the relevant law… Date of expiry of 
insurance…Persons or classes of persons entitled to 
drive...Limitations as to use”.290 
It is evident, therefore, that this form appreciates that the insurer may use 
limitations or exclusion clauses, it is unclear whether the use of exclusion clauses 
are related first or third parties, however, the provision says nothing which would 
prevent their use or validity.  
This is not an entirely new concept as the original 1930 and 1934 RTA’s evidently 
anticipated the use of limitations such as with Regulation 12 (1) (d) of the Motor 
Vehicles (Third Party Risks) Regulations 1933 requiring ‘the conditions subject 
to which the persons…specified in the policy will be indemnified’ to be inserted into 
the policy. Consequently, the insertion of use limitations in the standard form of 
policy has been pre-empted by the legislature since the introduction of compulsory 
insurance.291 It is apparent that judges agree that the effect of the current 
Legislation and Regulations is that these limitations are contemplated. As stated 
by Brooke J in Keeley v Pashen (henceforth ‘Keeley’),292 which examined the 
limitation involving the interpretation of the limitation to ‘social, domestic and 
pleasure purposes’:  
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“In Gardner v Moore [1984] AC 548, 555, 562, Lord Hailsham of St 
Marylebone LC overlooked the possibility that under the Act and the 
Regulations293 a motor insurer may impose express limitations on 
the third party cover it provides”. 294 
Consequently, the consensus between judges and academics is that the 
Regulations and standard form of policy allude to the fact that the utilisation of 
exclusion clauses is expected. Of course, this does not automatically validate 
exclusion clauses. Arguably, the legislature would rather that the insurer inserts 
exclusion clauses transparently to the third party in standard form, than disguise 
them. 
Section 151 
 “Covered by the Terms of the Policy” 
Despite evidence clearly pointing to the allowance of terms due to implications 
within the RTA 1988 and Regulation, both Ward LJ and Rix LJ decided to 
strengthen their judgments, through the examination and interpretation of Section 
151. Ward LJ stated that under Section 151, to gain compensation there are four 
conditions which the third party must satisfy:  
“(1) that “a certificate of insurance has been delivered under section 
147 ” ( section 151 ); (2) that “a judgment to which this subsection 
applies is obtained” ( section 151(1) ); (3) that the judgment relates 
“to a liability with respect to any matter where liability with respect to 
that matter is required to be covered by a policy of insurance under 
section 145 ” ( section 151(2) ); and (4) that the liability is “covered 
by the terms of the policy … to which the certificate relates”: 
section 151(2)(a)”.295 
Ward LJ stated that the first three conditions had been satisfied, as a certificate 
had been issued and a judgment had been obtained, which related to the liability 
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required to be covered. It was only the final condition, that the accident was 
‘covered by the terms of the policy’ which was to be considered. This key phrase 
was initially contained within Section 10 RTA 1934  with Shawcross noting that:  
“It is enough to refer the reader to the phrase....”covered by the 
policy”, and to remind him that a policy of motor insurance, whether 
made by means of a proposal form or an automatic money-in-slot 
machine, is and will remain a contract, and the fundamental rule of 
English law still lives that people can make whatever contract they 
please”.296 
Shawcross believed that due to the introduction of this term in the RTA 1934, 
insurers were entitled to avoid liability under the policy against third parties.. 
Shawcross gave the example of a policy containing a clause which stated that the 
car is not covered when being used for the purposes of the motor trade, if the car 
is used for that purpose, the terms of the policy do not cover the accident. 
Consequently, Shawcross noted, the third party would not receive 
compensation.297 
This seems to be the consensus amongst judges past and present. For example, 
in the Scottish case of Robb v M'kechnie,298 the driver of a lorry was prosecuted 
for being uninsured, after driving a lorry with a trailer attached, which was excluded 
under the policy. The driver was prosecuted and tried to utilise Section 10 RTA 
1934 to show that the third party would be compensated. The judges disagreed 
and Lord Justice-Clerk (Aitchison) stated:  
“Where a person with a claim against the person insured, in respect 
of a liability which is covered by the terms of the insured person's 
policy, has obtained judgment, he may go against the insurance 
company. But, then… upon the wording of the section itself, that the 
necessary condition precedent is not only judgment in respect of the 
liability but—and this is the important thing… the liability be a liability 
covered by the terms of the policy. If that condition is not satisfied, 
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then the section has no application…the policy does not cover 
the use of the vehicle when drawing a trailer”.299 
This therefore seems to follow the opinion of Shawcross. Rix LJ in Charlton was 
cautious about limiting the usefulness to third parties of the direct right of action 
under Section 151 and therefore only briefly examined it. Rix LJ examined the 
Hardy and Gardner judgments, which inferred that policies must cover all uses of 
the vehicle even in cases of deliberate acts, and stated that this would fall within 
its’ terms. Rix LJ stated that these cases did not have an insurance policy to 
construe and therefore the Courts could take a different direction where a policy 
fell to be construed. His Lordship stated:  
“The difficulty then, as it seems to me, is that it would seem to be 
arguable that the direct cause of action against an insurer vested in 
a third party who has obtained a judgment relating to a third party 
liability in respect of which the insured is required to be covered does 
not cover every situation but only, for instance, situations where it is 
‘a liability covered by the terms of the policy’”.300  
This interpretation of Section 151 was propounded by the motor insurers in both 
Bristol Alliance cases. The insurers argued that because there was an exclusion 
clause in the policy allowing repudiation in relation to deliberately caused damage, 
the incident and subsequent damage was not covered within the terms of the 
policy, a requirement of Section 151. Tugendhat J in the High Court recognised 
the force of the propositions expounded by Rix LJ in relation to Section 151, but 
did not examine the provision in any depth. Instead, his Lordship, preferred the 
analysis of Laws LJ in Charlton, that third parties should be protected from harm, 
and this overrides requirement for compensation to be within the terms of the policy 
in Section 151.301 Ward LJ took the alternative view that:  
“Liability for this damage is not covered by the terms of the policy 
because the terms of this policy expressly exclude any damage 
caused by the deliberate act of the driver. It is as short and as simple 
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and as attractive as that…The meaning is clear enough: the 
insurers’ liability must not only be of the kind which the Act 
requires must be covered but it must also actually be covered 
by the policy”.302 
Consequently, it is clear from Ward LJ’s judgment that the damage fell outside of 
the scope of the policy due to the exclusion clause. It is submitted that this is clearly 
the correct interpretation by Ward LJ. This can be seen through the Privy Council 
judgment in Insurance Company of the Bahamas Ltd v Antonio (henceforth 
‘Antonio’).303 Privy Council judgments are not binding in UK law, although they are 
persuasive, and the Bahamas has comparable legislation under its’ Road Traffic 
Act 1991 including the use of term, ‘covered by the terms of the policy’ in the same 
context as used in the UK’s Section 151 RTA. The Antonio case concerned an 
incident where a driver lost his sight after a collision with a bus; the vehicle driver 
gained a judgment for negligence against the bus driver’s employers whose 
insurers refused to pay because the driver of the bus was not within the coverage 
of the policy. 
The claimant argued that all exclusion clauses of coverage were invalid under 
Section 12 of the Bahamas RTA (identical to Section 151 in UK), and 
consequently, the insurer was liable to pay. The Privy Council held that the insurers 
could repudiate liability, because the accident was not within the scope of the 
policy. Lord Mance stated that: 
“Nothing… in the language of section 12(1) of the Road Traffic Act 
makes insurers liable to meet a third party liability judgment against 
their insured regardless of any restriction in the scope of cover. The 
Court of Appeal's (in this case) second ground of decision amounts 
to deleting from section 12(1) the critical bracketed qualification 
“being a liability covered by the terms of the policy”.304 
Consequently, with no Bureau to compensate, the injured victim was left without a 
remedy. It is submitted that Lord Mance effectively gives the terms, ‘covered by the 
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terms of the policy’ important meaning due his Lordship’s status as a Supreme 
Court judge (despite being in relation to a case from a different jurisdiction). This 
therefore enforces the dicta of Ward LJ, that this term allows the insurer to 
repudiate liability if the accident does not come within its' terms. This gives the term 
the meaning which was clearly intended in the original RTA 1934 which was 
criticised for permitting insurers to repudiate liability as previous cases such as 
Robb v M'kechnie signify.  
 “To which the certificate relates” 
The claimant’s final argument in Bristol Alliance, was that the words ‘to which the 
certificate relates’, inserted in the RTA 1960 under Section 207 should be given 
meaning. It has long been held that the certificate of insurance does not override 
the policy; the policy prevails in any potential conflict.305 However, as highlighted 
by Professor Merkin there was a, ‘possible argument that the certificate did override 
the policy where the policy itself did not provide the cover required by the RTA’.306  
The claimants suggested that the interpretation of the phrase should be that the 
certificate of insurance amounted to confirmation that the policy conformed to the 
requirements of the RTA 1988, meaning, that it should cover all liability including 
deliberate acts. Ward LJ, however, disagreed with the claimant’s interpretation of 
the term, and stated that they have not made any difference in relation to exclusion 
clauses. Ward LJ stated that these additional words do serve a purpose, namely to 
link the first requirement (delivery of a certificate of insurance) to the  policy which 
covers the liability. His Lordship stated:  
“This section applies where; after a certificate of insurance has been 
delivered to the person … judgment is obtained... The judgment is 
defined in section 151(2) being a judgment relating to a liability with 
respect to any matter where liability with respect to that matter is 
required to be covered by a policy of insurance under section 145, 
note the indefinite article…Clarification is given by section 151(2)(a) 
. The liability must be “covered by the terms of the policy to which 
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the certificate relates” …We are looking for the policy to which the 
certificate of insurance relates”.307 
Consequently, the words ‘to which the certificate relates’ are not otiose, if the 
certificate does comply with the RTA 1988, it does not override the terms of the 
policy. This argument, however, is no longer significant, as the Deregulation Act 
2015308 repealed the words ‘to which the certificate relates’. This essentially means 
that it is the policy of insurance which is important to the coverage and not the 
certificate. Thus, the certificate’s interpretation does not play an important role in 
deciding whether the policy covers the accident. 
It is evident that  two very different approaches were taken by Ward LJ in Bristol 
Alliance and Rix LJ in Charlton, compared to Tugendhat J in Bristol Alliance and 
Laws LJ in Charlton. Whereas the later took a principled approach based on the 
original premise of the RTA 1988 the former focussed on statutory interpretation 
by applying the provisions of the RTA 1988 to the accident. It is submitted that Rix 
LJ and Ward LJ’s judgments are to be preferred as this is the interpretation that 
Parliament took when introducing the original statute, third parties of road traffic 
accidents were never meant to be fully covered in every situation by the insurance 
policy.  
The above cases, however, show the difficulty in interpreting the RTA 1988 in 
relation to exclusion clauses. There are significantly different interpretations of the 
Act both of which are reasonable. The Hardy and Gardner cases have added 
another layer of complexity by examining the Act from a much wider perspective 
through the policy approaches. Consequently, whilst Ward LJ’s interpretation in 
Bristol Alliance is to be preferred, it would be unsurprising if another future court 
examined this, particularly as the main source of motor insurance law through the 
EU is likely to be removed through Brexit.309 
 The MIB 
The MIB will be discussed in Chapter Seven, however the use of Article 79 in the 
MIB Agreements is clear evidence for the permission of exclusion clauses beyond 
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the RTA. The MIB is a private body containing all insurers who conduct motor 
insurance business in the UK, its’ Uninsured and Untraced Drivers’ Agreements 
are entered with the Department for Transport. Under Article 79 of the MIB’s 
Articles of Association,310 if an insurer can be found, but it has repudiated liability, 
then they must pay as an agent of the MIB and under the MIB’s Agreements. 
These, ‘Article 79 Insurers’ include where, ‘iii) the use of the vehicle is other than 
that permitted under the policy’.311 
It is arguable that Article 79 is merely within the Articles of Association of a private 
body, and therefore does not determine whether insurers can repudiate liability 
against third parties. However, as noted within the MIB’s 2015 UDA, which is 
between itself and Secretary of State for Transport, ‘MIB may perform its 
obligations under this Agreement by agents’,312 which would certainly include 
insurers. This fits with the idea that insurers could utilise exclusion clauses other 
than in Section 148. 
Post-Bristol Alliance 
Ward LJ’s judgment and reasoning in Bristol Alliance was later re-affirmed by the 
judgment of Longmore LJ in Sahin.313 His Lordship examined both UK and EU law 
relating to exclusion clauses, although in much less depth than Ward LJ. Here, Ms 
Havard, who had insurance and hired a vehicle, permitted someone else, who did 
not have insurance, to drive. The claimant made a claim against the insurer of the 
hire car company for damages caused. The insurer argued that the damage caused 
by a person who gave their vehicle to an uninsured person was not required to be 
covered under the policy, and the policy did not cover this either, because the policy 
contained the following exclusion clause:  
“any liability loss of damage incurred whilst any Insured Vehicle is: 
... Being driven by any person not permitted by the Certificate of 
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Insurance or any Endorsement(s) attaching to and forming part of 
this Policy Document”.314 
Longmore LJ followed Ward LJ’s judgment in relation to domestic law.315 His 
Lordship re-affirmed Ward LJ’s dictum that: ‘there is no exhaustive list of matters 
which cannot be excluded and other exclusion clauses are “effective”’,316 and 
further stated that, ‘an exclusion for liability for loss incurred by someone driving a 
vehicle without permission will be effective as a matter of domestic law’.317 This 
therefore confirms Ward LJ’s UK law interpretation. It is notable, however, that 
Longmore LJ’s judgment was much shorter than Ward LJ’s in relation to national 
law, as his Lordship did not examine previous judgments relating to the policy 
behind the RTA 1988 such as Charlton v Fisher,318 potentially because Ward LJ’s 
judgment is very persuasive. 
The claimants in Sahin had requested permission to appeal to the Supreme Court, 
however, this was refused due to reasons relating to EU law. Consequently, the 
case alongside Bristol Alliance is currently binding, meaning that under UK law 
some exclusion clauses are permitted.  
Part III: Which Exclusion Clauses are prohibited and permitted 
under the RTA? 
 
In re-visiting the original potential outcomes which were to be decided by Ward LJ, 
it is clear to see that the first outcome, ‘the complete prohibition of use of all policy 
terms against third parties which limit or invalidate third party coverage’,319 has 
been disregarded by Ward LJ and Longmore LJ. Thus, one of the other outcomes 
are valid, which is either, ‘a strict policy term interpretation which would not be a 
complete ban but rather a limitation on the use of particular policy terms’ or, 
‘allowing the insurer to limit their policy in any way except for the prohibited policy 
terms in Sections 148 and 151 RTA’.320 With the issue largely irrelevant in 
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Charlton, it was only Ward LJ in Bristol Alliance and Longmore LJ in Sahin, who 
could authoritatively answer the question as to which exclusion clauses are 
permitted and prohibited against third parties.  
Longmore LJ in Sahin gave two examples of exclusion clauses which are 
permitted. First, in relation to deliberately caused damage as was used in Bristol 
Alliance, and second, in relation to, ‘an exclusion for liability for loss incurred by 
someone driving a vehicle without permission’.321 This exclusion clause is 
comparable to the ‘unlawfully taken’ exclusion expressly permitted in Section 151 
(4) RTA 1988, although it goes beyond the permitted ‘stolen vehicle’ exclusion in 
EU Law.322   
Ward LJ did not specify which exclusion clauses are permitted, although his 
Lordship stated that, ‘There is no exhaustive list of matters which cannot be 
excluded from the cover of the policy. Other exclusion clauses are effective’.323 
Consequently, his Lordship seemingly pointed towards validity of most other 
exclusion clauses which are not contained in Section 148. This still does not 
conclusively determine whether there are other clauses which cannot be used 
against a third party, but that there is no exhaustive list which is permitted.  
Ward LJ pointed to the permitted, ‘limitation of use’ clauses which have, ‘never 
been doubted’324 and the clause restricting coverage to, ‘social domestic and 
pleasure purposes’, therefore excluding business use. Ward LJ argued that, if this 
clause was broken, it would mean that the driver is uninsured, and further opined 
that this was to ensure that insurers could reduce the cost of premiums and drivers 
could obtain a policy which suits their needs which, ‘has to be good for us all’.325 
This follows the arguments made by the BIA in the Cassel Committee Consultation 
(Pages 51-55) that some ‘limitations of use’ are beneficial, due to potential to offer 
lower premiums resulting from decreased risk.   
It is apparent that Ward LJ’s analysis of ‘social domestic and pleasure purposes’ 
clauses is compatible with the majority of previous cases. For example, in Seddon 
                                                          
321 Sahin v Havard (n 208), [22]. 
322 This will be discussed in the next Chapter, however see the case of McMinn v McMinn [2006] 
EWHC 827 (QB) for the key differences between ‘stolen’ and ‘unlawful taking’. 
323 Bristol Alliance (n 15), [45]. 
324 Ibid. 
325 Ibid. 
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v Binions,326 the Court permitted the exclusion clause to be used against a third 
party when it was broken by a father giving a lift to his son in course of business. 
Similarly, in Keeley,327 there was no question as to the use of this exclusion 
although there was no evidence of breach in that case.328 In Wastell v 
Woodward329 the Court did not permit an exclusion clause relating to ‘business 
use’ and failed to acknowledge that any exclusion clauses are valid  by relying on 
Section 145. This, therefore, contrasts significantly with Ward LJ’s reasoning in 
Bristol Alliance that these clauses have, ‘never been doubted’, and doubts the 
relevance and applicability of this most utilised clause.  
Apart from the Courts’ reluctance to allow an exclusion relating to business use in 
Wastell v Woodward, it seems that the majority of, ‘limitations of use’ clauses are 
seen favourably, as previous cases demonstrate. For example, excluding ‘use’ in 
the motor trade was permitted in Browning v Phoenix Assurance Co Ltd.330 
Moreover, an exclusion clause is evidently permitted in relation to towing, as found 
in the early case of Gray v Blackmore.331 Moreover, an exclusion clause relating 
to the use of the vehicle for, ‘hire or reward’, such as in the criminal case of Singh 
v Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council,332 (henceforth ‘Singh v Solihull’) where 
Collins J inferred that this was permitted by stating: 
“The prohibited conditions shows that there may well be other 
conditions which are not prohibited and, as it seems to me, to use 
the vehicle in contravention of one of those conditions would 
mean that there was no insurance within the terms of the Act in 
s.143”.333 
Collins J therefore reinforces the majority of previous judgments that the 
contravention of a ‘limitation of use’, would mean that the insurer could repudiate 
liability. Of course, as stated previously on page 53, there is evidently a clear 
                                                          
326 Seddon v Binions [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 381. 
327 [2004] EWCA Civ 1491. 
328 See also earlier case of Jenkins v Deane (1933) 103 L.J.K.B 250 containing similar clause. 
329 Christopher Wastell v The Estate of Gordon John Woodward (Deceased), Chaucer Syndicates 
Limited 2017 WL 00956511. 
330 [1960] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 360. 
331 [1934] 1 K.B. 95. 
332 [2007] EWHC 552 (Admin). 
333 Ibid, [30], emphasis added. 
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rationale for the allowance of these clauses as they affect the rating of vehicles as 
well as public safety. Similarly, in relation to public safety, exclusion clauses have 
been successfully used in relation to ‘racing’. In Pinn v Guo,334 an insurer could 
transfer liability to the MIB in relation to a claim from a spectator, for participation 
in an illegal race on public roads. Whilst there were issues in relation to the 
interpretation of policy wordings and whether the facts of the case covered these, 
Judge Vosper QC found that the accident was outside of the policy, and therefore, 
racing was permitted. 
With ‘limitation of use’ clauses being examined favourably by the courts, it is 
questionable whether other exclusion clauses are also permitted beyond these. In 
relation to the term involving ‘deliberately caused damage’, Ward LJ in Bristol 
Alliance found that there was no adequate reason that the clause would not be 
permitted, as it is, prima facie, comparable to ‘limitation of use’ clauses.335 
Hemsworth,336 however, noticed a flaw in such reasoning, as ‘use’ refers to the 
insured vehicle in the sense of the activity, such as for a purpose. Whereas, 
‘intentionality’ (of the insured/driver) in causing damage refers to an individual’s 
state of mind. Accordingly, ‘one is simply not comparing like with like’.337 It is 
submitted that Hemsworth is correct and that Ward LJ was mistaken in comparing 
‘limitation of use’ clauses and exclusion clauses in relation to the insured’s state of 
mind. The latter is determined using the term ‘accident’, which, as stated previously 
on pages 81-82, is interpreted as including damage caused deliberately. The term 
‘accident’ was inserted within policy by the insurers in Bristol Alliance, and 
therefore following on from the interpretation given by Laws LJ in Charlton, the 
policy is contradictory. This is because the policy permits deliberate damage in 
utilising the term ‘accident’, but then prohibits it by using an express exclusion 
clauses damage deliberately caused. It is therefore, unclear whether the 
‘deliberately caused damage’ term is indeed permitted, due to the difficult 
reasoning of Ward LJ and the contradictory insurance policy.  
                                                          
334 Miss Sian Pinn, Mr Huw Rhodri Bevan v Mr Jia Guo, Zenith Insurance Management Ltd, Mr 
Michael Vincent Palumbo, AIG Europe Limited 2014 WL 12546268. 
335 Bristol Alliance, (n 15), [45]. 
336 Hemsworth M, (n 22). 
337 Ibid, 360. 
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Ward LJ only mentioned limitation of use clauses and deliberately caused damage, 
and therefore as stated above, it is unclear whether other exclusion clauses are 
permitted. An area, which it is submitted, an exclusion clause could be used is in 
relation to the driver. It could be imputed that, as Ward LJ mentioned that ‘limitation 
of use’ clauses could be ‘good for us all’, due to a reduced premium, the judge 
would also have been in favour of exclusion clauses limiting driving to a person or 
classes of person. This is because, as emphasised by the BIA in the Cassel 
Consultation,338 these too would confer a substantially less premium. Of course, 
Section 151 RTA states that so much of the policy which purports to restrict the 
use of the vehicle, ‘by reference to the holding of the driver of the vehicle of a 
licence authorising him to drive it’ is ineffective on the right of the victim to bring a 
direct action against the insurers. Accordingly, third parties can recover in relation 
to unlicensed drivers, this also includes clauses in relation to drivers who only have 
provisional licences,339 or who breach license terms as well as disqualified 
drivers.340 This, however, may not extend to exclusion clauses relating to drivers 
who may not be competent, clauses relating to vehicles taken without consent or if 
the driver has a criminal conviction.  
It is clear therefore that there is difficulty in deciding which terms are permitted and 
which terms are prohibited. This is likely to either be clarified eventually in statute, 
or through further individual judgments. It is submitted that this is an unsatisfactory 
situation due to significant uncertainty, and as evidenced by Wastell v Woodward, 
contradictory judgments. The list of prohibited exclusion was introduced 80 years 
ago, and it is therefore inexcusable that the legislature has largely ignored this 
provision.  
Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we have attempted to examine the validity of exclusion clauses 
within the RTA 1988. This has been complex due to competing policy 
considerations.  
                                                          
338 See pages 50-57 
339 See Professor Merkin (n 23), 184. 
340 Ibid. 
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However, it is notable that the list of prohibited exclusion clauses in Section 148 
are relatively straight forward, due to clear interpretation by both courts and 
academics. The interpretation of these is also consistent and is aided by occasional 
case law from other jurisdictions, making it uncomplicated to see what fits within 
these provisions.  
Conversely, the difficulty arises in determining whether the list of prohibited 
exclusion clauses is exhaustive. The Courts, when interpreting the Act have found 
difficulty in balancing the policy considerations. As noted in both Hardy341 and 
Gardner,342 the duty to compensate third parties, is in conflict with the insurers’ 
right to repudiate liability and needing to keep premiums low. The Hardy and 
Gardner cases were balanced in favour of the third party, although later cases 
such as Charlton,343 have left the judge’s finding difficulty in balancing this. A 
further difficulty is whether the Act should be interpreted based on its policy aims 
or through its wording. Laws LJ in Charlton and Tugendhat J in Bristol Alliance344 
both used the policy of the RTA 1988 and policy behind motor insurance, whereas 
Rix LJ in Charlton and Ward LJ in Bristol Alliance used the wording of the Act.  
Ward LJ’s in Bristol Alliance is the authoritative judgment, which was later re-
affirmed by Longmore LJ in Sahin.345 Ward LJ utilised Section 151 RTA and 
meaning of the phrase ‘covered by the terms of the policy’ in finding that exclusion 
clauses can be used. It is submitted that Ward LJ was correct in that Section 151 
clearly shows that the legislature intended for exclusion clauses to be permitted.  
Uncertainty exists, however, as to the extent that exclusion clauses are permitted, 
it seems from Ward LJs’ judgment that exclusion clauses relating to ‘use’ are 
permitted, although doubts exist as to Ward LJs’ interpretation of deliberate use.  
The prohibition of other exclusion clauses, however, is not entirely clear and this is 
clearly an uncertain and unsatisfactory situation. The author submits that it is likely 
that future courts will continue to permit exclusion clauses unless otherwise stated 
by the legislature in updates to the RTA.  
                                                          
341 Hardy (n 251). 
342 Gardner (n 259). 
343 Charlton (n 262). 
344 Bristol Alliance (n 43). 
345 Sahin (n 208). 
 101 
  
Overall therefore, this Chapters’ contribution to the thesis is through the 
interpretation of the prohibited exclusions in Section 148, and further through the 
examination of complex judgments, particularly from Ward LJ, providing that 
exclusion clauses, beyond Section 148, are permitted. It has further provided 
significant discussion on the extent to which exclusion clauses are permitted in UK 
law, which, due to confliction case law, is still uncertain and will be determined on 
a case by case basis.  
It is clear to see that the EU has influenced significant parts of the RTA 1988, 
particularly with exclusion clauses added Section 151 and, it seems to some 
extent, in the way in which exclusion clauses have been interpreted strictly on 
occasions such as was shown in Wastell v Woodward. It is important, therefore 
to examine the Directives and their implementation in the next chapters.  
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Chapter Four: The Motor Insurance Directives 
Introduction 
A significant influence upon UK law in recent history, in relation to exclusion 
clauses, comes from the EU. The EU regulates motor insurance law through the 
Sixth Directive, with the preliminary aims of harmonising cross-border travel, 
whilst ensuring consistently high protection for third party victims. Numerous 
decisions have further come from the then ECJ and CJEU, clarifying and 
reinforcing the Directives’ protective purpose. It is therefore important to examine 
EU regulation, its overall objectives, and its impact on exclusion clauses in motor 
policies.  
This Chapter will begin by examining the Directives individually, to see how each 
Directive has attempted to enhance third party protection and certainty, paying 
attention to the development of the law relating to exclusion clauses. It will then 
examine subsequent ECJ and CJEU decisions to see how they have interpreted 
the exclusion clause provisions of the Directives. It will pay attention to the issue of 
blameworthiness, which has caused the EU courts great difficulty, to understand 
whether exclusion clauses can be used against blameworthy third parties.  
Background 
As it became clear that disparities between the motor insurance laws of different 
EU Member States were becoming a major hindrance to the key European principle 
of the freedom of movement, which is crucial to the completion of a Single Market, 
the EU was forced to intervene to remove these disparities. The European Union 
(previously known as the European Community) introduced five Motor Insurance 
Directives to remove any inconsistencies, whilst ensuring that there is a minimum 
standard of protection for third party victims.  
The Directives have grown out of the green card scheme, introduced by the United 
Nations in 1949, to reduce cross-border litigation by permitting driving across 
borders on production of a green card. The scheme, however, resulted in long 
queues at borders, due to the need to check every green card and did nothing to 
harmonise substantive motor insurance laws. An attempt was further made to 
harmonise motor insurance through the European Convention on Compulsory 
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Insurance Against Civil Liability in Respect of Motor Vehicles 1959, although 
this only had five signatories and did little to harmonise motor insurance laws.346 
This Convention was later overtaken by a new harmonised system through the 
Motor Insurance Directives. The Directives were implemented to counter issues 
faced by the green card scheme (such as abolishing checks), and to harmonise 
substantive motor insurance laws across EU Member States. 
In relation to exclusion clauses, differences in Member States laws were one of the 
key hindrances to free movement. Cross border litigation issues were increased 
due to conflicts between Bureaux347 and insurers as to the compensation of victims 
when a clause was breached, causing delays. Consequently, the regulation of 
exclusion clauses was a key part of the implemented reforms. Of course, Directives 
are notoriously vague, and therefore much of the law comes from the judicial 
interpretation of Directives by the CJEU and further at domestic level through the 
implementation into statute and by the Courts.  
The Motor Insurance Directives 
There are currently five substantive Motor Insurance Directives and one codifying 
Directive, each with different aims to reflect the expanding EU. The Directives 
collectively represent social policy, seeking to minimise the impact on victims of 
large volumes of loss and injury occurring within the EU as a result of road traffic 
accidents.348 The Directives are progressive. As weaknesses became apparent, 
risking the creation of a barrier to free movement; a new Directive was introduced 
to reform those weaknesses. To minimise complexity, wherever possible, 
discussion will be made using the Articles of the Sixth Directive which 
consolidated all the currently enforced provisions from the other previous 
Directives.  
                                                          
346 For greater discussion, as to the provisions of the Convention see Victor Gerdes, “The European 
Convention on Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance” (1971), The Insurance Law Journal, 297-303.  
347 For the sake of clarity and consistency, the term ‘bureau’ will be used in this thesis, they are often 
referred to as the ‘compensation body’ also, particularly in the Directives.   
348 Papettas J, “The Law Applicable to Cross Border Road Traffic Accidents” PhD Thesis, University 
of Birmingham, September 2013, 133. 
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The First Motor Insurance Directive 
The First Motor Insurance Directive349 (henceforth ‘First Directive’) was 
introduced in 1972 to: ‘liberalize the rules regarding the movement of persons and 
motor vehicles travelling between Member States’.350 Through Article 3 (1) of the 
First Directive, each EU Member State was required to, ‘take all appropriate 
measures to ensure that all civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles 
normally based in its territory is covered by insurance’. 
Accordingly, all EU Member States were obliged to ensure that insurance was 
compulsory for every driver, essentially ensuring payment of all civil liability claims.  
There was uncertainty, however, as to the measures Member States were required 
to take to ensure that all civil liability was covered, although it was expected that 
this would be expanded in subsequent Directives.  
Article 4 permitted derogations from the requirement of compulsory insurance, as 
long as these derogations could still be paid by a compensation scheme or body 
from that Member State.351 These derogations were not explicitly set out, although 
the guidance from the Directive was that they could involve, ‘certain natural or legal 
persons, public or private’.352 The UK was already mostly compliant with the First 
Directive as compulsory insurance was introduced forty years earlier in the RTA 
1930. The Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) Regulations 1973 were 
introduced to extend compulsory motor insurance to territories other than the UK 
for the use of motor vehicles within the UK, ensuring full compliance with the 
Directives. 
Although the First Directive can be considered as a significant step towards the 
harmonisation of motor insurance, substantial disparities continued to exist 
between the different scopes and amounts of insurance coverage, as well as 
exclusion clauses in each Member State, which continued to become a substantial 
barrier to free movement. As emphasised by the Commission of European 
Communities, there were, ‘certain shortcomings or inaccuracies which are such as 
                                                          
349 Council Directive of 24th April 1972 on the Approximation of Laws of the Member States Relating to 
Insurance Against Civil Liability in Respect of the Use of Motor Vehicles, and to the Enforcement of 
the Obligation to Insure Against Such Liability (72/166/EEC). 
350 Ibid, [12]. 
351 Which in the UK is the Motor Insurers’ Bureau. 
352 The Member States were given a deadline of 31st December 1973 to implement the Directive. 
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may impede the smooth operation of the system’.353 Moreover, as stated by Dr 
Bevan: ‘Unfortunately the First Directive provided a wide margin of discretion on 
member states as to how its legislative objective was implemented both in form 
and substance’.354 Hence, it was clear that these shortcomings needed to be 
eliminated to ensure that free movement and the EU’s ambition of a Common 
Market was not hindered.  
The Second Motor Insurance Directive 
A Second Motor Insurance Directive355 (henceforth ‘Second Directive’) was 
introduced precisely to remove some of these inconsistencies and shortcomings. 
The fundamental objectives of the Directive were, first in the technical improvement 
of the First Directive, and second, by seeking to make the guarantees offered in 
various Member States more favourable for victims, by preventing the injured third 
party from being treated differently according to the Member State in which the 
accident took place. This was whilst at the same time ensuring that cover enjoyed 
by the insured person would not differ significantly depending on the Member State 
in which he was travelling.356 There were two key reforms within the Directives 
impacting exclusion clauses.  
It was evident that Member States had contrasting regulations in respect of 
Bureaux. For example, in Belgium, the Republic of Ireland, and Italy, if the 
uninsured vehicle responsible was registered in the Member State in which the 
accident occurred, the Bureaux would assume responsibility for personal injuries 
only.357 Whereas in Germany, France and the Netherlands, damage to property 
was payable. This resulted in substantial differences in the treatment of accident 
victims when the vehicle was uninsured.358 Consequently, to remove this anomaly, 
                                                          
353 Commission for European Communities, “Proposal for a Second Council Directive on the 
approximation of the laws of Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the 
use of motor vehicles” (Com (80) 469 final), 1. 
354 Nicholas Bevan “Mind the Gap: Ongoing developments in the United Kingdom resulting from the 
Government’s failure to fully implement the sixth European directive on motor insurance 
(2009/103/EC)” (2016) British Insurance Law Association Journal Issue 129, 2. 
355 Second Council Directive of 30th December 1983 on the Approximation of the Laws of Member 
States Relating to Insurance Against Civil Liability in Respect of the Use of Motor Vehicles 
(84/5/EEC). 
356 Objectives stated by Mr Zeccino, EU Parliament Resolution and Minutes, Sitting of Tuesday,13th 
October 1981 at 65. Also see definition given in White v White [2001] UKHL 9, 485. 
357 Ibid. 
358 Ibid.  
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Article 1 (2) of the Second Directive ensured that both property damage and 
personal injuries were covered by the respective Bureaux subject to limited 
exceptions.359 As far as the UK was concerned, compensation was already 
available in cases of both personal injury and property damage through the MIB,360 
and therefore no statutory amendment was needed. 
The second key reform came in the form of exclusion clauses. The European 
Commission, in the EU consultation for the Second Directive, emphasised that 
each Member State had different requirements when it came to the regulation of 
exclusion clauses, and their use against third parties.361 For example, in the 
Netherlands, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, the Bureaux would take over all 
third party claims from the insurer where an exclusion clause was breached by the 
insured. Consequently, the use of exclusion clauses against third parties was 
permitted.362 Whereas in the UK and Ireland, insurers could repudiate liability under 
the insurance contract, but would continue to compensate even when an exclusion 
clause was breached, but rather under an agreement with their respective 
Bureaux.363 Finally, in Italy, Germany, and Denmark, insurers were prohibited from 
availing themselves of exclusion clauses and were forced to compensate in every 
situation, even where the insured had breached an exclusion clause. The Bureaux 
were only liable for vehicles which had no insurance.364 
Because of these disparities, it was evident that third parties were being treated 
differently depending on the Member State where the accident occurred, causing 
confusion, as it was immediately unclear to the third party where they should direct 
their claim. Another issue caused by differences was that there were often: 
“Conflicts… between the fund and the bureau concerning the 
interpretation of the law of the country in which the accident occurred 
                                                          
359 According to Article 1 (4) the only exclusion permitted to be used by Bureaux was where a 
passenger entered into a vehicle knowing it to be uninsured. 
360 Which will be discussed in the next Chapter. 
361 Report Drawn Up on Behalf of the Legal Affairs Committee on the Proposal from the Commission 
of the European Communities to the Council (Doc 1-466/80) for a Second Directive on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of 
the use of motor vehicles (Document 1-427/81) 2. 
362 Ibid. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Ibid. 
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on the question whether the permitted exclusion amounts to a case 
of non-insurance or one in which the vehicle need not be insured”.365 
This was clearly an unsatisfactory situation, which made free movement much 
more difficult, as uncertainty concerning the interpretation of the laws of member 
states caused lengthy and expensive cross-border litigation proceedings, which 
was fundamentally detrimental to the accident victim. It was further an impairment 
of the Single Market by hindering the free movement of persons. Accordingly, in 
its’ recommendations for the Second Directive, the Commission proposed that all 
national laws on exclusion clauses should be harmonised to remove any disparity 
and confusion. The recommended provision stated:  
“Where an insurer refuses to make payment by the virtue of the law 
or of a contractual provision authorised by law, the vehicle shall 
be treated as an uninsured vehicle“. 366 
This provision, therefore, would have left it to the Bureau of each Member State to 
compensate when the insurer refused to pay. Insurers could then easily transfer 
liability to the Bureau and rely on exclusion clauses to repudiate liability against the 
injured victim. The European Commission argued that the proposed article would 
improve the position of the victim by guaranteeing compensation, without affecting 
the insurers’ obligation nor negating the insurance rating system or raising 
premiums.367 It is clear furthermore, that this provision would have enhanced the 
role of the respective Bureaux, whilst ensuring that the injured victim was 
compensated, because of the responsibilities conferred to the Bureaux in the 
eventually enacted Article 1 (4) of the Second Directive. This would lead to 
greater uniformity amongst Member States in respect of the effects of a contractual 
provision, which would arguably result in less confusion. It appears that conferring 
an enhanced role on the Bureaux was unpopular within the EU, as it would put the 
Bureaux under greater pressure, and would further encourage insurers to avoid 
liability in relatively easy circumstances.368 Moreover, the expression ‘authorised 
                                                          
365 Ibid, 3. 
366 Ibid, 9, emphasis added. 
367 See the last Chapter for discussion as to potential consequences for insurers if exclusions were 
void.  
368 Commission for European Communities (n 364). 
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by law’ in the proposed provision lacked clarity, as the definition and scope of the 
term, were not outlined. This would have been left open to the courts to interpret. 
The term would have almost certainly been interpreted differently by Member 
States, and would therefore increase potential conflict. 
The UK was sceptical of the provision and the enhanced role of the Bureaux. On 
19th May 1981, the House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities took evidence from the UK insurance industry on the proposed 
Second Directive and Article 2 (1). The MIB argued that the proposed increase 
in responsibility given to the Bureaux was ‘misconceived’,369 as by equating insured 
vehicles and uninsured vehicles, a situation would be created with potential for 
discrimination between the insurers of the Member State where the accident 
occurred and the insurers of visiting motorists coming from other Member States.  
The MIB argued, therefore, that such a provision would have, ‘much wider 
implications than is perhaps realised and would go much further than is necessary 
to deal with the existing problem’.370 The MIB was concerned that the introduction 
of the proposed provision would leave the situation unresolved, as there would 
continue to be discrimination between Member States. This, the MIB argued, would 
increase cross-border complexities and differences rather than remove them, 
which was something that the proposed provision had intended to avoid.371  
With such scepticism from the UK, changes to Article 2 were recommended, 
although uncertainty existed as to how to manage exclusion clauses. For example, 
in a European Parliament debate on the Second Directive, the Vice-President of 
the European Commission highlighted two alternative approaches to the regulation 
of contractual exclusion clauses: 
“There are two possible approaches: we could…establish a list of 
exceptions which could not be invoked against a victim but the list of 
exceptions…is not necessary exclusive…the second possible 
approach would be to set out a general rule…that no exceptions 
shall be valid against third parties. Here the difficulty would be that 
                                                          
369 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, “Motor Insurance”, 25th Report, 
19th May 1981, 9747/80: Com (80) 469, 6. 
370 Ibid, 7. 
371 Ibid. 
 109 
  
the same situation might be considered as an exception in one 
country and as a case of non-insurance in another. In our view, it is 
difficult to make an exhaustive list as to find a formula which is wide 
enough to all necessary cases”.372 
From the above statement, some restriction on the use of exclusion clauses was 
necessary, but the extent of that restriction was uncertain. This is because 
differences in interpretation by national courts meant that it was problematic to find 
a list of invalid or valid exclusion clauses which would fit every possible scenario 
and would be interpreted uniformly. Moreover, an exclusion clause in one Member 
State could be a case whereby the insurer would not need to insure a motor vehicle 
in another Member State. A difficulty would also be faced in complying with the key 
EU principle of subsidiarity373 which is where decisions are to be taken as closely 
as possible to the citizen. As by establishing a list of exclusion clauses which are 
void, the law is being decided by the European judicature rather than by the 
individual Member States. Accordingly, finding consistency and a satisfactory 
conclusion in this area seemed almost impossible, and it was therefore rather about 
finding a solution which would be implemented as consistently as possible 
throughout the EU.  
Reform, however, was clearly needed, and the UK MIB played a major role within 
the EU, through their consultation with the House of Lords, in deciding which 
approach was best suited. Ultimately, a compromise was reached, which did not 
seemingly provide for a complete prohibition on the use of exclusion clauses, nor 
provide that the Bureaux had an advanced role. The proposed and subsequently 
implemented Article 2 (1) (now Article 13) stated: 
“Each Member State shall take all necessary measures to ensure 
that any contractual provision contained in an insurance policy 
issued in accordance with Article 3 (1) of the Council Directive 
…which excludes from insurance vehicles driven by: persons who 
do not have explicit or implicit authorisation, or persons who are not 
in possession of a valid driving licence for the type of vehicle 
                                                          
372 Tugendhat, EU Parliament Resolution and Minutes, Sitting of Tuesday,13th October 1981, 70. 
373 Under Article 5 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union [2010] OJ 83/13–45. 
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concerned , or persons who are in breach of legal regulations of a 
technical nature in respect of mechanical condition or safety of the 
vehicle concerned, shall be considered invalid…in respect of claims 
for damages by third parties”.374 
Evidently, the EU did not attempt to introduce a full prohibition on exclusion 
clauses, and preferred to list three exclusion clauses which could not be utilised 
against third parties. Moreover, the preamble to the Second Directive also stated 
that: ‘it is in the interests of victims that the effects of certain exclusion clauses be 
limited to the insurer and the person responsible for the accident’. Consequently, 
the Second Directive is directed at the victim rather than the driver of the 
responsible vehicle, meaning, that under the Directive, exclusion clauses continue 
to be valid towards the responsible driver. It is notable that the provision does not, 
comparable to many Member States,375 provide the injured party with a right of 
direct action against the insurer, as the insured will be indemnified and will in turn 
pay the third party.  
Another provision included within Article 2 permitted the insurer to avoid payment 
for compensation paid by the social security body. Furthermore, the insurer could 
transfer liability to the Bureaux, when they could prove that the passenger entered 
the vehicle knowing that the vehicle was stolen, although completely refusing 
compensation in relation to a passenger in a stolen vehicle was avoided.  
It is further important to note that Article 2 (1) was limited purely to exclusion 
clauses. The EU Commission clarified during the consultation process that it would 
not intervene when Member States allowed cases involving false declaration of risk 
or deliberately caused damage (which the Commission pointed out was the case 
in France) to be treated as cases of non-insurance.  
The Third Motor Insurance Directive 
Although the Second Motor Insurance Directive partially eleminated the differences 
between Member States, especially in relation to policy coverage, it was 
                                                          
374 This article was almost identical to the one proposed by the UK MIB in the House of Lords Select 
Committee Report. It is therefore submitted that the MIB were the proposers of the provision, 
emphasis added.  
375 Such as the UK in Section 151 RTA. 
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recognised by the EU Legal Affairs Committee, that not all difficulties faced which 
affect victims of accidents could be overcome.376 A Third Motor Insurance 
Directive (henceforth ‘Third Directive’) was proposed to remove some of the most 
prominent difficulties which became clear from the first two Directives. One 
significant area of concern for the European Legislature was the rights of 
passengers. The Second Directive enhanced passenger rights by making it 
compulsory for insurance to cover the insured’s family members,377 and by 
nullifying certain exclusion clauses. Yet this continued to leave the majority of 
passengers who were not family members exposed, and often without 
compensation. It was highlighted by the European Commission, that some Member 
States such as Greece and Ireland did not provide compulsory cover for 
passengers,378 and many Member States did not cover where the insured or owner 
of the vehicle was a passenger.379 Moreover, some Member States had specific 
legislation excluding passengers in situations where their conduct may have 
contributed to the damage caused and insurers were inserting exclusion clauses 
to restrict their liability to passengers.380 The European Commission therefore 
contended that the situation was ‘unsatisfactory’, as passengers would often face 
unpleasant surprises when finding that they were unable to obtain compensation 
even when they were not at fault for the accident.381 
The Third Directive382 was therefore introduced, and provided that any personal 
injury liability towards passengers must be covered by insurance.383 The Directive 
stated that: ‘Whereas there are gaps in the compulsory insurance cover of motor 
vehicle passengers in certain Member States…such gaps should be filled’.384 The 
Directive further emphasised that this was necessary to, ‘protect this particularly 
                                                          
376 Commission of the European Communities (n 364), 26. 
377 Through Article 3. 
378 Proposal for a Third Council Directive on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
Relating to Insurance Against Civil Liability in Respect of the Use of Motor Vehicles (COM (88) 644 
final-SYN 165, Brussels, 20th December 1988). 
379 Ibid, 2. Such as in the UK which still does not have compulsory protection where the passenger 
who is insured allows another person to drive their car. See Churchill v Fitzgerald [2013] 1 W.L.R. 
1776. 
380 See Farrell v Whitty (C-356/05) [2007] E.C.R. I-3067which will be examined later in the Chapter 
which involved exclusions for passengers in a vehicle which was not designed for seating. 
381 Proposal for Third Council Directive, (n 381), 5. 
382 Third Council Directive of 14th May 1990 on the Approximation of Laws of the Member States 
Relating to Insurance Against Civil Liability in Respect of the Use of Motor Vehicles (90/232/EEC). 
383 Ibid, Article 1. 
384 Ibid. 
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vulnerable category of victims’.385 This, however, did not extend to the driver of the 
responsible vehicle, but went further to allow the insured who was passenger in the 
responsible vehicle to be covered. Of course, the legislature continued to allow an 
exclusion of passengers, with the passenger entering the vehicle knowing that the 
vehicle was stolen. However, it is unclear whether a passenger who was partially 
to blame would be excluded, the term ‘vulnerable’ appears incompatible with 
criminal or blameworthy. Although the Third Directive primarily relates to ensuring 
that insurance covers passengers, this seems to connote that exclusion clauses, 
which relate to passengers, would additionally be prohibited,386 and except for the 
exclusion mentioned above.  
Another important reform in relation to exclusion clauses came in the form of 
Article 4 of the Third Directive. As mentioned previously, a consequence of 
having different rules on exclusion clauses, depending on the Member States, was 
that there would often be conflicts between Bureaux and the insurer as to who 
would pay damages to the innocent victim, this would often be a time-consuming 
process. The Commission of the European Communities recognised that this 
continued to be problematic, and therefore proposed Article 4, which was 
subsequently enacted. Article 4 states that when there is conflict between Bureaux 
and insurers, Member States will designate the responsibility of paying to one of 
these who will then be able to gain re-imbursement from the other if necessary. 
This eliminates the potential time-consuming conflicts which are detrimental to the 
rights of third parties.  
Another area of reform for the Third Directive was in relation to differences 
between minimum amounts of cover required in Member States. Article 2 of the 
Directive stated that every motor insurance policy must guarantee the minimum 
amount of cover prescribed in the Member State visited, however, when the 
Member State where the vehicle is normally based prescribes a higher amount of 
cover, the latter determines the extent of compensation. Hence, this provision 
outwardly allows countries to have differing laws relating to insurance coverage, as 
long as the higher amount of cover is used. It is submitted, however, that Member 
                                                          
385 Ibid. 
386 This will be discussed later in the Chapter. 
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States must always have cover which is above the minimum prescribed by the 
Directives.  
The UK was one of the latter Member States to introduce passenger insurance in 
the Motor Vehicle (Passenger Insurance) Act 1971, but continued to comply with 
the Third Directive’s need to ensure that passengers were covered and therefore 
no change to the UK domestic regulation was warranted, except in relation to 
employees.387 
The Fourth and Fifth Directives 
Although the Third Directive helped close many of the loopholes in relation to 
passengers, some gaps in protection existed. It was argued that the previous 
system did not enable victims of road accidents outside their country of residence 
to be covered adequately in practice.388 The Fourth Motor Insurance Directive389 
(henceforth ‘Fourth Directive’) was introduced in 2000, and expanded the 
compulsory insurance scheme for the benefit of persons injured whilst visiting 
another Member State. The Fourth Directive gave a choice to the injured party as 
to whether they would like to pursue the negligent drivers’ insurers in either the 
Member State in which the accident occurred, or through the victims’ home 
Member State. Moreover, the Directive conferred the right upon the individual party 
to sue the insurer directly.390 
The Fifth Motor Insurance Directive391 (henceforth ‘Fifth Directive’) attempted to 
further enhance the rights of passengers and other vulnerable victims. Moreover, 
it was acknowledged that the Directives needed to be updated and improved, as 
                                                          
387 The RTA originally excluded compulsory liability to employees so as to avoid overlap with 
compulsory employer’s liability insurance legislation. However, after the creation of the Third 
Directive, the UK amended this through the Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) Regulations 
which amended Section 145 (4) (a) of the RTA 1988 to allow employees to be covered under Motor 
Insurance Rules. 
388 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a European Parliament and 
Council Directive on the approximation of laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil 
liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles and amending directives’ 73/239/EEC and 93/49/EEC 
(Fourth Motor Insurance Directive)’ (98/C 157/02), [2.5]. 
389 Fourth Council Directive of 11h May 2000 on the Approximation of Laws of the Member States 
Relating to Insurance Against Civil Liability in Respect of the Use of Motor Vehicles (2000/26/EEC). 
390 Ibid. 
391 Directive 2005/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 11th May 2005 
amending Council Directives 72/166/EEC 84/5/EEC 88/357/EEC 90/232/EEC 2000/26/EEC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use 
of motor vehicles. 
 114 
  
harmonised protection was still missing in certain situations due to gaps which 
became clear over time.392 Hence, the Fifth Directive amended each Directive 
individually. In relation to exclusion clauses, it became apparent through several 
cases being referred to the CJEU,393 that Member States had express legislation, 
or allowed insurers to repudiate liability through exclusion clauses. This was 
particularly when the insurer could prove that the passenger entered the vehicle 
knowing that the driver was intoxicated. The Directive highlighted that clauses such 
as these were placing into ‘jeopardy’ the major achievements of the Directives.394 
The Directive stated that, ‘the passenger is not usually in the position to assess the 
intoxication level of the driver’,395 and further that the objective of discouraging the 
driver from driving whilst intoxicated would not be achieved by reducing the 
insurance coverage of the passenger, even if they were aware of the increased risk 
due to the driver’s intoxication.396 Accordingly, legislative provisions and exclusion 
clauses that restricted insurance coverage for a passenger, when they knew that 
the driver was intoxicated, were required to be removed from the legislation, and 
contractual clauses were to be prohibited.  
This exclusion was subsequently introduced alongside the other prohibited 
exclusion clauses from the Second Directive within Article 13 of the Sixth 
Directive. Another significant provision of the Fifth Directive is in Recital 16 which 
states: 
 “Personal Injuries and damage to property suffered by pedestrians, 
cyclists and other non-motorised users of the road, who are usually 
the weakest party in an accident, should be covered by the 
                                                          
392 See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council 
Directives 72/166/EEC, 84/5/EEC, 88/357/EEC, 90/232/and Directive 2000/26/EC on insurance 
against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles COM (2002) 244 final at Recital 3. 
393 Candolin (n 217), and Storebrand Skadeforsikring AS v Finanger (E-1/99] [1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 863. 
394 Directive 2005/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 11th May 2005 
amending Council Directives 72/166/EEC 84/5/EEC 88/357/EEC 90/232/EEC 2000/26/EEC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use 
of motor vehicles, recital 15. 
395 Ibid. 
396 Ibid. 
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compulsory insurance of the vehicle involved in the accident where 
they are entitled to compensation under national civil law”.397 
This provision recognises that, as well as the strong emphasis on the protection of 
passengers, protection must also be offered to those physically weaker parties 
when involved in an accident, such as pedestrians.398 This provision, alongside the 
protection of passengers, fills many of the remaining gaps. It is uncertain whether 
because of this provision, victims of accidents who are driving, and who are not at 
fault, would receive similar treatment, as they are not expressly mentioned as a 
third party which require special protection in either the Third or Fifth Directives.  
Evidently, therefore, the overall theme of the Directives is to ensure the protection 
of the injured victim, and further that any inconsistencies between the national laws 
of Member States, which prejudice the rights of the victims, are removed. The 
Directives have attempted to limit the insurers’ right to introduce exclusion clauses 
within policies, although it is unclear from reading the Sixth Directive, the extent 
of this limitation. Of course, these Directives only provide a framework of the rules, 
which necessitate subsequent interpretation. Directives are not directly applicable 
and therefore require the Member State to implement them into their national law.  
A significant amount of interpretation was left to be decided by the CJEU, national 
legislatures and national courts.  We, therefore, turn briefly to examine how the UK 
legal landscape had immediately changed due to the provisions limiting exclusion 
clauses. 
Immediate Impact of the Directives on the UK Legal Landscape 
in Relation to Exclusion Clauses 
 
                                                          
397 Directive 2005/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 11th May 2005 
amending Council Directives 72/166/EEC 84/5/EEC 88/357/EEC 90/232/EEC 2000/26/EEC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use 
of motor vehicles at Recital 16 
398 It is also interesting to note that the proposed provision was much more controversial as it would 
have harmonised civil liability. It is not known why the EU judicature had altered the provision 
although this may have been in the face of fierce scepticism, especially amongst European Tort 
Academics, see for example Koch A in Koziol H and Steininger B, European Tort Law 2007: Tort and 
Insurance Law Yearbook (Springer, 2007) 610 who was very much against the harmonisation of tort 
law in Motor Insurance. 
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The RTA 1988 came into force midway through the consultation process for the 
creation of the Third Directive, and before any case law arose before the CJEU, 
concerning the issue of exclusion clauses. It was clear from consultation 
documents during the creation of the Second and Third Directives, alongside the 
implementation documents released subsequently, that the UK considered that the 
RTA 1988 would be virtually compliant with the Directives in relation to the use of 
exclusion clauses. Consequently, any amendments made due to the Directives 
would be minor. Professor Lewis writes:  
“It (the MIB) covers, at least in theory not only the bankrupt insurer, 
but also the driver who has taken out a policy but liability under it is 
successfully challenged by an insurer, with the driver being left 
uninsured for the accident in question”.399 
Professor Lewis did not examine the legality of this under EU law. However, UK 
legality was not questioned within the critical analysis of the article. A similar 
position was taken within the industry, as highlighted by the MIB in the House of 
Lords during the consultation for the Second Directive: 
“Article 2 would cause no difficulty in the United Kingdom since 
…measures have already been taken by the UK Government to see 
that contractual clauses cannot be used as a defence to third party 
claims”.400 
Since it was the MIB which originally proposed the text in the subsequently enacted 
Article 2 (1) during House of Lords consultation process, it is easy to see why there 
was confidence that the UK would be fully compliant. The RTA 1988, via Section 
148, restricted the use of certain exclusion clauses (these were discussed in 
Chapter Three).  
Article 13 listed three void exclusion clauses and the UK had already prohibited 
the use of one of these by inserting it in Section 148 (2) (b) (i.e. where the insured 
                                                          
399 Richard Lewis “Insurers’ Agreements not to Enforce Strict Legal Rights: Bargaining with 
Government and in the Shadow of the Law”, (1985), M.L.R., 48 (3), 280. 
400 Although it was the original Second Motor Insurance Directive proposal which the House of Lords 
had looked at, the MIB made recommendations which were identical to those enacted in Article 2 (1) 
of the Second Directive. See House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, 
“Motor Insurance” 25th Report, 19th May 1981, 9747/80: Com (80) 469, 6. 
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is in breach of legal regulations of a technical nature in respect of mechanical 
condition or safety of the vehicle). In relation to the other two express exclusion 
clauses prohibited by Article 13 (i.e. persons who do not have explicit or implicit 
authorisation to drive the vehicle, or persons who are not in possession of a valid 
driving licence for the type of vehicle concerned), it was recognised that the RTA 
1988 would need to be amended. This is because although the outcome in these 
circumstances had the practical benefits of extending voidance to use by 
unauthorised or unlicensed drivers by the recourse to the MIB, there were 
questions surrounding the acceptability of this. The Department for Transport, for 
example, were unsure and stated that: ‘The Department is advised that it must 
have regard to specific results required by the Directive and not just the practical 
outcome’.401 
Despite the victim being guaranteed compensation through the MIB, the RTA 1988 
would need to be altered to comply with the Directives, by ensuring that such 
exclusion clauses could not be used by the insurer. These provisions were inserted 
in Section 151 (3), which stated that when deciding whether a liability would be 
covered by the terms of the policy, any reference to the holding by the driver of the 
vehicle of a licence authorising him to drive it, was treated as void. Moreover, in 
relation to the expressly nullified exclusion in the Fifth Directive (where the 
passenger enters a vehicle when they know that the driver is intoxicated), this 
would most likely be covered by Section 148 (2) preventing exclusion clauses from 
being utilised in relation to the age or physical or mental condition of persons driving 
the vehicle. Thus, whilst some minor amendments were needed to be made by the 
UK, the introduction of the Second Directive only minimally affected the immediate 
legal landscape.  
Although the UK government made changes enforced by the Directives quickly, 
uncertainty existed because the Directives had not been interpreted before by 
either EU or UK Courts. It is therefore important to examine how the European 
Courts have interpreted the Directives.  
                                                          
401 Department for Transport, “Giving Effect to the Second European Community Motor Insurance 
Directive” London, 1984 (DEP 1024), [2.3]. 
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Directives Interpreted by the CJEU 
Many cases have come before the CJEU as well as other European Courts402 
which have been referred up by appellate courts in different Member States.  It is 
now important to examine two key questions which concern the Directive’s 
provisions relating to exclusion clauses contained in Article 13 which were 
considered in the key Criminal Proceedings Against Bernáldez (henceforth 
‘Bernáldez’)403 decision. This Chapter will then examine the issues which were left 
open by Bernáldez and which were later addressed in subsequent ECJ and CJEU 
decisions.   
Is the List of Void Exclusion clauses in Article 13 of the Sixth 
Directive (Formerly Article 2(1) of Second Directive) Exhaustive or 
Illustrative? 
 
The Directive’s effect on exclusion clauses can be examined from two potential 
angles, first whether Article 13 of the Sixth Directive provides the exhaustive list 
of exclusion clauses which cannot be utilised against the third party. Second, 
whether the stolen vehicle exclusion in Article 13 is exhaustive of exclusion 
clauses that can be utilised, and whether the insurer can utilise an exclusion 
beyond the exclusion expressly provided for. 
The first EU case to examine the scope of exclusion clauses is Bernáldez.404 Here, 
the defendant crashed his vehicle whilst intoxicated and was ordered to pay 
damages for property damaged as a result. The Seville Criminal Court absolved 
the defendant's motor insurer from any liability to pay the compensation based on 
national motor insurance legislation,405 which provided that insurers were not liable 
in respect of property damage where the driver was intoxicated. On appeal, the 
Seville Provincial Court stated its’ belief that legislation which limits exclusion 
clauses should be read in line with the EU Directives and therefore insurers should 
not be able to utilise exclusion clauses against third parties. The Provincial Court, 
however, sought a preliminary ruling from the then ECJ as to whether the Spanish 
                                                          
402 For example, the matter has been examined to some extent by the European Free Trade 
Association Courts as will be discussed on pages 130-132 
403 Bernáldez (n 216) 
404 Ibid.  
405 Article 3(4) of the Real Decreto Legislativo (Royal Decree) 1301/86 of 28 June 1986 and Article 
12(3)(b) of the Royal Decree 2641/86 of 30 December 1986. 
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legislation was compatible with the Directives.406 One of the five questions referred 
up to the Court was:  
“Must the cases referred to in Article 2(1) of the Second Council 
Directive be regarded as a precise and exhaustive enumeration of 
the statutory provisions and contractual clauses which may remove 
insurance cover but which are not valid as against a person who has 
suffered harm, so that any other statutory or contractual exclusion 
would be valid as against him?”.407 
In their pleadings, representatives from the Spanish, Greek, and UK Governments 
stated that the purpose of the obligation on Member States was to ensure a high 
level of protection for the victim.408 Moreover, permitting the use of an exclusion is 
incompatible with Article 13.409 They submitted, however, that Member States 
have wide discretion when drawing up the legal rules on insurance, so that 
exclusion clauses are permissible as between the insured and the insurer, although 
these rules must not result in the absence of compensation for the third party 
victim.410 The Spanish Government, however, argued that an exclusion from 
insurance cover as against the intoxicated driver who caused the accident is 
entirely another matter due to criminality.411 The European Commission 
alternatively argued that the prohibited exclusion clauses set out in Article 13 are 
exhaustive and that in the case of other exclusion clauses, the motor vehicle must 
be deemed to be uninsured, which results in the transfer of liability to the Bureaux 
of the Member State in which the accident occurred.412 
Advocate General (henceforth ‘AG’) Lenz argued that Article 13 must be regarded 
as a minimum requirement, in the sense that certain lawful exclusion clauses from 
insurance cover may not be invoked, at least against an injured third party.413 AG 
Lenz further utilised Recital 7 of the Second Directive, which stated:  
                                                          
406 It is important to note that Bernáldez went before the ECJ before the fifth directive, which expressly 
prohibits such an exclusion, was introduced. 
407 Bernáldez (n 216), [7]. 
408 Ibid. 
409 Ibid, 893. 
410 Ibid. 
411 Ibid. 
412 Ibid, 895. 
413 Ibid, 898. 
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“(it) is in the interest of victims that the effects of certain exclusion 
clauses be limited to the relationship between the insurer and the 
person responsible for the accident”.414 
Accordingly, AG Lenz argued, the prohibited exclusion clauses in Article 13 cannot 
be exhaustive and therefore other exclusion clauses were prohibited. In its’ 
decision, the EU Court affirmed the AG’s opinion by stating that Article 13 is merely 
illustrative of the possible exclusion clauses from cover that could not be used and 
is not an exhaustive list.415 Any other interpretation, the Court argued, would allow 
disparities of coverage from State to State which was what the provisions on 
exclusion clauses intended to avoid.416  
It is submitted that the then ECJ in Bernáldez417 interpreted the Second Directive 
correctly, in that the three exclusion clauses expressly prohibited are not 
exhaustive. This was a very challenging decision to make, because generally, lists 
of prohibited exclusion clauses mean that everything else is valid. However, as 
previously noted418 by the preparatory work to the Second Directive, the Vice 
President of the European Commission during a European Parliament Debate, 
stated: ‘it is difficult to make an exhaustive list’. The exclusion clauses listed were 
only expected to be illustrative and it was left to EU Member States and then ECJ, 
utilising Marleasing,419 to interpret and expand the list of void exclusion clauses 
beyond those prescribed by the Directives. 
Are Any Other Exclusion Clauses Permitted other than the 
Stolen Vehicle Exclusion? 
 
With it being made clear in Bernáldez420 that the list of exclusion clauses in Article 
13 are merely illustrative rather than exhaustive, one must question whether the 
expressly permitted stolen vehicle exception in the Second Directive is 
exhaustive, or whether other exclusion clauses can be used by the insurer to 
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415 Ibid, 907. 
416 Ibid, 906. 
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418 On page 109. 
419 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA (C-106/89) [1993] B.C.C. 421. 
420 Bernáldez (n 216). 
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repudiate liability against third parties. It is arguable from the preamble to the 
Second Directive that other exclusion clauses are permitted. The preamble states 
that ‘certain’ exclusion clauses should only be effective between the driver and the 
insurer. The term ‘certain’ is usually incompatible with a blanket prohibition, and 
therefore, it is arguable that other possible exclusion clauses would go beyond the 
insurer/driver relationship and be valid against a third party. It is submitted that such 
an argument is weak as ‘certain’ is vague, and could easily connote the already 
permitted stolen vehicle exclusion alongside the exclusion in Article 1 (4) relating 
to the Bureaux.421 The question as to whether the stolen vehicle exception is 
exhaustive was analysed in Bernáldez422 in two parts, first in relation to whether a 
clause could be utilised:  
“Does the wording of Article 3(1) allow…the system of compulsory 
insurance …in respect of the use of motor vehicles in each Member 
State to lay down any exclusion… or must exclusion clauses…be 
limited to those expressly provided for in the …Directive?”.423 
Second, whether such a clause, if it could be utilised, would render non-insurance 
and any claim would therefore be picked up by the Bureaux of the respective 
Member State: 
“If the provisions of the…directives…allow exclusion of compulsory 
insurance cover…which is valid as against the victim where the 
driver was intoxicated, may it be considered that such a case entails 
an absence of insurance…which would determine payment and 
cover by the body provided for?”.424 
In case of an intoxicated driver, AG Lenz stated that such a provision could not be 
utilised against a third party, as this will go directly against the primary objective of 
the directives, which is to protect accident victims and to ensure uniformity across 
the EU. In an unusual turn, however, AG Lenz seemingly argued that there could 
                                                          
421 See Professor Merkin, The Law of Motor Insurance, 2015 (n 23), 464. 
422 Bernáldez (n 216). 
423 Ibid, [7]. 
424 Ibid, [7]. 
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be cases other than the stolen vehicle exclusion where the insurer could repudiate 
liability. AG Lenz argued: 
“Under the system established by the directive, a defence as 
against the person who has suffered harm appears to be 
conceivable only if it can be proved that he was himself guilty 
of misconduct. That tends to be indicated by the second 
subparagraph of Article 2 (1) (the stolen vehicle exclusion) …Apart 
from those highly exceptional cases of the victim's own 
blameworthy conduct, it must be assumed that there is a need to 
ensure that there are no gaps in the duty to compensate the victim. 
That principle can be seen to be the guiding principle of the 
directives”.425 
AG Lenz appears to suggest that in cases of the victim’s own blameworthy conduct 
the victim could be denied damages. AG Lenz’s use of the term ‘blameworthy’ 
indicates that there must be a causal link between the conduct of the victim and 
the accident, although the use of the term ‘misconduct’ evidently goes further, and 
could refer to criminal or improper behaviour. Furthermore, AG Lenz does not state 
the extent that the victim must be to blame for the accident, although in the use of 
‘highly exceptional cases’, and by AG Lenz’s reference to the stolen vehicle 
exclusion, it is inferable that the degree of blameworthiness must be relatively high.  
It is arguable that gaps in the duty to compensate are those already expressed 
through Article 10 (the uninsured driver exclusion) and Article 13 (stolen vehicle 
exclusion already mentioned by AG Lenz) of the Directive.  However, AG Lenz 
could be referring to exclusion clauses under civil liability rules, which are 
unaffected by the Directive,426 potentially preventing the victim from receiving 
compensation. This, however, is unlikely, because AG Lenz refers specifically to 
the exclusion in insurance law already permitted under the Directives. It must be 
remembered, however, that although AG Lenz’s opinion is highly instructive, it is 
                                                          
425 Ibid, 901, emphasis added. 
426 Although as this thesis will discuss later in the Chapter with some limits.  
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only advisory,427 and therefore cannot bind either the same court or any other future 
court. 
The then ECJ found that a compulsory insurance policy cannot provide, where the 
driver of the vehicle was intoxicated, that the insurer is not obliged to compensate 
the third party victim. In relation to the general use of exclusion clauses the Court 
found: 
“In view of the aim of ensuring protection… Article 3(1) of the First 
Directive…must be interpreted as meaning that compulsory motor 
insurance must enable third party victims of accidents caused by 
vehicles to be compensated for all the damage to property and 
injuries sustained”.428 
The Court further argued that: 
“Any other interpretation would have the effect of allowing Member 
States to limit payment of compensation to third party victims of a 
road-traffic accident to certain types of damage, thus bringing about 
disparities in the treatment of victims depending on where the 
accident occurred, which is precisely what the directives are 
intended to avoid”.429 
From the above statements, the ECJ were firmly of the belief that all damage 
should be compensated, as disparities could occur between Member States. There 
is uncertainty as to the extent to which an insurer can utilise exclusion clauses in 
their policies. The ECJ only stated that victims of the accident must be 
compensated in every situation, but omitted to state whether the compensation 
must be paid by the insurer or the backup compensation body. In the next 
paragraph, however, the Court states: 
“That being so, Article 3(1) of the First Directive precludes an 
insurer from being able to rely on statutory provisions or 
                                                          
427 This was highlighted in Nicholas Bevan “A World Turned Upside Down” (2014) J.P.I. Law, 3, 136-
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428 Bernáldez (n 216). 
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contractual clauses to refuse to compensate third party victims of 
an accident caused by the insured vehicle”.430 
This is clearer from the then ECJ, and confirms that the insurer cannot utilise 
statutory provisions or exclusion clauses in their policies to refuse to compensate 
the injured third party victim. The then ECJ finally stated that although the insurer 
cannot utilise exclusion clauses against third parties, there are no limitations on the 
use of exclusions against the insured driver who was responsible for the 
accident.431 The Court, however, did not specifically address the issue of 
passenger blameworthiness, as this was covered by AG Lenz. The then ECJ only 
dealt with circumstances put before them, and therefore as there was no third party 
blameworthiness in the case. It would appear, however, from the strong message 
portrayed above by the then ECJ, that all damage to third parties must be 
compensated.   
Issues Left Open by Bernáldez 
Although the ECJ in Bernáldez aided in the clarification of some of the provisions 
of the Directives, there were still some issues which were left open for a later Court 
to decide. The two most important issues left unresolved by Bernáldez432 was 
discussed briefly in the guidance from AG Lenz in the fifth question. First, whether 
the Bureau can take over any claims when there is an exclusion clause in the 
policy, and second, whether exclusion clauses could be relied upon when there is 
a degree of blameworthiness from the injured third party. 
Can the insurer transfer liability to the Bureau? 
The first issue, which was not addressed directly by the then ECJ in Bernáldez,433 
was whether an insurer could utilise an exclusion, with the Bureau taking over any 
claims for compensation when an exclusion clause was breached. It is arguable 
that preventing an exclusion from being used is tantamount to preventing the 
insurer from transferring liability to the Bureau.  Potentially, however, the Directives 
are primarily concerned with the protection of third party victims and if 
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compensation is paid, the EU legislature would be unconcerned as to where the 
compensation comes from, as the spirit of the Directive is achieved, the Directives,  
are unclear on the issue. Article 10 (1) of the Sixth Directive, which sets out the 
rules for Bureaux, states:  
“Each Member State shall set up or authorise a body with the task 
of providing compensation, at least up to the limits of the insurance 
obligation for damage to property or personal injuries caused by an 
unidentified vehicle or a vehicle for which the insurance obligation 
provided for in Article 3 has not been satisfied”.434 
An unsatisfied insurance obligation could occur where there is no policy in 
existence or where the obligation is unsatisfied because of an exclusion in the 
insurance policy. It is difficult to ascertain from the wording of Article 10 (1) whether 
the insurer could transfer liability, or pay under an agreement with the Bureau. The 
issue was first dealt with by AG Lenz in Bernáldez.435 AG Lenz examined the 
original Article 2 (1) and Article 1 (4) and stated:  
“The wording finally adopted and the provision's legislative history 
show that the “body” is in no way conceived as a general “catch-all”, 
providing compensation upon the occurrence of any excluded 
events. Nor does the provision simply refer to the “absence of 
insurance” to which the national Court alludes…. Only if, for 
whatever reasons, he has no claim for compensation against an 
insurer, would the “body” have to pay compensation in the interest 
of the extensive protection of victims. Furthermore, the Member 
States are free to extend the competence of the “body” by statute, 
provided complete protection is ensured for victims”.436 
AG Lenz here considers that the insurer should be permitted to transfer liability to 
the Bureau when an exclusion clause is breached and states that if complete 
protection is guaranteed for victims, it is irrelevant whether the insurer or Bureaux 
pays. This, with respect, is very contradictory by AG Lenz, who argued previously 
                                                          
434 emphasis added. 
435 Bernáldez (n 216). 
436 Ibid, [51], emphasis added. 
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that there should only be very limited defences open to the insurer to use against 
a third party claim. 
Further cases have examined, either directly or indirectly this issue. In Evans v 
Secretary of State,437 a case concerning interest rates in Bureaux agreements. 
The then ECJ repeatedly utilised the term, ‘insufficiently insured vehicle’438 to refer 
to Bureaux obligations. This term also seemingly refers to cases where the driver 
has insurance, but the insurance does not cover the use of the vehicle at that time, 
and therefore the insurance coverage is not sufficient. The then ECJ in Evans, 
however, did not expressly clarify their use of the term, which was not used by 
future courts.  
This issue, however, was expressly dealt with and largely clarified by the CJEU in 
Churchill Insurance Co Ltd v Wilkinson 439 (henceforth ‘Churchill’) and Csonka 
v Magyar Allam440 (henceforth ‘Csonka’). In Churchill, the CJEU evidently 
disagreed with the opinion of AG Lenz in Bernáldez and held:  
“The payment of compensation by a national body is considered to 
be a measure of last resort, provided for only in cases in which the 
vehicle that caused the injury or damage is uninsured or 
unidentified”.441  
The decision in Churchill442 therefore confirms that the Bureau can solely be 
utilised as a measure of ‘last resort’. Of course, it is arguable that the breach of 
exclusion would make the insured technically uninsured, and therefore this would 
fall within the meaning of the ‘last resort’ specified in Churchill.443 It is submitted, 
however, that this is a weak argument as the CJEU would have clarified that this 
was the interpretation.  
                                                          
437 Evans v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport, and the Regions (C-63/01) [2003] 
E.C.R. I-14447. 
438 Ibid, [54] and [55]. 
439 Churchill Insurance Co Ltd v Wilkinson [2013] 1 W.L.R. 1776. 
440 Csonka v Magyar Allam (C-409/11) [2014] 1 C.M.L.R. 14. 
441 Wilkinson (n 442), [41], emphasis added. 
442 Ibid. 
443 Ibid. 
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This issue, however, was left beyond doubt in the CJEU’s ruling in Csonka;444 this 
case questioned whether the Bureau should pay for liabilities owed by the insurer 
to the victim when the insurer becomes insolvent. AG Mengozzi reinforced the dicta 
from Churchill that the Bureau’s role is one of ‘last resort’.445 In giving his opinion, 
the AG focussed on the travaux preparatoires of the Second Directive. As 
explained on pages 107-108, the EU legislature, in its’ proposal for the Second 
Directive, had originally intended to allow the transfer of liability to the 
compensation fund when an exclusion clause was breached. This was unpopular 
and was therefore later revoked in favour of the eventually enacted Article 13. The 
Court agreed with the AG’s opinion and stated that the EU legislature: 
“did not restrict itself to providing that the body must pay 
compensation in the event of damage caused by a vehicle for which 
the insurance obligation has not been satisfied in general, but made 
it clear that that was to be the case only in relation to damage caused 
by a vehicle for which the insurance obligation provided for in art.3 
(1) of the First Directive has not been satisfied, that is to say, a 
vehicle in respect of which no insurance policy exists”.446 
Accordingly, as made clear by the CJEU in Csonka,447 the only time in which 
Bureaux can compensate is where there is no insurance policy, not merely when 
policies’ terms have been breached. It has been argued in the UK that the Csonka 
decision is not as wide as previously thought. As noted by the MIB in the judicial 
review proceedings taking place at time of writing:  
“It was not disputed (in Csonka) that the insurance policy would have 
covered the losses if the insurer had been solvent, the CJEU did not 
have to consider a situation where a policy did not provide cover for 
all uses to which a vehicle could be put”.448 
                                                          
444 Csonka (n 443). 
445 Ibid, AG28. 
446 Ibid, 10. 
447 Ibid. 
448 R on the application of Road Peace Claimant v Secretary of State for Transport  and  Motor 
Insurers Bureau CO/4681/2015, Defendant’s skeleton, [59]  
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The argument therefore is that Csonka only related to situations where insurer was 
insolvent. It is submitted that this is a weak argument, because the CJEU in 
Csonka was clear in its’ decision. The matter was very recently made clearer by 
the CJEU in the Fidelidade Companhia de Seguros SA449 (henceforth 
‘Fidelidade’) ruling, concerning the validity of Portugese legislation450 which 
declares invalid, insurance contracts obtained by false statements concerning the 
identity of the owner and driver. In this situation, the Fundo de Garantia Automóvel 
(Portuguese Guarantee Fund) would pay for the injury or damage. This is 
comparable to the UK position under Section 152 RTA which allows the insurer to 
transfer liability to the Bureau in this situation. The CJEU followed the lines of 
previously decided ECJ and CJEU decisions, and held that derogations from the 
requirement of insurers to compensate is only in that ‘one specific case’451 involving 
stolen vehicles. The CJEU further stated:  
“The fact that a vehicle is driven by a person not named in the 
insurance policy relating to that vehicle cannot…support the 
conclusion that that vehicle is uninsured for the purposes of the third 
subparagraph of Article 1(4) of the Second Directive”.452 
A novel question was further put to the CJEU regarding whether nullity of an 
insurance contract is permitted against a third party, in the event that the person 
on whose behalf the insurance has been taken out, ‘has no economic interest in 
the conclusion of that contract’.453 The CJEU held that although legal validity as to 
the conditions of the insurance contract are done at Member State level, they must 
not deprive the Directives of their effectiveness. Further, that civil liability must be 
covered by insurance. The CJEU further stated that: 
 “Such provisions (the Portuguese Commercial Code) are thus liable 
to result in compensation not being paid to third-party victims and, 
                                                          
449 Fidelidade Companhia de Seguros SA v Caisse Suisse De Compensation (Case 287/16) [2017] 
EUECJ. 
450 Portuguese Commercial Code Articles 428 and 429. 
451 Fidelidade (n 452), [26]. 
452 Ibid, [29]. 
453 Ibid, [30]. 
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consequently, in those directives being deprived of their 
effectiveness”.454 
To put this issue beyond doubt and to reinforce previous CJEU decisions, the CJEU 
stated that the compensation body is only to be used as a, ‘measure of last resort, 
envisaged only for cases in which the vehicle that caused the injury or damage has 
not satisfied the requirement for insurance referred to in Article 3(1) of the First 
Directive, that is to say, it is a vehicle in respect of which no insurance contract is 
in place’.455 Consequently, it is clear that Bureaux must not be compensating the 
injured victim when an exclusion clause is breached, it removes any doubt that the 
Csonka decision was relating to all cases including involving exclusions.  
It is submitted that the CJEU are correct with its interpretation of the Directives. 
The travaux preparatoires show that the intention of the EU legislature shifted 
rapidly from making the Bureaux pay once an exclusion clause was breached to 
making it the insurers’ responsibility. The above cases therefore ensure certainty 
that insurers cannot utilise the compensating body, to compensate victims of 
insufficiently insured vehicles or particularly in situations where they have cover in 
place.456 
Blameworthiness 
The next issue which was left undecided by Bernáldez,457 due to the contradictory 
discussion by AG Lenz, was the issue of blameworthiness and, whether the insurer 
could utilise an exclusion or statutory term to repudiate liability, when the third party 
is fully or partially to blame for the accident. This can be divided into two parts. 
First, whether an exclusion relating to blameworthiness can be utilised within 
insurance law rules, and second, whether the insurer can limit or deny 
compensation under the rules of civil liability. These rules are often difficult to 
separate and have caused the courts considerable confusion. This Chapter will 
now examine the issue of blameworthiness in insurance law rules and will then 
examine the issue of blameworthiness under civil liability and the relationship 
between the two. 
                                                          
454 Ibid, [34]. 
455 Ibid, [35]. 
456 Nicholas Bevan, “Marking the boundary” (2013) J.P.I. Law, 3, 151-161, 151. 
457 Bernáldez (n 216). 
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Blameworthiness under EU Insurance Law Rules 
Storebrand v Finanger458 (henceforth ‘Finanger I’) came before the European 
Free Trade Association Court459 (henceforth ‘EFTAC’) allowing Court to examine 
the issue of passenger blameworthiness. Here, the respondent was injured in an 
accident due to an intoxicated driver (which was evident to the passengers within 
the vehicle) and was denied compensation under Section 7 (b) of the Norwegian 
Bilansvarsloven 1961,460 which stated that, inter alia, the passenger cannot gain 
compensation if he enters into a vehicle when he knew that the driver was 
intoxicated. The Governments of Iceland and Norway argued that Article 13 
already contains a permitted exclusion of compulsory insurance cover and this 
should not be deemed exhaustive.461 The Government of Liechtenstein, however, 
claimed that the provisions in Article 13 were exhaustive, and therefore the 
exclusion was prevented under European Law.462 The European Commission 
agreed with the Government of Liechtenstein and argued that it is clear from their 
whole rationale, that the Directives guarantee compensation for victims in all cases 
of accidents (except those listed as permitted), including where there is an element 
of blameworthiness from the passenger.   
The EFTAC held that it is sufficient to state that the stolen vehicle exclusion 
contained within Article 13 is an exception to the general rule and should be 
interpreted narrowly. Any other interpretation, the Court stated, would jeopardise 
the overall goal of the Directives, to ensure that innocent victims and passengers 
are covered.463 They stated that the majority of Member States do not prevent the 
passenger from obtaining compensation even if they knew that the driver was 
intoxicated464. Subsequently, the passenger would receive substantially more 
favourable treatment in other Member States which was something that the 
Directives had intended to avoid. The EFTAC further stated that differences would 
                                                          
458 Storbrand Skadeforsikring v Veronika Finanger (Case -1/99) [1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 863. 
459 The European Free Trade Association (henceforth ‘EFTA’) is an intergovernmental organisation 
set up for the promotion of free trade and financial integration to the benefit of its four Member States: 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. These countries are not part of the EU, however in 
certain circumstances they agree to follow EU rules. The EFTAC decisions, although highly 
instructive, are not binding on the ECJ or the national courts of EU jurisdictions. 
460Also referred to as the Automobile Liability Act. 
461 Storbrand Skadeforsikring v Veronika Finanger (n 461), [7]. 
462 Ibid, [11]. 
463 Ibid, [24]. 
464 Ibid 
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lead to a distortion of competition between motor vehicle insurers in different 
Member States which is incompatible with the aim of establishing a homogeneous 
European Economic Area. Accordingly, the EFTAC stated that such a provision 
cannot be utilised against a blameworthy third party.  
The issue re-appeared in Finanger v Norway,465 (henceforth ‘Finanger II’) as the 
Norwegian Court found it impossible to interpret Section 7 (b) in conformity with 
the Directives, and accordingly the victim initiated an action against the Norwegian 
government for its erroneous interpretation. The victim therefore sued the 
Norwegian Government for Francovich466 damages as a result of breaching the 
Directives. The case went to the Norwegian Supreme Court who held that the 
breach of the Directives was sufficiently serious to allow the claimant to gain 
Francovich467 damages. Gussgard J, in giving the leading decision stated: 
“The Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives do not grant national 
authorities a margin of political or economic discretion with 
regard to the requirement of insurance…The purpose was to 
pave the way for a Common Market with free movement, and one of 
the means was to achieve security for the survivors of road traffic 
accidents... The development from the first to the third Directive 
shows that a strong degree of protection was intended, so that the 
various exemption rules that existed in certain countries were 
forbidden”.468 
Both Finanger cases demonstrate that due to the strong protection of victims, 
which is clearly at the heart of the Directives, there is little discretion available in 
relation to whether liability can be avoided by way of exclusion, even when the 
injured party is wholly or partially to blame for the damage. Of course, this is not 
binding on non-EFTA Member States such as the UK. It does, however, act as a 
warning to other Member States that they should consider the protection of victims 
(even if they are partially or fully to blame for the accident) as of paramount 
                                                          
465 Finanger v Norway (National Association for Road Traffic Victims, intervening) [2006] 3 C.M.L.R. 
13 
466 Francovich v Italy (C-6/90) [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66, the requirements for Francovich damages will be 
discussed later in thesis pages 172-173. 
467 Ibid. 
468 Finanger v Norway (n 468), emphasis added. 
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importance, and should not permit exclusion clauses to be used against them or 
risk being liable for Francovich damages in the future.469 
The next case to go before the European Courts, this time in the then ECJ, is 
Candolin, containing similar facts to Finanger.470 In this case, the claimants were 
passengers in a vehicle in Finland, owned by one of them and driven by the second 
defendant and subject to insurance provided by the insurer who was the first 
defendant. All passengers and the driver of the vehicle were intoxicated, and the 
second defendant lost control of the vehicle resulting in the death of one passenger 
and severe injuries to the other passengers. Under the Finnish Law on Motor 
Insurance, passengers can be deprived of compensation if they enter the vehicle 
knowing that the driver was intoxicated. The Finnish Court of first instance found 
that the claimants would have been aware of the first defendant's intoxication and 
accordingly held that none of the claimants could be entitled to receive 
compensation from the defendant insurer. On a further appeal by the claimants, 
the Supreme Court referred to the ECJ the question as follows:  
“Is it consistent with Community law, in any situation other than the 
cases mentioned in…Article 2(1) of the Second Directive, to exclude 
or limit, on the basis of the conduct of a passenger in a vehicle, 
his right to obtain compensation from compulsory motor vehicle 
insurance for road accident damage?”.471 
Another arising question was whether the owner of the vehicle, who was also a 
passenger in the vehicle, should be treated equally the other passengers. The 
majority of the arguments from the parties concerned civil liability rules (which will 
be discussed on pages 135-136), however, the European Commission’s argument 
was analogous to its’ discussion in Finanger I that there can be no exclusion 
clauses. The Commission further argued that the then ECJ in Bernáldez472 
considered the situations of the victims themselves, but only within the limits of 
Article 13. 
                                                          
469 Francovich (n 469) this case paved the way for state liability where Member States are obliged to 
make good the loss caused to individuals due to breaches of Community Law. 
470 Candolin (n 217). 
471 Ibid, 6, emphasis added. 
472 Bernáldez (n 216). 
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AG Geelhoed in this case disagreed with the opinion of AG Lenz in Bernáldez by 
stating that Article 13 provides the only exclusion which can be utilised against a 
third party. The AG further stated that in view of the principle aims of the directive, 
namely to provide the victim with adequate protection, a national provision which 
automatically excludes any cover from the outset is inconsistent with the directives. 
The AG further held: 
“The Community legislature's intention with this provision (the stolen 
vehicle exclusion) was to provide for an exception to the rule that 
statutory provisions or contractual clauses in an insurance policy 
may not be relied on as against passengers and third parties who 
are the victims of an accident. This exception must be interpreted 
narrowly and as being exhaustive since it forms a departure from 
the general rule”.473 
The ECJ agreed with AG Geelhoed, and stated that as it is a provision which 
derogates from the general rule that exclusion clauses cannot be utilised, the stolen 
vehicle exclusion must be interpreted strictly, and is the only exclusion permitted 
by the Directives.474 The Court stated that a different interpretation would allow 
Member States to limit the payment of compensation to third parties in cases 
certain types of damage. This, they argued, would allow disparities to exist in the 
treatment of road accident victims depending on the Member State in which the 
accident occurred, which is something that the Directives had precisely intended to 
avoid.475 The ECJ further held that the only distinction that can be made in deciding 
compensation is between the driver and the passengers, therefore in cases 
whereby the original insured and owner of the vehicle allows an intoxicated person 
to drive, the legal relationship between the insured person and the insurer passes 
to the person causing the loss or injury. Consequently, the owner passenger of the 
vehicle is entitled to the same compensation as the other passenger victims and 
cannot have their coverage limited or removed.  
                                                          
473 Ibid, AG 42, emphasis added. 
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Candolin476 has certainly clarified some inconsistencies, stating that the conduct 
of the victim does not decrease the amount of insurance protection offered to them. 
Contrary to the remarks of AG Lenz,477 it can be inferred from Candolin478 that 
Member States cannot limit the insurance coverage offered to third parties even in 
exceptional circumstances such where the passenger was partially or fully to blame 
for their injuries. The Court has clarified that the permitted stolen vehicle exclusion 
is to be interpreted restrictively, as it is a departure from the general rule that 
passengers should always receive compensation.479 
 
This issue was again revisited by the then ECJ in Farrell v Whitty (henceforth 
‘Farrell’).480 Here, the passenger was injured whilst sat on the floor in the back of a 
van which was not constructed for the purpose of seating. The van driver was 
uninsured and the Irish MIB refused to compensate the plaintiff on the basis that 
liability for the personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff was not a liability for which 
insurance was compulsory under the Irish Road Traffic Act 1961. Ireland argued 
that its restrictive approach was justified by a desire for consistency with legislation 
on road safety, since the inclusion of such persons within the scope of compulsory 
insurance would be tantamount to requiring insurers to underwrite conduct that was 
deliberately dangerous. Therefore, they argued, exclusion clauses other than the 
stolen vehicle exclusion should be permitted when the victim is involved in 
dangerous conduct to provide a deterrent.   
 
The issue was referred to the then ECJ which decided against the Irish 
Government, and emphasised that passengers were a potentially vulnerable class 
of victims with which the Third Directive attempts to ensure compensation. The 
Court stated that Member States are not entitled to introduce additional restrictions 
to the level of compulsory insurance cover to be accorded to passengers, and 
further reinforced previous ECJ decisions that exclusion clauses could not be 
utilised, because of the requirement for compatibility of treatment across Member 
States. Furthermore, in relation to blameworthy passengers, they argued that it 
                                                          
476 Ibid. 
477 Bernáldez (n 216). 
478 Candolin (n 217). 
479 Subject to issues surrounding civil liability rules which will be examined in the next sub-Chapter. 
480 Farrell v Whitty (n 383) 
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‘seems difficult to make the concept of passenger for the purposes of Art.1 of the 
Third Directive depend on the conduct of a victim of a road traffic accident’.481 
Referring to Candolin,482 the AG argued:  
 
“Transposed to the instant case…that reasoning might mean that 
insurance cover for certain classes of persons carried cannot be 
reduced or excluded on the basis of considerations depending on 
the hazardousness in the abstract of their conduct”.483 
Farrell reinforces the view of the Court in Candolin,484 that insurers cannot rely on 
the contributory conduct of the victim to repudiate liability under insurance law 
rules, even where the injured party’s conduct is dangerous or even illegal. The then 
ECJ in Farrell, however, showed greater hesitation than in Candolin by the use of 
‘might mean’, a term that does not suggest certainty. It is clear though that the then 
ECJ, especially in Candolin, have been stringent on the use of exclusion clauses 
or statutory terms. Consequently, it is extremely unlikely that any future CJEU 
decision would permit any clause which excludes from insurance coverage being 
used. Of course, dangerous or blameworthy conduct which contributes to the 
accident can allow a limitation of damages under civil liability rules which are not 
expressly dealt with by the Directives. This Chapter will now examine civil liability 
rules, their relationship with insurance law rules and how the Directives affect them.   
Blameworthiness and Civil Liability Rules 
The finding of civil liability and awarding of damages occurs before insurance 
coverage is decided. There is nothing in the Directives which expressly prevent the 
insurer from excluding liability, if civil liability itself is absent, or can be limited in 
some way due to contribution to the accident or damage from the injured party (i.e. 
in the UK through contributory negligence). The Directives are unclear on the issue 
and only indicate that all civil liability is to be protected by insurance.   
Cases have come before the ECJ and CJEU questioning the relationship between 
civil liability and insurance law exclusion clauses, and the effect which the 
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Directives have on the law of civil liability. The question as to the effect of the 
Directives on civil liability was examined first by the then ECJ in Ferriera v 
Companhia.485 The case concerned an accident where a 12-year-old boy was 
fatally injured. The motor insurer refused to pay any damages because Spanish 
law, provided that passengers not carried for a fee could only claim compensation 
based on the fault of the driver and as the driver was not at fault for the accident, 
no compensation would be paid. The matter was taken to the then ECJ, which held 
that the Directives do not seek to govern the laws on civil liability, and it is left to 
the Member States to use the type of liability they choose (i.e. fault, no fault, or 
strict liability) as long as this liability is covered by insurance within the terms of the 
Directive. Accordingly, Spanish law could exclude liability to the injured victim 
under the law of civil liability.   
The issue of civil liability rules was then considered by the then ECJ in Candolin.486 
It is worth reiterating that this case concerned an intoxicated driver, and intoxicated 
passengers, who knew that the driver was intoxicated. As well as arguments based 
on insurance law exclusion clauses, the Finnish, German, and Austrian 
Governments argued that they could deny paying the passengers because 
Community law does not impose any restrictions on the appraisal, under national 
law on civil liability, of the extent to which the passenger contributed to the 
occurrence of his injuries.487 The Court partially agreed and stated: 
“It is clear from the aim of the First, Second and Third 
Directives…that they do not seek to harmonise the rules of the 
Member States governing civil liability...Member States are free to 
determine the rules of civil liability applicable to road 
accidents”.488 
The then ECJ recognised, however, that there is potentially a significant overlap 
between the Directives and civil liability rules and held that: ‘The national provisions 
which govern compensation for road accidents cannot, therefore, deprive those 
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provisions of their effectiveness’.489 The Court further held that such would be the 
case where: 
 “Solely on the basis of the passenger's contribution to the 
occurrence of his injuries, national rules, established on the basis of 
general and abstract criteria, either denied the passenger the right 
to be compensated by the compulsory motor vehicle insurance or 
limited such a right in a disproportionate manner”.490 
The Court finally held that: ‘It is only in exceptional circumstances that the amount 
of the victim's compensation may be limited on the basis of an assessment of his 
particular case’.491 It is clear, therefore, that the law of civil liability is in fact 
impacted considerably by the directives as any limit of damages based on civil 
liability must be done proportionately and based on the individual circumstances of 
each case. Moreover, it is evident that the then ECJ was concerned that substantial 
differences in damages under civil liability could create a barrier to the freedom of 
movement as there would be differences in the treatment of victims from State to 
State, which is something that the Directives had intended to avoid. Finally, it is 
possible that the reduction of damages under civil liability rules could be used as 
an alternative to the reduction of damages for the blameworthiness under 
insurance law rules, which would thereby limit the overall effectiveness of the 
Directives.  
The Courts’ decision in Candolin,492 however, has been criticised vehemently by 
many tort law academics.493 One author stated that, ‘the Court reads the Directive 
word for word and comes to the outrageous conclusion in this decision’.494 The 
author then goes onto state that Candolin disregards the most fundamental of tort 
law principles, that the damages received by the third party should be based upon 
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the fault of that third party.495 By limiting this, the author argues that the 
fundamental principles of the law of tort are being undermined by the Directives 
and subsequent EU dictum.496 In spite of this, the importance of the ECJ’s decision 
cannot be underestimated. The decision allows the courts to disregard any legal 
liability provisions, which it deems to be depriving the directives of effectiveness by 
limiting compensation disproportionately. It also goes a step further by potentially 
prohibiting tortious limitations other than those made in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’. The meaning of these terms was not expressly addressed by the 
Court in Candolin and were therefore left open to interpretation for future Courts.   
The decision in Lavrador497 provides an example as to how the issue as to civil 
liability rules and ‘exceptional circumstances’ should be interpreted. This case 
concerned a road accident where a child was clearly to blame due to cycling on the 
wrong side of the road towards traffic. The Spanish Código Civil provided that 
when the victim’s fault has contributed to the occurrence or aggravation of the injury 
or loss, according to the seriousness of that fault, that person is to be deprived of 
some or all compensation. The CJEU held that this provision was lawful as it did 
not omit automatically compensation and only prevented compensation when the 
accident was caused exclusively by the victim. The Court held that unlike in 
Candolin498 and Farrell499 the right to compensation in this case is not affected by 
a limitation of the cover of insurance, but rather by a limitation of the insured driver’s 
civil liability under the applicable civil liability rules.500 This was a relatively 
straightforward case as the Código Civil was legislation which solely examined 
civil liability rules whereas the Irish Road Traffic Act 1961 in Farrell was 
legislation which dealt with the overall law of insurance. 
In Carvalho,501 an accident occurred where neither driver could be proven to be at 
fault. Therefore, the compensation given to both drivers was limited based on their 
contributions to the accident. The CJEU held that limiting damages in a manner 
which is not disproportionate but rather based on the fault of each party did not 
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cause an ‘impediment’ to free movement and therefore did not undermine the 
Directives.502 The CJEU held that by intervening too much into the rights of 
jurisdictions to determine their laws on legal liability, it would be a ‘significant 
intrusion’ into the legal systems of the member states which would cause 
uncertainty.503 Both Carvahlo504 and Lavrador505 were clear cases as the rules on 
which they were based, were clearly rules of civil liability which limited the 
compensation payable proportionately to the damage caused. Of course, it is 
arguable that in Carvahlo506 the circumstances in which compensation was limited 
were not ‘exceptional’ as was required in Candolin,507 but nevertheless, the 
damages were limited proportionately based on the fault of the parties.  
An example of the difficulties in establishing whether a rule is based on civil liability 
or insurance can be found in Churchill,508 where uncertainties were addressed as 
to whether Section 151 (8) RTA was either of these rules. Section 151 (8) 
provided that the insurer could recoup losses from the insured when the insured 
permits an uninsured person to drive the vehicle. This acted as an effective bar to 
recovery when the insured was himself a passenger, as the insurer could recoup 
any damages paid to the insured. It was uncertain, however, as to the nature of 
Section 151 (8), as it only had the nature of an insurance law exclusion when the 
insured was a passenger. In the CJEU, AG Mengozzi found determining the 
differences between civil liability rules and insurance law rules problematic:  
“I may not… fail to observe that the distinction between the two 
stages can, in practice, present certain difficulties, and it is 
conceivable that the court may, in the future, be called upon to give 
further clarification on this point”.509  
This was re-iterated in Aitkens J’s decision in the Court of Appeal. Aitkens J found 
that the rule in Section 151 (8) was based on both insurance law and civil liability. 
In ‘case 1’ the insured is not a passenger in the vehicle and by seeking to recover 
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the insurer is not prejudicing the insureds right to compensation, this situation, 
Aitkens J argued, concerns civil liability, and does not have an insurance law 
exclusion element. However, in ‘case 2’ the insured is a passenger who is injured 
and hence when the insurer seeks to recover damages paid to the insured, this is 
an exclusion based on insurance law rules which is affected by the Directives.510 
Accordingly, Aitkens J stated, that Section 151 (8) must be read with additional 
words stating:  
“where the person insured by the policy may be entitled to the benefit 
of any judgment to which this section refers, any recovery by the 
insurer in respect of that judgment must be proportionate and 
determined on the basis of the circumstances of the case”.511 
This demonstrates the difficulty which the Courts have found when deciding 
whether a rule is based on insurance law or civil liability. Some academics believe 
that Aitkens J’s decision was incorrect, and that there does not appear to be an 
element of civil liability in Section 151 (8).512 This is because it does not determine 
whether and to what extent compensation is due to the victim under tort law; it 
solely gives the insurer a right of recourse against the insured who caused or 
permitted the use of a vehicle by an uninsured person.513 
It is notable that although the Directives do already have a significant effect on civil 
liability as previous cases have highlighted, the EU have made attempts to alter 
the position, and harmonise civil liability through the Directives. When consulting 
for the Second Directive, a resolution was passed by the EU Parliament which 
called on the European Commission, without delay, to harmonise the rules of civil 
liability relating to victim.514 This, however, had no effect as there was major 
opposition by many Member States.515 The issue then re-appeared and was 
proposed in the Fifth Directive. The proposed recital stated: 
                                                          
510 Ibid. 
511 Ibid. 
512 See Karolina Ludwichowska-Redo “The Road Traffic Act 1998 and EU motor insurance standards: 
a few reflections on Churchill” P.N. 2013, 29(1), 49-58, 52. 
513 Ibid. 
514 See OJ no C 293 of 13/12/1976, 18. 
515 Commission of European Communities, “Proposal for a Second Council Directive on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of 
the use of motor vehicles” Com (80) 469 final, 1. 
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“It should be ensured that pedestrians and cyclists are covered by 
the compulsory insurance of the vehicle involved in the accident, 
irrespective of whether the driver is at fault”. 516 
This would have ensured that insurers could not exclude compensation in any 
circumstances even based on the civil liability fault of the victim. This, however, 
gained numerous amounts of criticism especially from tort lawyers who argued that 
this would impose a system of strict liability against the wishes of the Member 
States.517 The proposal was therefore subsequently dropped.  
It is evident that there is some work to do to ensure certainty in this area, great 
disparities in civil liability has the potential to disrupt the effectiveness of system by 
making litigation difficult. Further, there is continued confusion as to the overlap 
between civil liability rules and insurance law rules. Moreover, the Courts need to 
clarify whether civil liability can only reduce damages in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ as was explained in Candolin518 and the circumstances involved, 
or whether Member States can reduce damages in non-exceptional circumstances 
as in Carvahlo.519 
The CJEU Expanding the Scope of Insurance 
It transpires from the above CJEU jurisprudence that EU law has taken a protective 
stance towards compensation in relation to third parties and a restrictive stance 
towards exclusion clauses in both civil liability and insurance law. This protective 
stance has recently been entrenched in the case of Damijan Vnuk v 
Zavarovalnica Triglav520 (henceforth ‘Vnuk’). Here, a tractor and trailer reversed 
into a farmworker who was on a ladder on a private farm in Slovenia. The worker’s 
claim for compensation was refused in the Slovenian Courts because compulsory 
insurance did not cover for accidents involving farm machinery on private land. The 
worker appealed to the CJEU and argued that the use of machinery on private land 
                                                          
516 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council 
Directives 72/166/EEC, 84/5/EEC, 88/357/EEC, 90/232/EEC and Directive 2000/26/EEC on 
insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles (Com (2002) 244 final), Recital 
14. 
517 See Robert Merkin and Jeremy Stuart-Smith, Motor Insurance (First Edition, Sweet and Maxwell: 
London, 2004), 1-45. 
518 Candolin (n 217). 
519 Carvahlo (n 499). 
520 Vnuk (n 239) 
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should be covered; the Directives were not clear on the issue. However, the CJEU, 
in its’ decision, stated: 
 “The development of the European Union legislation concerning 
compulsory insurance shows that that objective of protecting the 
victims of accidents caused by vehicles has continuously been 
pursued and reinforced by the European Union legislature”.521 
Consequently, the Court stated, the worker should be compensated because 
insurance should cover, ‘any use of a vehicle that is consistent with the normal 
function of that vehicle’,522 and went as far as stating that this involves accidents 
that occur on private land.523  
This decision has significant implications, as most Member States only require 
motor vehicles to be covered on public roads.524 The decision was unexpected and 
very few would have predicted that a case would expand the scope of compulsory 
insurance so far. The UK for example only provides compulsory insurance cover 
for certain types of vehicle and only on public land.525 The decision signifies that 
the CJEU is willing to go to great lengths to ensure that the third-party victim is 
always compensated.  
The Future of EU Motor Insurance Law 
The EU is beginning to retract slightly on the protection given to third parties, 
although this is only in relation to the Vnuk decision from the CJEU.  The European 
Commission, in its’ impact assessment, stated that the Vnuk decision would have 
a significant effect on premiums and would make some activities such as motor 
sports unviable.526 Subsequently, the Commission stated that a new Directive was 
needed to address and clarify the scope of cover.527 
                                                          
521 Ibid, [52]. 
522 Ibid, [56]. 
523 Ibid 
524 See the UK which states that Motor Insurance is needed for vehicles on a ‘road (or public place)’ in 
Section 143 (1) (a) RTA 1988. 
525 Road Traffic Act 1988. 
526 European Commission, “Inception Impact Assessment Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and the 
Council relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the 
enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability”, June 2016.  
527 Ibid. 
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With the potential for the EU to revert from the CJEU’s very protective Vnuk 
decision, it is questionable as to whether the EU may clarify or indeed revert from 
its’ decisions in relation to exclusion clauses. However, it is submitted that this is 
unlikely and the intention of the EU is clear. This is evident from the EU’s 
announcement of a REFIT exercise528 in relation to Motor Insurance with the 
preparation for a new Directive which will include any reversal of Vnuk. This was 
announced in a Communication from the European Commission which, inter alia, 
examined motor insurance. The Communication stated:  
“The Commission will complete the REFIT review of the Motor 
Insurance Directive and will decide on any amendments required to 
enhance the protection of traffic accident victims”.529 
This, therefore, seems to be an indication from the Commission that it will not take 
any measures that reduce protection for accident victims. In July 2017, the EU 
Commission again introduced an ‘inception impact statement’ for a REFIT Review 
of the Motor Insurance Directive.530 The Statement stated in relation to context:  
“Evidence coming from court cases, complaints, enquiries and 
parliamentary enquiries suggests disparities in terms of its 
implementation at Member States level, in particular as regards the 
scope”.531 
The Commission stated that the REFIT review will examine four priorities relating 
to the Directive.532 Whilst exclusion clauses were not mentioned within the four 
priorities, the Commission stated that, ‘The REFIT review will evaluate the whole 
Motor Insurance Directive, including elements where no problems have so far been 
identified’.533 The Commission within the document consistently mentioned higher 
                                                          
528 European Commission, “Communication from The Commission to The European Parliament, The 
Council, The European Central Bank, The European Economic and Social Committee and The 
Committee of The Regions: Consumer Financial Services Action Plan: Better Products, More Choice” 
Brussels, 23.3.2017 COM (2017) 139 final, 7 
529 Ibid. 
530 European Commission “Inception Impact Assessment: REFIT Review of the Motor Insurance 
Directive”, 24/07/2017 Ref. Ares (2017)3714481. 
531 Ibid, 1. 
532 Information about claims, Guarantee Funds response to insolvency, adequacy of minimum 
amounts of cover and scope (focussed on Vnuk), Ibid. 
533 Ibid. 
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scopes of cover, meaning higher premiums.534 There was no discussion in terms 
of reduction coverage or permitting exclusion clauses to be used. It is submitted, 
therefore, that it is unlikely that this REFIT exercise will alter the position with 
regards to exclusion clauses. There is potential, however, considering recent CJEU 
rulings, for later alterations in the Directive, to confirm that exclusion clauses cannot 
be used against third parties.  
Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we have examined the EU’s attempt at harmonisation of the law of 
motor insurance and exclusion clauses across the EU Member States. This is to 
ensure consistency, remove confusion, and provide a high standard of protection 
for third parties through all EU Member States.  
The Directives are vague and have needed significant interpretation by the then 
ECJ, the EFTA and the CJEU, particularly with regards to exclusion clauses as this 
provision in Article 13 is particularly vague. Through the line of case law from the 
EU courts, a strict interpretation of EU law has been taken, with only one exclusion 
clause permitted, involving stolen vehicles. This is unsatisfactory, even if the 
Bureau picks up claims which are excluded by the insurer.  
Moreover, the courts have taken a strict interpretation towards the use of insurance 
law exclusion clauses, even where the passenger is partially to blame for the 
accident. It is submitted that the CJEU’s interpretation of the Directives is correct 
as is evident from the travaux preparatoires to the Second Directive, which 
emphasise the need for consistency.  
However, some confusion remains in relation to the engagement of the Directives 
and civil liability rules, with confusion as to the extent to which courts can reduce 
damages through civil liability, before deciding on the insurance coverage. It is 
submitted that this needs to be clarified and the courts need to be careful, so as 
not to provide a back-door to the use of exclusion clauses.  
This Chapter has contributed to this thesis through the analysis of EU law’s 
restrictive effect on the validity of exclusion clauses. Providing a rationale behind 
                                                          
534 See particularly ibid, 2. 
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the EU’s approach and consistency in the case law, clarifies that under EU law 
(with one narrow exception), exclusion clauses are not valid.  
Thus, with a strict interpretation of the Directives taken by the EU courts, it is 
important to examine how UK Courts have interpreted EU law and the ways in 
which third parties could enforce their EU law rights. It is clear, as the next chapter 
will show, that the UK has taken inconsistent interpretive approaches. Moreover, it 
is important to examine the effects of Brexit on UK law.    
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Chapter Five: UK Interpretation of EU Law 
Introduction 
With the interpreting case law from the European Courts, EU law seems clear. 
However, as the CJEU only has the power to interpret European Law and not to 
apply it, application is left to the national courts. This is not always straightforward 
as there is possibility of inconsistent interpretation amongst appellate and first 
instance courts.     
Moreover, it is apparent that the RTA 1988 is not consistent with EU Law. For 
example, as shown throughout Chapter Three, the RTA only prohibits some 
exclusion clauses, whereas EU law prohibits almost all exclusion clauses, except 
for those relating to ‘stolen vehicles’. The UK appellate courts have attempted to 
manage these inconsistencies. Furthermore, since the UK voted in a referendum 
to leave the European Union in June 2016, the situation has become even more 
complex and uncertain. The UK did not invoke its’ Article 50 Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union535 (henceforth ‘TFEU’) rights until March 
2017, and with negotiations still taking place before an official withdrawal (which 
takes a maximum of two years). The UK must continue to implement EU law until 
it formally withdraws from the EU and the authority of the CJEU and risks 
Francovich action if it refuses to comply. 
This Chapter will examine the ways in which Directives can be enforced by third 
parties in national courts through direct and indirect effect.  It will then examine the 
UK courts’ interpretation of EU law through the Bristol Alliance and Delaney v 
Secretary of State for Transport536537 (henceforth ‘Delaney’) cases as well as 
very recent case law. The chapter will finally look at the potential impact of Brexit 
and whether the UK is at threat of a state liability challenge due to non-compliance.  
Direct Effect 
The legal definition of a Directive can be found in Article 288 of the TFEU538 which 
states that:   
                                                          
535 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, [2012] OJ C326/15 
536 Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] R.T.R. 25  
537 [2015] EWCA Civ 172 
538 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, [2012] OJ C326/15  
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“A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon 
each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the 
national authorities the choice of form and methods”. 
Accordingly, Directives are not directly applicable and Member States are required 
to introduce or amend national law to ensure that the Directive’s objectives are 
achieved, but are given a degree of latitude as to the form and methods used to 
achieve those objectives.  
However, when a Member State fails to implement a Directive effectively, the 
principle of direct effect can allow individuals to immediately invoke EU Law in their 
national courts539 against the Member State or its emanation540 (henceforth ‘vertical 
direct effect’).  Essentially, direct effect prevents the Member State from relying on 
national law provisions which infringe the Directive. However, for Directives to be 
capable of direct effect, three conditions must be satisfied: First, the provision which 
the individual seeks to rely must be sufficiently clear and unconditional,541 second, 
the date for implementation of the directive must have passed,542 and third, the 
individual must bring an action against the state or an emanation of the state.543 
Consequently, it is clear from the third condition, that Directives cannot be directly 
enforced between individuals or businesses (‘horizontal direct effect’ (HDE)).544 
This means that as an insurer cannot be deemed an emanation or the state, HDE 
cannot be used against an insurer when breaching European law by inserting an 
exclusion clause in its’ policy. 
It is further ambiguous whether the Motor Insurance Directives could be subject to 
vertical direct effect because of the absence of clarity amongst the provisions and 
the way in which the Directives are to be implemented. The UK courts have not 
been decisive on this issue, Collins J in Singh v Solihull,545 suggested that the 
                                                          
539 See Van Duyn v Home Office (Case 41/74 C) [1974] E.C.R. 1337. 
540 This will be discussed later. 
541 Van Duyn v Home Office (n 542). 
542 Ratti (Case 148/78) [1979] E.C.R. 1629. 
543 Case 152/84 Marshall (No.1) [1986] EC4. 335. 
544 This was concluded in Marshall See Ibid. Also see article Sara Drake and Cathryn Costello, 
‘Enforcing EC Motor Insurance Directives: Navigating the Maze’ (2003) European Public Law 9 (3) , 
pp. 371-398, 378. 
545 Singh (n 335) 
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Directives are unclear in their wording and are therefore incapable of having direct 
effect:  
“In this case it is clear that the limits are not exactly defined and there 
is a degree of discretion left to individual Member States as to what 
provisions they do enact in relation to the compulsory insurance of 
those who use motor vehicles”.546 
Other cases have examined Direct Effect and have followed the same line of 
reasoning as Collins J in Singh v Solihull.547 For example, in Mighell v 
Reading,548 Hobhouse LJ stated:  
“the Second Directive is sufficiently precise to enable the persons 
intended to benefit to be identified and it also sufficiently defines the 
scope of the rights which… persons are to have but it…leaves it to 
the Member States to decide how they will implement the 
Directive…The Directive therefore…fails to satisfy the third 
criterion of “direct effect””.549 
It is submitted that Collins J and Hobhouse LJ are both correct, although the 
directives are sufficiently clear in defining the rights to be given to the victim, they 
provide significant discretion as to their limits and implementation. Thus, the 
Directives are incapable of direct effect.  
Alternatively, however, individuals may invoke the doctrine of indirect effect. In fact, 
it is recognised that indirect effect is utilised more than direct effect in the UK.550 
Indirect effect arrived in the case of Von Colson551 but was later examined and 
applied in greater depth in the Marleasing.552 The Marleasing decision found that 
the national court is required to interpret national law, ‘in light of the wording and 
purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result (of the directive)’.553 
                                                          
546 Ibid, [31]. 
547 Ibid. 
548  Mighell v Reading and Another, Evans v Motor Insurers Bureau and White v White and Another 
[1998] EWCA Civ 1465. 
549 Ibid, [71], emphasis added. 
550 Chalmers D, ‘The Positioning of EU Judicial Politics within the United Kingdom’ (2000) 23 WEP 
169, 190. 
551 Von Colson v Land Nordrhein-Westfahlen (C-14/83) [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430 . 
552 Marleasing (n 422). 
553 Ibid, [21]. 
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Marleasing therefore strengthens the Courts’ interpretative duty as it is, ‘no longer 
sufficient for a national court to turn to Community law only if the national provision 
is ambiguous’.554 Moreover, indirect effect is not limited to disputes against the 
state and can be used between private parties, meaning that Courts are required 
to use indirect effect in disputes involving insurers and third party victims. 
Marleasing was expanded in Pfeiffer v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz Kreisverband 
Waldshut eV (henceforth ‘Pfeiffer’)555 where the Court stated:  
“(the) principle of interpretation in conformity with Community law 
thus requires the…court to do whatever lies within its jurisdiction, 
having regard to the whole body of rules of national law to ensure 
that Directive…is fully effective”.556 
Subsequently, the national court is required to do whatever lies within its’ 
jurisdiction to give effect to the Directive and the rules which are founded and 
interpreted within the CJEU. An example of indirect effect being used in relation to 
the Directives can be found in Churchill v Fitzgerald.557 It was clear that the UK 
legislative regime under Section 151 (8) conflicted with the Second Directive, as 
it was deemed to have some insurance exclusion elements, which were prevented 
by the Directive. Aitkens LJ re-interpreted the Section by utilising the Marleasing 
approach and added to the wording of the provision to introduce a proportionality 
element, giving effect to the CJEU’s previous ruling in Candolin. Dr Bevan stated 
that Churchill:  
“Provides helpful guidance on the modern approach to the purposive 
interpretation required under national law where this conflicts with 
Community law. It has also contributed its own fairly radical 
application of those principles, amending the relevant provision by 
the insertion of 47 new words, as if to illustrate in graphic terms just 
how far we have come since Marleasing”.558 
                                                          
554 Docksey C and Fitzpatrick B, “The Duty of National Courts to Interpret Provisions of National Law 
in Accordance with Community Law” (1991) 20 ILJ 113,119. 
555 Pfeiffer v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz Kreisverband Waldshut eV (C-397/01) [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 44 . 
556 Ibid, [118]. 
557 Churchill Insurance Co Ltd v Fitzgerald [2013] 1 W.L.R. 1776. 
558 Nicholas Bevan “Churchill Insurance Co Ltd v Fitzgerald and Wilkinson: personal injury - road 
traffic accidents – compensation” (2012) Journal of Personal Injury Law, 4, C223-C230, C226. 
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It is evident that Churchill provides a rather radical example as to the distance that 
Courts can go to ensure consistency between national provisions and Directives. 
The courts can amend the wordings of existing national provisions to ensure that 
they are compliant with EU law. Of course, there is only so far in which a Court can 
interpret and therefore indirect effect may not always be effective if the provision is 
so inconsistent that it cannot be worded sufficiently considering EU law.  
Alternatively there is a potential for the Courts to use incidental horizontal direct 
effect to mitigate for the absence of horizontal direct effect. This was examined in 
the CJEU decision of CIA Security International,559 whereby the CJEU held that a 
private claimant could rely on the Member States’ failure to comply with a directive 
in an action against the defendant,560 although this did not provide the defendant 
with any obligation bound from the Directive.561 The relevance of this, however, for 
victims attempting to enforce their EU law rights in UK courts is unlikely, as the 
Motor Insurance Directives do provide responsibility for motor insurers to 
compensate directly, and no known case has examined the potential to use 
incidental direct effect in motor insurance scenarios. This means that it is unlikely 
that incidental direct effect could be used to mitigate for lack of horizontal direct 
effect. 
UK Interpretation of the Directives 
With the issues in relation to direct effect having been examined, it is important to 
consider how the UK Courts have interpreted EU law in relation to the issue of 
exclusion clauses. Few cases have come before the UK Courts in dispute of the 
UK’s interpretation of EU law to challenge the use exclusion clauses, because the 
victim is rarely left without any form of compensation even if an exclusion clause is 
breached. The MIB will pay in those circumstances, unless it is not covered within 
their agreements, and therefore it is unlikely that the victim of the accident will 
challenge the rights of the insurer to repudiate liability. 
                                                          
559 CIA Security International SA v Signalson SA (C-194/94) [1996] E.C.R. I-2201, note this was not a 
case about motor insurance or concerned whether this could be used in motor insurance.  
560 Paul Craig “The legal effect of Directives: policy, rules and exceptions” (2009) E.L. Rev. 34(3), 
349-377, 365. 
561 Ibid. 
 151 
  
In fact, only one case has come before UK Courts which has directly and 
comprehensively dealt with the EU law on exclusion clauses. In Bristol Alliance 
Partnership Ltd v Williams562 , a driver purposely drove into a House of Fraser 
Store in Bristol which was compensated by the property insurer who then claimed 
under the laws of subrogation against the motor insurer. The motor insurer denied 
liability due to an exclusion clause in the motor policy which stated that the motor 
insurers will not pay for deliberately caused damage. This case was important for 
the property insurers as the MIB exclude payment for subrogated claims, therefore 
if they were denied compensation from the insurer, they would be unable to 
recover. As well as examining UK law on this issue which was discussed in the 
previous chapter, Ward LJ contemplated whether EU law prevented the motor 
insurer from repudiating liability, and further whether the UK was in breach of EU 
law by giving the MIB an enhanced role. Ward LJ stated that the crucial issue was 
whether the Bernáldez563 decision should be interpreted as being of general 
application. This would compel a Marleasing564 meaning to be given to Section 
151(2) (a)565 RTA, which states that for there to be a direct right against the insurer 
the claim must be ‘within the terms of the policy’, and read with Section 145 RTA, 
which gives requirements in respect of policies.566 His Lordship further stated that 
if Bernáldez567 was interpreted widely, which therefore restricts all exclusion 
clauses from being used by the insurer: ‘then the way the Road Traffic Act 
combined with the way that the MIB scheme has always operated is not compliant 
with the Directives’.568 
                                                          
562 [2013] Q.B. 806. 
563 Bernáldez (n 216). 
564 Marleasing (n 422). 
565 Section 151 (2) States. 
Subsection (1) above applies to judgments relating to a liability with respect to any matter where 
liability with respect to that matter is required to be covered by a policy of insurance under section 145 
of this Act and either—. 
(a)it is a liability covered by the terms of the policy or security to which the certificate relates, and the 
judgment is obtained against any person who is insured by the policy or whose liability is covered by 
the security, as the case may be, or. 
(b) it is a liability, other than an excluded liability, which would be so covered if the policy insured all 
persons or, as the case may be, the security covered the liability of all persons, and the judgment is 
obtained against any person other than one who is insured by the policy or, as the case may be, 
whose liability is covered by the security. 
566 Section 145 lists the requirements of insurance policies.  
567 Bernáldez (n 216). 
568 Bristol Alliance, (n 15), [65]. 
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It is therefore important to examine how the UK Courts have interpreted EU law in 
this area and whether the EU Directives and case law have been given a general 
or narrow interpretation. Numerous cases have further come before UK Courts 
where judges have, obiter, contemplated the interpretation to be given to EU law 
concerning exclusion clauses. This Chapter will now examine cases which have 
interpreted EU Law to give it general application, it will then go onto examine the 
Bristol Alliance case and how it has attempted to restrict the effect of EU Law.   
Giving General Effect to EU Law 
Prior to Churchill v Wilkinson569 being referred up to the CJEU, both the Queen’s 
Bench Division and Court of Appeal examined EU Law and Article 13 closely. In 
the Queen’s Bench Division, Blair J stated:  
“I consider that in general terms the claimant was justified in his 
submission that, whatever the precise analysis of Candolin, the 
trend of these authorities is towards a strict interpretation of any 
exclusion from the right to compensation unless provided for by the 
terms of the Directives”.570 
Blair J noted that the result of Section 151 (8) RTA was to exclude the victim from 
compensation which is impermissible under the Directives. The issue then went to 
the Court of Appeal and was heard before Waller LJ. Before referring the case to 
the CJEU, Waller LJ stated:  
“Article 12(1) would suggest that insurance is required to cover all 
...passengers injured except those contemplated by…art.13 (1) … 
Does art.12 (1) have the wide meaning suggested? In my view the 
judgments in the CJEU support the view that it does”.571 
Waller LJ further went on to examine the opinion of AG Lenz and the then ECJ 
decision in Bernáldez and stated:  
“(AG Lenz) relied on the obligation to have in place compulsory 
insurance under…art.3 of the…Directive in taking the view that the 
                                                          
569 [2010] EWCA Civ 556. 
570 [2009] EWHC 1297 (QB), 376, emphasis added. 
571 Ibid, [26]. 
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exclusion clauses contained in art.13(1) were not an exhaustive list. 
That that was his view is apparent from his answers to Questions 1, 
3, and 4…it is clear the court took the same view…if the reasoning 
in Bernáldez …is followed, the insurers cannot argue that art.13 
(1) defines the only prohibited exclusion clauses”.572 
Waller LJ, therefore, believes the Directives are to be interpreted widely to prevent 
the insurer from relying on an exclusion clause. Waller LJ does not state that all 
exclusion clauses are prohibited, but that exclusion clauses cannot be utilised 
against passengers, (subject to Article 13) and the prohibited exclusion clauses 
contained within Article 13 (1) are not an exhaustive list due to the obligation to 
insure put in place by Article 3 of the First Directive.  
In White v White,573 the House of Lords examined the MIB Agreements and the 
definition of the term ‘knew or ought to have known that the vehicle was uninsured’, 
an exclusion within Clause 6 of the MIB agreements. This term seemed wider than 
the phrase ‘knew that the vehicle was uninsured’ permitted within Article 10 of the 
Directives.  Lord Nicholls stated, ‘The context is an exception to a general rule. The 
Court of Justice has stressed repeatedly that exceptions are to be construed 
strictly’.574 Lord Nicholls acknowledged that there was some discrepancy and 
followed the dicta of the then ECJ in Candolin that derogations from the general 
rule were to be interpreted strictly. Although this case is based on MIB exclusion 
clauses rather than insurer exclusion clauses, it highlights that the Courts are 
willing to give the Directives a wide interpretation, and it is submitted that the Court 
in this instance would have certainly given Article 13 the same interpretation if the 
issue had arisen.  
Tugendhat J was next to widely interpret the Directives in Bristol Alliance.575 The 
property insurers in Bristol Alliance argued that the cases post-dating 
Bernáldez576 effusively restricted the validity of exclusion clauses towards third 
parties. Consequently, as the insurance policy included a term which was not 
                                                          
572 Ibid, emphasis added. 
573 [2001] 1 W.L.R. 481, [14]. 
574 Ibid. 
575 Bristol Alliance (n 43). 
576 Bernáldez (n 216). 
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permitted by the Directives, it was not compliant with the Directives. The Motor 
Insurers alternatively argued that Bernáldez577 is not to be interpreted as applying 
to exclusion clauses other than those specified exhaustively in Article 13. They 
further argued that the property insurers, who were claiming compensation from 
the motor insurers, were not victims which the Directives were intended to aide as 
they have not suffered direct loss or damage. It was further submitted by the motor 
insurers that Bernáldez578 only prohibited the one exclusion for intoxicated drivers 
and this could be shown because the exclusion was eventually codified in Article 
13 as being void against third parties. 
These arguments, however, were rejected by Tugendhat J in Bristol Alliance. His 
Lordship stated that motor insurers should be classed as a victim, as they suffered 
loss, thereby removing limits to the definition. The learned judge further stated that: 
‘the reasoning of the Court of Justice in Bernáldez is clear, and is not confined to 
purported exclusion clauses relating to drivers who are intoxicated’.579 Tugendhat 
J therefore stated that English law must be interpreted considering EU law and 
therefore an exclusion clause, which denied insurance liability in relation to 
deliberately caused damage, was not permitted. This judgment is significant, 
because it is the first time that a UK judge has expressly ruled that Bernáldez 
should be interpreted as preventing all exclusion clauses. Of course, Tugendhat 
J’s decision is not binding, as it was only a High Court decision which was later 
overruled by Ward LJ in the Court of Appeal. 
Another recent case to examine Bernáldez580 is Delaney.581 Here, a passenger 
was carrying a substantial quantity of cannabis when he was injured in an accident. 
The insurers repudiated liability under Section 152 RTA due to a misstatement in 
the policy. The MIB refused to compensate the passenger due to an exclusion 
within the MIB’s Uninsured Drivers Agreement  which refused compensation when 
the accident occurred ‘in course or furtherance of a crime’. This provision was 
arguably direct conflict with Article 10 of the Sixth Directive which substantially 
limited the exclusion clauses available to the Bureaux. The claimant argued that 
                                                          
577 Ibid 
578 Ibid. 
579 Bristol Alliance (n 43), [83]. 
580 Ibid. 
581 Delaney (n 534 and 535). 
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Article 10 and Article 13 of the Sixth Directive together provide that there should 
be no gaps in the duty to compensate the victim.  
Jay J examined the advisory opinion of AG Lenz in Bernáldez582 and stated:  
“I have paid particular attention to the opinion of Advocate General 
Lenz because it appears to me to contain a flawlessly coherent, 
logical and principled guide to the scheme of the Second 
Directive…The only matter where there might be a scintilla of 
uncertainty is answered by an accurate reading of the Directive itself 
and subsequent CJEU jurisprudence. (The Directive) sets out a 
number of exclusion clauses…and it is an established principle of 
Community law that these must be read restrictively…. it is a 
basic principle of Community law that derogations are to be 
construed restrictively…these specific derogations represent 
the limits of an insurers’ ability to avoid liability to the victim… 
there is no room for an alternative view”. 583 
Jay J further stated that the victim cannot be permitted to fall between two 
metaphorical stools whereby they are deprived of compensation. His Lordship 
stated that the insurer should pay and in the last resort the MIB must step up to 
compensate the victim. Jay J’s dictum follows closely to that of the ECJ in 
Candolin,584 that all derogations from the general rule should be read restrictively. 
Delaney was then appealed by the MIB to the Court of Appeal and was heard 
before Richards LJ, Kitchin LJ, and Sales LJ. In the Court of Appeal the MIB did 
not argue for a different interpretation of Article 13 from the interpretation offered 
by Jay J. The learned judges nevertheless agreed with the opinion of Jay J and 
held that it was a general principle of EU law, specifically applied in the context of 
the Directives by the CJEU in its’ decision in Candolin, that derogations from a 
general rule are to be strictly construed. 
                                                          
582 Bernáldez (n 216). 
583 Delaney (n 539), [41], emphasis added. 
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 Restricting EU law in Bristol Alliance 
Despite numerous decisions where judges have given a wide interpretation to 
Bernáldez585, Ward LJ in Bristol Alliance586  took the opposite view, and overruled 
the previous judgment of Tugendhat J. The learned judge agreed with the motor 
insurer’s argument that Bernáldez only applied to cases involving intoxicated 
drivers and held that, ‘there is no justification for reading the Ruiz Bernáldez 
decision in such a way as to preclude the insurer relying on the exclusion clause’.587 
Ward LJ’s decision was based on three rationales: First, that Member States are 
permitted discretion as to how they implement EU Law, second, that the 
incorporation of a comparable exclusion clause to that examined in the Bernáldez 
decision, into the Directives, is evidence that the decision should be interpreted 
narrowly. Third by relying on this restrictive interpretation of EU law by Collins J in 
Singh v Solihull.588 It is therefore important to examine these rationales to see 
whether Ward LJ was correct in relying upon them.  
Permitting Member State Discretion 
Ward LJ’s interpretation of EU Law in Bristol Alliance589 is heavily reliant upon 
decisions within the UK which permit a wide degree of discretion when 
implementing the Directives. The first case to examine the extent of discretion is 
Clarke v Kato.590 This case concerned an accident which occurred within a car 
park, the case was sent to the House of Lords by the Court of Appeal (who did not 
acknowledge EU law in its’ decision), to decide whether a car park fell within the 
meaning of the term ‘road’ under Section 145 (3) (a) RTA. It was submitted, amicus 
curiae, by the claimant that the UK could be in breach of the Directives.591 Lord 
Clyde dismissed this argument and stated in relation to EU law: 
“It seems to me that while in this Directive it is certainly required that 
there be in each country an insurance against civil liability in respect 
of the use of motor vehicles, recognition is being paid to the fact 
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that there may be differences in the precise cover which 
national laws may impose in the different member states ”.592 
Lord Clyde further reinforces this point by relying on Article 2 of the Third 
Directive which states:  
“Member states shall take the necessary steps to ensure that all 
compulsory insurance policies against civil liability arising out of the 
use of vehicles: cover, on the basis of a single premium… and 
guarantee, on the basis of the same single premium, in each 
member state, the cover required by its law or the cover required 
by the law of the member state where the vehicle is normally 
based when that cover is higher”.593 
Lord Clyde stated that from an interpretation of this provision, the scope or extent 
of the insurance cover obligatory in different Member States may be greater or 
smaller than the cover in other Member States. His Lordship further stated that the 
Member State must ensure that the greater cover is available in respect of those 
Member States where the greater cover is required by its domestic law. 
Accordingly, the victim will always be awarded the greatest amount of cover 
available and any provision allowing greater cover will be compliant with the 
Directives.  
This was again examined in Axa Insurance UK plc v Norwich Union594 by Smith 
J, who held that an employee, failing off a raised hoist, was not classed as being 
carried on or inside a vehicle, and therefore did not fall within compulsory insurance 
rules under Section 145 (4A) RTA. The judge rejected an argument by the 
employer’s insurers based on Bernáldez595 that the Directives should protect the 
employee. Furthermore, by creating differences between the scope of cover than 
what the Directives and Bernáldez require, His Lordship stated the UK is in breach 
of the EU law.596 The learned judge examined the Second and Third Directives 
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and relied on the case of Withers v Delaney597 which was an Irish case similar to 
facts in Farrell598 (where the claimant was sat in the back of a vehicle not designed 
with seating). The Court in Withers v Delaney held that: “In the sphere defined by 
the First and Second Directive, Member States remain competent to determine the 
extent of passenger cover”.599 
Consequently, Smith J held that it must be recognised considering Bernáldez, that 
there are some restrictions on exclusion clauses within policies, creating 
uncertainty about how far this impinges upon the freedom of Member States to 
determine the extent of compulsory cover. The learned judge argued, however, 
that it cannot be accepted that this affects the approach of European law that 
Member States have the right to determine the extent of compulsory insurance.  
This was again considered and applied in Singh v Solihull600 which will be 
discussed in greater detail on pages 162-163. Collins J in Singh v Solihull 
examined the decision of Lord Clyde in Clarke v Kato, and stated:  
“The point that is being made… is that the… Member State… was 
entitled to provide for a greater or lesser…than other Member States 
but the Directives would be complied with provided…the drivers 
registered in… France would be entitled to the same protection …as 
was required in France if that protection was greater than…required 
in Great Britain”.601 
Collins J therefore argued that Member States are permitted to have a greater or 
lesser amount of coverage, provided that when a claim is made by an individual 
within another Member State, that obligation is the same as it would have been if 
the person claimed in the Member State in which they reside. It is proposed that 
the judgments in Singh v Solihull,602 Axa Insurance,603 and Clarke v Kato 604 are 
all correct in their reasoning; there is nothing in the Directives which prevent 
Member States from having different coverage than others. The Directives allow 
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Member States to have a certain degree of discretion as to the exact scope of 
cover. This is only if the same protection is achieved and the Member State does 
not go below the minimum requirement provided for by the Directive.  
However, it is respectfully submitted that Ward LJ’s reliance on these decisions to 
argue that Bernáldez605 is limited, is incorrect. The Directives and subsequent 
CJEU decisions, (especially Candolin,606 due to the Courts’ strict interpretation of 
derogations) are clear that Member States have very little discretion in relation to 
exclusion clauses. This is evident from Jay J’s decision in Delaney,607 where the 
issue as to whether the UK’s breach of EU law in relation to the MIB agreements 
and Article 10 (which is similar to Article 13 as it provides an instance where the 
MIB cannot deny liability and it is questioned whether this is exhaustive608) was 
‘sufficiently serious’ to compel Francovich damages. Jay J stated that: ‘the present 
case is a paradigm of a little or no margin of discretion type of case’.609 Although 
this statement refers to Article 10, this would apply to Article 13 also. In fact, it 
can be inferred from the judge’s conclusion in the same paragraph that both Article 
13 and Article 10 are clear that no exclusion clauses can be used. Moreover, the 
above cases all examine other areas of the Directives, and have very little to do 
with the validity of exclusion clauses.  
Further, it is proposed that whilst the Directives in general do allow some discretion 
as to their implementation, this discretion is only permitted if the minimum amount 
of cover is adhered to. Consequently, there is nothing to prevent a Member State 
from giving greater amounts of cover than is prescribed by the Directives, as long 
as the cover does not fall below the minimum required in the Directives. In relation 
to exclusion clauses, this could mean that a minimal amount of discretion could be 
used whereby the Member States can prevent an exclusion clause from being used 
in relation to stolen vehicles (a permitted exclusion in the Directive). 
It is therefore submitted that Ward LJ’s reliance on discretion given to Member 
States is incorrect because Article 13 is clear in that it does not permit any more 
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than minimal discretion. Furthermore, because any discretion that can be used 
cannot allow the Member State to have lower than the minimum prescribed cover.  
 Bernáldez’s insertion into Article 13 
Ward LJ610 accepted a submission by the motor insurers that by incorporating the 
exclusions used in both Bernáldez611 and Candolin612 (in relation to intoxicated 
drivers) within the Fifth Directive, other exclusion clauses could be permitted. 
Ward LJ did not discuss this point directly, however, it can be inferred that by his 
general acceptance and failure to dispute the submission, that Ward LJ was 
supportive of the argument.  A similar argument was considered by Waller LJ in 
Churchill v Wilkinson,613 who stated:  
“Article 12(1) (in relation to compulsory passenger cover) would 
suggest that insurance is required to cover all passengers injured 
except those contemplated by the second paragraph of art.13(1) i.e. 
those where the insurer can prove that the passenger knew the 
vehicle was stolen. If its effect is as wide and straightforward as that 
then much of art.13 would seem to be for the avoidance of doubt. 
For example art.13(3) prohibiting the exclusion of a passenger 
injured where he knew the driver was intoxicated and art.13(1)(b) 
and (c) prohibiting certain exclusion clauses would not seem to be 
strictly necessary”.614 
This is an interesting and powerful point made by Waller LJ. If Bernáldez615 
prohibited all exclusion clauses then it can be questioned as to why the EU 
legislature decided to continue to explicitly prohibit certain exclusion clauses within 
Article 13. Moreover, the legislature later prohibited exclusion clauses relating to 
intoxication, analogous to the exclusion in Bernáldez. Of course, the general rule 
in relation to lists of exclusion clauses is that anything absent from that list is valid. 
Consequently, it certainly would have been clearer, if the EU legislature stated that 
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all exclusion clauses are void towards third parties, rather than naming a few void 
exclusion clauses.  
It is questionable whether the EU’s original intention through the Second Directive 
was to allow some exclusion clauses, and that the ECJ in Bernáldez decided to 
extend this due to the introduction of later Directives, which included greater 
protection for victims.  Although the action of the EU legislature is perhaps 
confusing, it is submitted that this still is a weak premise to use in determining that 
Bernáldez616 is limited. It is respectfully submitted that Ward LJ should have 
examined the preparatory documents to the Directives, which show the difficulty in 
making an exhaustive list. 
Additionally, Ward LJ completely overlooks the dictum in paragraph 20 of 
Bernáldez617 where the Court does not limit its decision to intoxicated drivers, but 
expands it to all exclusion clauses. Moreover, Ward LJ could have expanded his 
analysis to the ECJ decisions Candolin618, Finanger619, and Farrell, whereby the 
ECJ explicitly stated that all exclusion clauses are to be viewed restrictively. The 
honourable judge further ignores arguments made by the property insurers based 
on the Churchill620 decision. The CJEU in Churchill621 confirmed that a statutory 
provision which would effectively deny the victim compensation was to be 
ineffective against third party claimants, even though such a measure was not 
contemplated nor limited expressly by Article 13. This case alongside the ECJ’s 
decision in Farrell v Whitty622 (which found that a statutory exclusion relating to a 
passenger sat in a vehicle not designed for seating is void), shows that although 
the Bernáldez623 exclusion was expressly inserted into Article 13, this does not 
restrict the application of Article 13 to all other exclusion clauses.  
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Reliance on Singh v Solihull MBC 
A major influence of the decision from Ward LJ was the decision of Collins J in 
Singh v Solihull624 which examined whether the driver’s contravention of an 
exclusion clause confer criminal liability on the driver for having no insurance. The 
case concerned a taxi driver who was prosecuted due to an undercover operation 
which caught him being paid for ‘public hire’, despite having exclusion clause in the 
policy of insurance which prevented the vehicle from being used as a taxi. This 
meant that the driver was driving without valid insurance which is illegal under 
Section 143 RTA.625 The taxi driver argued that as the insurer would have been 
obliged to compensate an innocent third party victim, due to the prevention of the 
reliance of exclusion clauses in the Directives, he should not be prosecuted for 
driving without insurance. The Court held that the Directives are not concerned with 
the criminal responsibility of the driver in relation to whether he has failed to comply 
with the compulsory insurance laws of the Member State in question. Collins J 
further stated:  
“The purpose…behind the directives is to ensure that innocent 
victims of road traffic accidents are compensated… if one takes what 
it (Bernáldez) says…in its literal way, it means that no exclusion 
clause in a contract of insurance would be able to be relied on in 
relation to an innocent victim”.626 
Collins J took a very negative view of the Directives, and argued that it is immaterial 
whether the insurer or the Bureaux compensates as long as the victim is 
guaranteed compensation, therefore: ‘the Court (in Bernáldez) need not have 
extended the application of Art.3 in the way that it did’.627 Collins J then went a step 
further and relied on the decision of Gibson J in Silverton v Goodall,628 concerning 
the legality of a clause in the MIB agreement. Gibson J briefly mentioned that the 
UK’s overall motor insurance regime was currently complying with EU law. Collins 
J in Singh v Solihull629 followed Silverton v Goodall and stated that it supports 
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the proposition that ‘the decision in Bernáldez does not have the wide effect that is 
suggested’.630 
This, with respect, seems to be contradictory from the learned judge in Singh v 
Solihull, who appears to suggest that the Bernáldez decision has gone too far in 
its’ extension of Article 3 to prevent the Bureaux from picking up claims when an 
exclusion clause is used, but then goes on to suggest that Bernáldez may not have 
the wide effect as is suggested.  
Collins J’s reliance on the Silverton v Goodall can also be criticised, as it occurred 
only a year after Bernáldez and before any of the other main CJEU rulings. 
Moreover, the case had little relevance to exclusion clauses, and only mentioned 
the key ECJ Bernáldez decision, in passing, once. Consequently, Collins J in 
Singh v Solihull631 should have taken the Silverton v Goodall632 case lightly and 
read it alongside subsequent clarifying CJEU decisions.633 As Dr Bevan stated, ‘It 
behoves any national court to interpret a Directive by considering first any relevant 
rulings by the Court of Justice, as opposed to imposing an inconsistent 
interpretation … as appears to have happened in EUI’.634 
It is proposed that despite the errors made by Collins J, Singh v Solihull635 was 
correctly decided, because it is evident that the interpretation of the Directives do 
not affect the criminal liability of the driver, the Directives are only concerned with 
compensation of victims.636 Essentially removing criminal liability of the driver when 
they breach an exclusion would make restricting insurance policies pointless, as 
there would be no deterrence against breaching an exclusion. It is notable, 
however, that Collins J’s remarks about Bernáldez637 are obiter and therefore 
although persuasive, were not binding on the Court. Moreover, it is respectfully 
submitted that his lordship’s line of reasoning based on the Silverton v Goodall 
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case is flawed. The contradictory reasoning of Collins J makes Singh v Solihull638 
an unreliable case to follow.  
It is therefore submitted that Ward LJ’s reasoning to interpret EU law narrowly is 
incorrect. The three premises utilised by Ward LJ are weak, and the learned judge 
misinterpreted EU Law. Academic authors agree that Ward LJ’s interpretation of 
EU law is fundamentally wrong, with Dr Bevan stating:  
“In Bristol Alliance, it seems that whilst the Court of Appeal paid lip 
service to the importance of Bernáldez, it went on to disregard its 
implication…leaving us with an unsatisfactory Court of Appeal 
precedent that appears to have failed to apply the correct 
Community law”.639 
Dr Papettas agreed that Ward LJ was incorrect in his interpretation of EU law, and 
stated that an insurer could not avoid liability when a policy was in force. Dr 
Papettas stated, however that finding this a difficult position to reach was 
‘understandable’.640 Furthermore, Hemsworth argues that Bristol Alliance641 rests 
on ‘insecure foundations’ and this warrants further consideration by future 
courts.642   
It is arguable, however, that this case mattered little to the actual victim of the 
accident, and satisfied the Directive’s overall aim of compensating the innocent 
victim of the accident. The House of Fraser store (the actual victim) in this case 
received compensation from the property insurer for damage caused, but the 
property insurer could not recover from the motor insurer. It is proposed, however, 
that even though damages were paid to the victim, the precedent that this case 
sets could leave future victims without compensation (this will be examined in the 
next Chapter), which is something that the Directives have intended to avoid. It 
further causes significant confusion for later third party claimants as to where their 
claim should be made, the insurer or the MIB.  
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The author therefore agrees with both Dr Papettas and Dr Bevan that the Bristol 
Alliance643 case is incorrect and sets a worrying precedent. It is doubtless that the 
Directives and subsequent case law impose strict rules in relation to exclusion 
clauses, the CJEU has been clear that exclusion clauses cannot be utilised by an 
insurer to repudiate liability towards a third party and this is not limited to those in 
the Directive. Ward LJ sought to limit these exclusion clauses through the three 
rationales outlined above and it has been proven that all three are incorrect. Ward 
LJ’s decision, however, is the only authoritative decision on this issue as all other 
comments are either obiter or from a lower court.   
 Does the role of the MIB ensure the UK’s compliance with EU 
Law? 
 
It should therefore be clear from the previous paragraph that the UK is currently 
infringing EU law. As stated by Ward LJ, a general or wide interpretation of EU law 
would mean that the UK is not fulfilling its’ obligation under the Directives and CJEU 
decisions. One questionable issue is whether, despite the illegality of exclusion 
clauses, the role of the MIB in the UK ensures that the UK is compliant with EU 
Law. This Chapter has already examined this issue finding that EU judges (see 
Csonka644 and Churchill645) overwhelmingly believe that the insurer cannot 
transfer liability to the Bureau when an exclusion clause is breached. It seems, 
however, that UK judges have a different opinion. Ward LJ in Bristol Alliance 
stated: 
“The Act (RTA) coupled with the MIB arrangements satisfy the aim 
and the spirit of the directive to ‘enable third party victims of accidents 
caused by vehicles to be compensated for all damage to property 
and personal injuries sustained by them’”.646  
Ward LJ was of this opinion because of his interpretation of the Bernáldez case. 
Moreover, Sir Ralph Gibson in Silverton v Goodall,647 a case concerning the 
legality of Clause 5 of the MIB Uninsured Drivers Agreement, stated:  
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“The structure of our statute law under the Act of 1988, together with 
the terms of the MIB Agreements, provide, in my judgment, laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions which satisfy the 
requirements of the Directives”.648 
This was a similar argument made in Clarke v Kato649, where Lord Clyde stated 
that because no action had been taken by the European Commission to challenge 
UK law in relation to motor insurance, despite it being scrutinised, the UK can be 
deemed compliant with the Directives. However, possibly the most surprising dicta 
relating this issue comes from Jay J in Delaney v Secretary of State for 
Transport. As stated earlier in this Chapter,650 Jay J showed certainty that the 
Directives do not permit exclusion clauses to be used against third parties and that 
there was ‘no room for an alternative view’.651 Jay J then goes onto state, however, 
that:   
“Were it not for the manner in which the MIB operates in this 
jurisdiction, this state of affairs would have the tendency to place 
the United Kingdom in breach of its obligations under the 
Directives”.652 
Jay J further relies on the opinion of AG Lenz in Bernáldez and states:  
“The third point I derive from these paragraphs of Advocate General 
Lenz’s opinion is that, although the scheme of the Second Directive 
is such that the insurer (if it exists) and not the national body should 
pay compensation, provided that the system as a whole ensures 
complete protection for victims there may be no objection in 
principle to the national body having an enhanced role”.653 
These are unforeseen comments made by His Lordship, who unmistakably 
suggests that the UK is complying with the Directives due to the role of the MIB. 
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This follows the views of AG Lenz in Bernáldez and Ward LJ in Bristol Alliance, 
that if complete protection is provided for the innocent victim, it is irrelevant who 
pays compensation. Jay J seemingly ignores later dicta by CJEU judges, which 
contradict the remarks made by Ward LJ.  
Furthermore, it is very difficult to consummate Jay J‘s comment here with his 
previous comments on exclusion clauses. Ward LJ suggested that if the Bernáldez 
case was to be interpreted as being of general effect then the UK regime would not 
be compliant. Whereas Jay J argues the complete opposite that Bernáldez is of 
general effect but the UK regime is still compliant. These two cases are in direct 
conflict with each other over EU law. Jay J’s decision alongside Ward LJ’s decision 
shows a reluctance of the Court to find that the UK is not compliant with EU law. 
The reason for this reluctance is unclear; potentially there is an absence of 
complaint about the current system from third party victims, with the third party 
likely to be paid compensation.  
Alternatively, it is possible that insurers continue to argue that exclusion clauses 
continue to be vital to assess and rate risks, as can be seen in Cassel Committee 
evidence. The author respectfully submits, however, that Jay J is incorrect, there 
can be no doubt that the UK is currently not in compliance with EU law. The 
Csonka, Churchill, and Fidelidade decisions are clear that the insurer 
compensates when exclusion is breached and not the Bureaux. Moreover, 
although some believe Csonka is not as wide as has been previously suggested,654 
the theme of not permitting exclusion clauses runs throughout the CJEU case law 
up to the very recent Fidelidade decision. The main aim of the Directives is to 
minimise inconsistency amongst different Member States, by allowing the MIB to 
have an enhanced role. It matters little in terms of compliance that the UK attempts 
to guarantee compensation. EU reluctance to permit Bureaux to pay when an 
exclusion clause is breached can also be found in the Travaux Preparatois of the 
Directives, where the original proposal to allow the Bureaux to compensate was 
removed due to potential inconsistencies and uncertainty.  
Post Delaney and EUI 
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It is notable, however, that whilst Bristol Alliance is binding without being 
overruled, lower courts have attempted to work around Ward LJ’s interpretation of 
the Directives, in cases where the accident fell outside the terms of the policy. The 
Birmingham County Court case of Allen v Mohammed655 concerned a vehicle 
which knocked a cyclist of his bike. The vehicle was not being driven by the insured, 
and the insurance policy excluded anyone apart from the insured from driving. As 
well as examining UK law in relation to this issue, HHJ Tindal referred to the 
substantial dicta from Jay J in Delaney, as well as from Csonka, and stated:  
“it is clear from Csonka, and the judgment of Jay J and (more 
implicitly Richards LJ) in Delaney, that the scheme envisaged by 
what was Art.1(4) Directive 84/5 (i.e. the MIB Scheme) was not 
intended to apply where there is an insurance policy in existence”.656  
The judge further stated that it was, ‘not the point’,657 that the UDA would cover the 
cost of the injuries suffered by the victim, as this would run flatly against the 
observations of the ECJ in Csonka. This, therefore, directly contradicts the 
approach of Jay J in Delaney as noted on page 166 above. However, as this was 
a case from the County Court, its authoritativeness is limited.  
The idea that the MIB would compensate was further examined by Gloster LJ in 
Cameron v Husain.658 Here, the insurer argued that the availability of an 
alternative remedy, namely under the MIB UtDA, should lead the Court to not use 
its discretion through Section 151. Gloster LJ in this case declined by stating:  
“it cannot be just to deprive her of her remedy, simply by the courts’ 
refusal to exercise a procedural power on the grounds of an 
alternate remedy…the claimant might well regard a claim under 
the UTDA as an inferior remedy to a court action for damages 
and under Section 151”.659  
Although Gloster LJ did not justify this through EU law, it is suggested that this 
follows an approach very much based on EU law. Whilst this case involved the 
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deprivation of a remedy, the honourable Judge implies that the Agreements are 
inferior remedies, moreover, that the Court cannot refuse to exercise a procedural 
power (to allow the claim under UK law) despite the existence of an alternate 
remedy.   
The decision shows the beginning of judicial scepticism of Ward LJ’s dicta from 
Bristol Alliance. Although Gloster LJ implies reluctance to follow the decision of 
Ward LJ and Jay J, her ladyship did not expressly overrule them. 
However, these cases have been contradicted by the Court of Appeal in Sahin660 
concerning £100,000 of damage to a vehicle after a collision with a vehicle which 
was identified but the driver was unidentified. The vehicle was owned by a company 
who hired the car to the Ms Havard, who then allowed an unidentified driver to use 
the vehicle, with the Ms Havard knowing they were uninsured. The third party victim 
brought a claim against Ms Havard and then against her insurer. The High Court 
judge stated that there were prominent questions: First, whether Ms Havard's 
liability to the claimant was a liability which was statutorily required to be covered 
pursuant to Section 145 RTA 1988, and second, whether Ms Havard's liability was 
in fact covered by the terms of the insurance policy. Citing Bernáldez and Csonka, 
the appellants argued that EU law required this liability to be covered by the insurer 
rather than the Bureau, as there was an insurance policy in existence in relation to 
Ms Havard.  Longmore LJ, in relation to EU Law, followed Ward LJ’s decision in 
Bristol Alliance closely and re-affirmed the statement that:  
“the scheme of the 1988 Act, coupled with the MIB arrangements, 
satisfied both the aim and spirit of the Directive and enabled the third 
party victims of accidents to be compensated for all damage to 
property and personal injuries sustained by them”.661 
The honourable judge further relied on the cases cited by Ward LJ in Bristol 
Alliance including Singh v Solihull and Norwich Union v Axa to reinforce this 
point. Longmore LJ further stated that there is no reason to interpret Section 145 
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separately from the MIB Agreements and ignore the result that the claimant is 
compensated by the UDA, which, in turn, satisfies the Directive’s objectives.662 
This is surprising from Longmore LJ, especially because of his Lordships’ use of 
EU law. Longmore LJ utilises Evans v Secretary of State from 2003 in support of 
Ward LJ's decision in Bristol Alliance, rather than the later Csonka decision, 
which occurred post Bristol Alliance, and which undermines the argument made 
by Ward LJ. The Csonka decision clarifies that where an insurer can be found, 
they are responsible for paying any claim, not the Bureaux, it is irrelevant if the 
accident fell outside the policy.  
The rationale behind the Courts’ judgment in this case is unclear. It is evident that 
the Court were dissatisfied with the £100,000 claim which they deemed ‘rather 
surprising’,,663 although this should not explain the Courts’ reluctance to apply clear 
EU law. Alternatively, it could be due to the reluctance of the Court to overrule a 
judgment made previously, in favour of a European Court decision on a slightly 
different issue. Despite not being mentioned in the decision, it is proposed that the 
dictum from Jay J in Delaney may have been persuasive. Although Jay J found a 
breach of EU law in relation to the UDA, his Lordship implied that the MIB’s 
operation in the UK in relation to exclusion clauses ensured UK compliance.   
The claimants then applied to appeal the Court of Appeal judgment to the Supreme 
Court, however, this was denied and consequently the application to appeal went 
directly to the Supreme Court, which was heard by Lord Mance, Lord Sumption, 
and Lord Carnwarth. Their Lordships, however, denied the application to appeal, 
for three reasons, two of which were related to EU Law. First, ‘The Motor Insurance 
Bureau provided appropriate protection in the present situation as contemplated by 
Article 2(1) of the Second Motor Directive 84/5/EEC’,664 and second, ‘there is no 
relevant point of EU law which is unclear or which requires a reference to the 
CJEU’.665 These reasons are, with respect, surprising. The first reason is identical 
to the dictum of Ward LJ, Longmore LJ, and to some extent Jay J, that the role of 
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the MIB prevents the UK from breaching EU law by paying compensation when an 
exclusion is breached. 
It is submitted that although this may satisfy one of the Directive’s main objectives, 
it does not satisfy the need for consistency across Member States which was 
another key objective. The second reason given by the Supreme Court is difficult, 
because although the Directives and subsequent cases are clear, it is rather 
obvious that EU law does not permit exclusion clauses. UK judges have evidently 
struggled with this as can be seen from inconsistent interpretation.   
However, it is likely that the Supreme Court were considering Brexit when making 
this decision. The Supreme Court as the final appeal Court in the UK, would need 
to send a preliminary ruling to the CJEU as to the interpretation of the Directives 
and Bernáldez.666 The average waiting time for the CJEU to hear a case is up to 
16 months,667 and therefore it is likely that Brexit would have almost been 
completed and therefore a possibility that EU Law is not relevant. However, as will 
be stated later in this chapter, this would be untimely as there is potential that the 
UK would need to continue to comply with the Directives due to the continuance of 
cross border travel.  
The courts’ inconsistency in interpreting EU law is evident in the judgment in the 
recent High Court case of Wastell v Woodward.668 The case involved an injury to 
a burger van owner crossing a road after affixing a sign, killing a motor cyclist. The 
insurer attempted to repudiate liability,669 by arguing that this was a liability will fell 
completely outside the RTA 1988. Furthermore, the use of the vehicle (business 
use) did not fall within the scope of the policy. The judge utilised Section 145 RTA 
to dismiss the validity of the exclusion against the third party, interestingly neither 
EU law nor Ward LJ’s or Longmore LJ’s interpretation were examined in the 
decision. It is unclear as to why the Judge did not examine either, however, it is 
                                                          
666 Unless they argue that this would be unnecessary since the answer is already clear or the question 
has already been asked, see CILFIT v Ministry of Health Case 283/81 [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 472. 
667 See Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No 17/17, “Statistics concerning 
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668 Wastell (n 332). 
669 They would not have been liable under Article 75 as it was arguably a liability falling outside of the 
RTA 1988. 
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submitted that it was not argued because of the little difference it would have made, 
as the insurer would continue to pay as an Article 79 insurer, and therefore focused 
more on the issue of the accident falling outside the Act.  
Is the UK Open to State Liability? 
As stated previously on pages 146-147, individuals can enforce their European 
Law rights through the principles of direct and indirect effect. However, when this 
fails because it is impossible to reconcile national law with EU rules, an individual 
may be able to sue the state directly for its’ breach of EU Law in either the national 
or European court. The conditions for state liability which must be fulfilled were 
given in Francovich670 and then further explored in Brasserie,671 the conditions 
for state liability are: the rule of law infringed is intended to confer rights on 
individuals; the breach is sufficiently serious and there is a direct causal link 
between the breach and the damage. 
There can be little doubt that the Directives confer rights upon individuals,672 and 
the third causation criteria would also be satisfied, as there is likely to be a causal 
link between the non-implementation of EU Law and the damage caused to the 
claimant (although this will be determined depending on the facts of the case). The 
test for the second criteria is slightly more difficult, because as previously stated, 
UK courts have not found a breach of EU law in relation to exclusion clauses. 
Therefore, unless a rapid change in approach by UK courts is undertaken, the 
claimant would need to apply for a referral up to the CJEU. The meaning of 
‘sufficiently serious’ was examined in Robins,673 where the CJEU stated:  
“The condition requiring a sufficiently serious breach of Community 
law implies manifest and grave disregard by the Member State for 
the limits set on its discretion”.674 
Lord Clyde gave a non-exhaustive list of factors which can be considered when 
defining whether a breach is sufficiently serious. These included: the importance of 
the principle, the clarity and precision of the rule breached; the degree of excuse 
                                                          
670 Francovich (n 469). 
671 Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Germany (C-46/93) [1996] Q.B. 404. 
672 See Delaney where the Court found that the Directives do confer rights upon individuals.  
673 Robins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (C-278/05) [2007] 2 C.M.L.R. 13. 
674 Ibid, [70]. 
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available an error of law, the existence of any relevant judgment on the point; of 
the mind of the infringer, and whether the infringer was acting intentionally or 
involuntarily. It would, of course, be in the claimant’s favour that the UK has already 
been successfully sued for breach of the Directives involving Article 13 and Article 
10 in Delaney. This would therefore remove the government’s excuse. In relation 
to the seriousness of the Secretary of State for Transport’s breach of EU law, Jay 
J in Delaney stated that the protection of traffic accident victims was ‘a principle of 
second-order importance which is worthy of recognition’.675 Jay J further stated that 
there was very little margin of discretion open to Member States when 
implementing Article 13 or Article 10.  
In relation to the clarity of provisions, the learned judge further stated that the 
Bernáldez decision is clear, no exclusion clauses are permitted against third 
parties and this was ‘self-evident’. Jay J stated that, ‘my approach has been that 
the language of the Second Directive —even unadorned by authority—was and is 
clear enough’.676 It is submitted that the UK may have had some excuse when 
originally implementing the RTA 1988 as it was relatively unclear whether the 
Directives prohibited the use of exclusion clauses and it was clear that the UK, at 
the time, were under the impression that they did not.677 However, subsequent 
decisions such as Bernáldez and Candolin clarified beyond doubt that exclusion 
clauses cannot be used. Consequently, the UK cannot state that the provisions are 
unclear, although an attempt could be made to show that the Courts have been 
confused on this issue. However, it may be possible for the UK to argue that they 
are reliant on numerous decisions, such as Ward LJ in Bristol Alliance, that have 
come before UK courts which have stated that the UK follows EU law.  
Of course, it is also important to note that when the Supreme Court is requested to 
examine this issue and fails to interpret the Directives properly, it is possible for an 
individual to gain damages against the UK based on that Courts failure under  
Kobler 678. This could be particularly relevant in the Supreme Courts’ mis-
interpretation of EU law by essentially reaffirming the judgment in Sahin. The 
                                                          
675 Delaney (n 539), [106]. 
676 Ibid, [112]. 
677 See the House of Lords Report found earlier in this Chapter where the UK MIB believed that the 
UK would have no problem with complying with the proposed and eventually enacted Article 13. 
678 See Kobler v Austria (Case C-224/01) [2004] Q.B. 848. 
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requirements for Kobler liability are the same as in state liability,679 with the added 
requirement of it being the court of last resort680 (which the Supreme Court clearly 
is). It is notable, however, that the requirement in relation to seriousness of the 
breach is particularly difficult to meet, as noted in by the CJEU in Traghetti681 ‘State 
liability can be incurred only in the exceptional case where the national court 
adjudicating at last instance has manifestly infringed the applicable law.’682 There 
is, in this authors view, a manifest infringement here by the Supreme Court, as a 
factor683 in determining this is if there is a failure to refer a case to the CJEU for 
preliminary reference which is required under Article 267 TFEU684, if the answer 
is unclear. However, Kobler liability is difficult to satisfy, not only because of the 
requirement of manifest infringement, but also because the determination as to 
whether the Supreme Court has manifestly infringed EU law would ultimately fall to 
a national court685 which would find it difficult to essentially rule against a decision 
of the Supreme Court.  
In terms of the state’s liability for its’ own legislative acts, it is difficult to understand 
the exact behaviour of the UK and the state of mind of the legislature without 
examining documents and internal consultations that it may have had. It would be 
difficult to find any excuse in the UK’s disregard and failure to act in compliance 
with EU law in this instance, as there are several EU cases which have consistently 
clarified that exclusion clauses cannot be utilised in any situation. In fact, it is 
submitted that the UK Government should take warning from the decision in 
Finanger686 whereby the Norwegian Government was obliged to pay substantial 
Francovich damages to a victim of a road accident because of their statutory 
provision allowing the insurer to repudiate liability in relation to intoxicate drivers. 
The Norwegian Supreme Court in that case held that there was ‘no justification’ for 
the Norwegian Government to allow the denial of compensation and therefore held 
                                                          
679 Ibid, [52]. The conferment of rights on individuals would likely be met (see for example the Delaney 
(n 539) judgment previously) and there is evidently causation between the loss and the damage.  
680 Ibid [34] 
681 Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA (In Liquidation) v Italy (C-173/03) [2006] 3 C.M.L.R. 19 
682 Ibid [32]. 
683 Ibid. 
684 (n 538). 
685 A preliminary reference would likely be sent to the EU which would then require application by the 
national court. A discussion of this can be found in Helen Scott and N.W.Barber, ‘State liability under 
Francovich for decisions of national courts’ (2004) L.Q.R. 120(Jul), 403-406,405.  
686 Finanger v Norway (n 468). 
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them liable.687 Hence, it is submitted that it is very possible that the UK could be 
eventually sued for their breach of the Directives in relation to exclusion clauses.  
Judicial Review 
Another route that could be taken against the UK and the MIB, which, unlike 
Francovich, does not confer damages, is Judicial Review. This action requests 
that the Court sets aside incompliant national law, in favour of EU law. As stated 
by the Grand Chamber in Unibet:688 
“It is for the [national court] to ensure that the examination of the 
compatibility of [national] law with Community law takes place 
irrespective of the assessment of the merits of the case with regard 
to the requirements for damage and a causal link in the claim for 
damages”.689 
Consequently, both causation and damage do not need to be proven for Judicial 
Review, and this is an easier route to take. At time of writing, a Judicial Review is 
underway in R (on the application of Road Peace) v Secretary of State for 
Transport and the MIB.690 The Judicial Review concerns both the MIB 
Agreements691 and the RTA 1988. In their skeleton arguments,692 the claimants 
submitted several grounds in arguing that the UK were breaching the Directives. In 
relation to exclusion clauses, the claimants argue on grounds 9.2 and 9.4 that the 
UK: ‘unlawfully permit insurers to include limitations and exclusion clauses in their 
policies which are not permitted by the Directive’.693 The claimants relied heavily 
on the EU decisions Evans and Csonka cases to make this point.  
The MIB and SoSFT argued that the UK is not in contravention of EU law as 
explained by Ward LJ in Bristol Alliance and through a narrower interpretation of 
the CJEU decisions in Bernáldez and Csonka. They further utilised the argument 
which is often used, which was that third parties remain protected, notwithstanding 
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the existence of any such exclusion clause in the insurers’ contract with the 
policyholder.694 
As the Judicial Review is ongoing at the time of writing, it is uncertain as to whether 
the Judicial Review will succeed and subsequently the UK will be forced to alter 
the RTA 1988. However, it is submitted that the very recently decided case of 
Sahin695 in the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Courts’ rejection of an appeal, 
makes it much more difficult for the High Court to decide against the government, 
as the case clearly supports the SoSFT view. However, considering the recent 
Fidelidade696 case, which re-affirms the Csonka decision and gives it a broader 
interpretation, the decision of the High Court may now go in the claimant’s favour.  
Post Brexit 
On June 23rd, 2016, the UK voted to leave the EU. The UK later invoked Article 50 
of the TFEU 697 on March 29th, 2017 which signalled the beginning of a two-year 
process of negotiation before the UK leaves.698 As stated previously on page 146, 
EU Law continues to apply in the UK within these two years, but it is uncertain as 
to whether it will continue to apply post-Brexit, although it is apparent that the 
government’s position is that the UK will leave the Single Market. Consequently, 
the UK will not be under the jurisdiction of the EU legislature or CJEU.  
There is further possibility that current directives and CJEU decisions will become 
redundant.  However, as noted in the Government’s white paper: 
“we will introduce the Great Repeal Bill to remove the European 
Communities Act 1972 from the statute book and convert the ‘acquis’ 
– the body of existing EU law – into domestic law”.699 
This, however, was qualified by stating that, ‘wherever practical and appropriate, 
the same rules and laws will apply on the day after we leave the EU as they did 
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before’.700 It must be remembered that because the Directives are not directly 
applicable, the Government has transposed them into UK law already, although it 
is apparent that the significant case law from the European courts has not been 
implemented.701 The Government could repeal their implementation of the 
Directives post Brexit without fear of Francovich action. However, due to a two-
year limitation period on claims, EU law need to be used in relation to accidents 
that occurred before Brexit.  
In relation to case law, it is likely that the UK will implement CJEU decisions which 
have already occurred and will introduce them into UK law as equivalent to 
Supreme Court decisions.702 However, a significant difficulty with motor insurance 
and exclusion clauses is with the interpretation of Bernáldez. As stated previously, 
Ward LJ in Bristol Alliance and Longmore LJ in Sahin took narrow approaches to 
Bernáldez. Because the Government has not amended the list of prohibited 
exclusion clauses in Section 148, its’ intention continues to be that all other 
exclusion clauses are valid, and therefore a Ward LJ approach to exclusion clauses 
is most likely to be preferable. With this confusion, it is likely that the government 
will either clarify the RTA 1988, or there will be significant case law questioning the 
interpretation of Bernáldez.703 
It is evident that the Government does not view parts of the Directives favourably, 
first by their non-implementation, and second, through a Telegraph blog704 written 
by the foreign minister Boris Johnson on the Vnuk decision. Boris was critical of 
the CJEU’s decision and the potential scope for needing to insure different vehicle 
types such as ‘golf buggies’ or ‘grannies’ bath chairs’.705 Whether this was Brexit 
rhetoric is uncertain, however, it emphasises some genuine unease of motor 
insurance legislation within the government. Boris’ article was argued to be ‘lazy 
and deliberately uninformed’ due to the absence of understanding of derogations 
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contained within the Directives.706 If deemed too protectionist therefore, the UK’s 
implementation of Directives could be altered.  
It must be remembered, however, that despite Brexit, the UK will not halt travel 
across the EU707 and therefore that harmonisation would need to continue. If the 
UK decided to remove high-level protection to third parties, it could revert to a 
Green Card Scheme, this, as argued previously on page 102, would lead to queues 
at the border due to needing to check every green card to ensure that adequate 
insurance is in place. It is submitted that it is unlikely that the EU would force 
reversion to the Green Card Scheme if exclusion clauses were permitted as long 
as the MIB would pay, however, if the MIB’s agreements conferred less protection 
then this could cause reversion to the Green Card Scheme.  
Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we have examined the ways in which the UK has interpreted and 
applied EU law harmonisation of exclusion clauses, and have found that the UK’s 
interpretation is inconsistent. The Bristol Alliance case, in its narrow interpretation 
of the Directives, conflicts with the obiter remarks of other UK judges and is based 
on insecure foundations. It is respectfully submitted that the three rationales utilised 
by Ward LJ are weak. However the confirmation of his Lordship’s judgment by the 
Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court means that it is unlikely that it will be 
successfully challenged. Moreover, even if a challenge is successful against the 
UK for breach of EU law, there is, depending on the future relationship between 
the UK and EU, potential for the UK to reverse any alterations it would make to 
comply with the EU’s approach.  
Consequently this Chapter has contributed to the thesis through finding that, 
despite the judgments in both Bristol Alliance and Sahin, the UK is not complying 
adequately with EU Law, in both legislation and case law. However, the 
enforcement of EU law rights (through liability or direct/indirect effect) in this area 
is difficult, as the courts are determining that national law is fully compliant. 
Consequently, despite there being, in this authors’ view, a major difference 
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between national and EU law here, the answer as to whether exclusion clauses 
are valid in the UK remains the same.  
Because exclusion clauses can currently be used due to the narrow interpretation 
of EU law, it is important to examine whether there are any alternative routes in 
which victims could take to prevent an insurer from relying on a clause. Such as 
through legislation which is not aimed at motor insurance exclusion clauses, but 
nevertheless affects them.  
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Chapter Six: Regulation of Exclusion clauses beyond the 
Road Traffic Act 
 
Introduction 
Although the most significant prevention of reliance on exclusion clauses against 
third parties falls within the RTA 1988 under Section 148, this is certainly not the 
only legislative intervention which could affect exclusion clauses. It is notable that 
other Acts and instruments could also have a significant effect on third party claims 
in motor insurance. Although these are primarily aimed at protecting either a first 
party business or consumer, these could have some secondary effect on third party 
claims also. Consequently, in determining the extent to which exclusion clauses 
are valid, it is important to examine these Acts and instruments.  
This chapter will examine the statutory and non-statutory provisions which regulate 
exclusion clauses generally in both contract and insurance contracts. It will begin 
by examining unfair terms in consumer contracts, which although are not aimed 
primarily at insurance contracts, may have some effect on third party insurance 
claims.  Consequently, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (henceforth ‘CRA’) will be 
examined. Then this chapter will examine the Insurance Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook to see if this has any effect. Finally, CIDRA 2012 and the Insurance 
Act 2015 to see if these Acts also have an effect on the validity of exclusion clauses 
towards third parties.  
 Regulation of General Consumer Contracts 
A Short History 
The regulation of unfair terms in consumer contracts has a fascinating history, 
especially regarding insurance policies. Regulation of general consumer contracts 
began with the Unfair Contract Terms Act (henceforth ‘UCTA’) 1977, which 
prevented reliance on unfair exclusion clauses by traders. However, due to 
insurance lobbying,708 insurers were exempted from the Act.709 This is because 
exclusion clauses are generally concerned with insurer risk, therefore it was argued 
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vehemently by the insurance industry that any attempt to regulate those ‘core’ 
terms would be to rewrite the basis on which the premium had been set.710 The 
insurance industry made a similar argument previously when the RTAs were 
originally introduced in the 1930s. 
Nonetheless, the insurance industry and Lloyds’ of London recognised that there 
was a problem with insurers’ use of unfair terms generally. Consequently, the 
Insurance Ombudsman Bureaux (henceforth ‘IOB’) was formed to ensure that the 
‘statements of good practice’, previously adopted by insurers, were adhered to.711 
The statements were only relevant on members of the Association of British 
Insurers and it was untested as to whether they were ‘legally binding’. The Financial 
Ombudsman Service (henceforth ‘FOS’) was introduced with the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (henceforth ‘FSMA’), and was given the authority 
to deal with relatively minor consumer complaints regarding exclusion clauses as 
well as other issues, using what is now referred to as the Insurance Conduct of 
Business Sourcebook (henceforth ‘ICOBS’).712  
In 1999, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 
(henceforth ‘UTCCR 1999’) were introduced in the UK to implement the EU 1993 
Unfair Consumer Contract Terms Directive (henceforth ‘UCCTD 1993’)713 into 
domestic law. These regulations also applied to unfair terms in consumer insurance 
contracts and required exclusion clauses to be fair and ‘transparent’.714 The 
UTCCR, however, continued to significantly reduce the right to claim unfairness as 
it exempted terms which, ‘clearly define or circumscribe the insured risk and the 
insurers’ liability’.715 This Chapter will now examine the successor of the UCTA 
1977, the recently introduced CRA 2015 and then the ICOBS.  
Consumer Rights Act 2015 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (henceforth ‘CRA 2015’ or ‘the Act’) was 
introduced to, ‘amend the law relating to the rights of consumers and protection of 
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their interests’.716 The Act consolidated and replaced the EU UCCTR 1999 and the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (henceforth ‘UCTA’) due to significant disparities 
between the legislation in relation to consumer contracts. It further modified UCTA 
in relation to business to business. The Act is only relevant to contracts between a 
‘Trader’, meaning a, ‘person acting for purposes relating to that person’s trade, 
business…or profession, whether acting personally…name or on the trader’s 
behalf’ (Section 2 (2) CRA) and a ‘consumer’, a natural person acting outside of 
that capacity (Section 2 (3) CRA). An insurer comes under the definition of the 
term ‘trader’ within the Act as a, ‘service provider’. Consequently, motor insurance 
policies between an insurer and consumer are covered under the Act, however 
business motor insurance policies are not, although, businesses can refer to other 
forms of intervention both statutory and non-statutory.717 It is clear from the 
preamble of the Act (as noted above), that it is not aimed at the protection of third 
parties; and it is not altogether clear whether third parties could rely on this 
legislation. It is unlikely that a third party can argue for the unfairness of claims 
outright and they are unable to utilise the Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999718 which states that a third party can rely on a contract term which confers a 
benefit to them. However, this would clearly not apply here as the third party would 
be attempting to avoid a detriment from a term rather than seek a benefit.   
One solution, however, may be in Section 71 of the CRA which states that: ‘The 
Court must consider whether the term is fair even if none of the parties to the 
proceedings has raised that issue or indicated that it intends to raise it’, whether 
the Court would be willing to utilise this provision to strike out a clause under the 
CRA is again unclear. O’Brien implies that this will not be available to third parties 
by stating in relation Section 71, ‘any unfair term will not be binding on a 
consumer’,719 this follows from the general scheme of the Act which is aimed 
primarily at consumer rather than third party protection. However, it is submitted 
that the Court may be willing to use this provision for blatantly unfair terms in both 
first or third party claims. It would be inequitable for there to be disparity between 
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consumers and third party rights, especially as a third party would not have signed 
up for the term in the first place. Moreover, as first and third party coverage is part 
of the same policy, insurers may take more care within the policy to comply.  
If the third party could rely on unfair terms it is important to examine exactly what 
the CRA 2015 deems as ‘unfair’, which is dealt with in Part II if the CRA. If a term 
is regarded as ‘unfair’ it can be challenged in the Courts and subsequently deemed 
unenforceable (see Section 62 CRA), although this does not cancel the contract, 
policy and any of the obligations arising from it.  
Due to the need for a ‘case by case’ approach, ‘unfair’ is necessarily a somewhat 
uncertain, vague, and subjective term. The Act states that a term is unfair if: 
“contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract 
to the detriment of the consumer…taking into account the nature of 
the subject matter of the contract, and…by reference to all the 
circumstances existing when the term was agreed and to all of the 
other terms of the contract or of any other contract on which it 
depends”.720 
The requirement of good faith, according to the Competition and Markets Authority 
(henceforth ‘CMA), entails a general principle of ‘fair and open dealing’.721 
Contracts should be drafted to respect the legitimate interests of consumers and 
the CMA goes as far as to refer to, ‘good standards of commercial morality and 
practice’.722  This issue of commercial morality is relevant particularly to clauses in 
motor insurance policies which are no longer used, but which were seemingly 
prevalent in the 1930’s, clauses which excluded ‘jews’ or ‘foreigners’ and other 
controversial exclusion clauses relating to characteristics or professions of drivers 
which had no relation to the risk, would almost certainly be declared as immoral at 
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present day. Of course, it is unlikely that these clauses would ever be used in a 
modern policy.  
Moreover, as was stated by Lord Bingham in Director-General of Fair Trading v 
First National Bank plc,723 the trader should not, ‘whether deliberately or 
unconsciously, take advantage of the consumers necessity, indigence, lack of 
experience, unfamiliarity with the subject matter of the contract (or) weak 
bargaining position’.724 The definition of an ‘average’ consumer has been of interest 
and discussion amongst an extensive corpus of EU law, however, the definition 
which is most used and contained within the CRA is someone, ‘who is reasonably 
well informed and observant and circumspect’.725 This, however, does not signify 
that the ‘trader’ should ignore vulnerable consumers, who have ‘educational, 
intellectual, cultural, social or linguistic limitations’.726 Demonstrating that the 
consumer’s situation should be considered when examining whether a significant 
imbalance has occurred, and consequently whether the insurer has acted in good 
faith. It is evident that policies and exclusion clauses must be adapted to meet the 
needs of the individual consumer. Meaning that it should consider any potential 
limitations in understanding, or should be constructed at a level which would be 
understood by all consumers. This is particularly the case in Motor Insurance as 
with over 30 million policies being issued to almost half of the population, with the 
clear majority likely to be unfamiliar with the exact nature and effects of the terms 
contained within motor insurance policies.  
It is also a separate and distinct requirement that a written term of a consumer 
contract is transparent. This will be met under Section 68 CRA, if the term uses, 
‘plain and intelligible language and is legible’. There is, of course, more to this 
definition, and as stated in the Competition and Markets Authority Guidance:  
                                                          
723 [2002] 1 AC 481. 
724 Ibid, [17]. 
725 For a greater discussion on the meaning of ‘consumer’ see, See Mak V, “Standards of Protection: 
In Search of the ‘Average Consumer’ of EU Law in the Proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive” 
TISCO Working Paper Series on Banking, Finance and Services, No. 04/2010, 1. [Accessed 14th 
June 2017] 
726 Samuels A, “The Consumer Rights Act 2015”, (2016) J.B.L. 3, 159-185. 
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“Obligations…should be set out fully, and in a way that is not only 
comprehensible but puts the consumer into a position where he or 
she can understand their practical significance”.727 
Again, this depends on the individual consumer’s understanding and limitations, 
and therefore adapting the policy and exclusion clauses based on this. However, 
as noted in the insurance case of Bankers Insurance Company Limited v 
South728 this does not mean that the insured can ignore their own responsibilities. 
The case concerned whether the term ‘waterborne craft’ was in plain intelligible 
language in terms of it incorporating the term ‘jet-ski’. Having examined numerous 
definitions of the term, the Court held that it was transparent and ‘would be so 
understood by any reasonable insured who troubled to read the policy wording’.729 
The Court further stated that: 
“(The insured) could have read the policy wording which I have 
found was available and could have asked (the insurer) whether it 
covered jet skis if he was in any doubt or even if he couldn't be 
bothered to read all the wording”.730 
This emphasises that whilst there is a significant amount of responsibility on the 
insurer to ensure that terms are transparent, there is also a degree of responsibility 
on the insured to read the policy, but also to ask questions if there is a term which 
they are struggling to comprehend. It is also important to note that, in relation to 
the relationship between transparency and fairness, both terms are regarded as 
separate to one and other,731 however, the fairness test is more likely to be met 
when the term is transparent but this is not guaranteed.  
Core Terms 
One term which does not need to be assessed for fairness can be found under 
Section 64 (1), which is a term that ‘specifies the main subject-matter of the 
contract’. These ‘core terms’ fall outside needing to comply with the fairness 
                                                          
727 Competitions and Markets Authority “Unfair Contract Terms Guidance: Guidance on the unfair 
terms provisions in the Consumer Rights Act 2015”, 31st July 2015: CMA 37, [2.4]. 
728 [2003] EWHC 380. 
729 Ibid, [23]. 
730 Ibid, [24]. 
731 Ibid. 
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requirement although this does not automatically make them immune from attack 
as they must be deemed ‘transparent’ and ‘prominent’ (Section 64 (2) CRA). The 
difficulty here, therefore, is in determining which terms fall within the ‘subject matter’ 
of the contract, as stated by Professor Merkin, the distinction between core and 
ancillary terms is particularly acute when the term is an exclusion from cover in an 
insurance policy.732 Moreover, the term ‘transparent’, which is analogous to the 
term ‘fairness’, is open to interpretation.  
As stated by the CMA, ‘core terms’ are the, ‘very essence of the contractual 
relationship’733 and, ‘must be understood as being those that lay down the essential 
obligations of the contract’.734 This provides some clarity as to determining ‘core 
terms’, but continues to leave open the question as to the definition of ‘essential 
obligations’. The answer, in insurance contracts, seemingly lies in the 1993 EU 
Unfair Terms Directive735 at Recital 19, which states: 
 “In insurance contracts, the terms which clearly define or 
circumscribe the insured risk and the insurers’ liability shall not 
be subject to such assessment (of fairness) since these 
restrictions are taken into account in calculating the premium paid 
by the consumer”.736 
Consequently, exclusion clauses included in motor insurance policies, which have 
a clear effect in defining the insured risk, therefore impacting on calculating the 
insured’s premium, will not be assessed for fairness if they are ‘transparent’ and 
‘prominent’. As stated in previous chapters, the majority of terms which are used in 
calculating the premium involve the insured’s ‘use’ of the vehicle such as for ‘social 
domestic or pleasure purposes’. Of course, it is unlikely that the term which limits 
use to ‘business use’, would fall within this Act due to the Act’s clear limitation to 
consumer contracts.   
However, it is important to note that, the overall issue as to whether ‘risk clauses’ 
fall within ‘core terms’ is not entirely certain, as noted using the word ‘potentially’ in 
                                                          
732 Professor Merkin (n 23), 6. 
733 CMA (n 724).  
734 Ibid. 
735 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts 
736 emphasis added. 
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Professor Merkin’s book.737 However, as explained at the beginning of this chapter, 
from the legislature’s decision to exclude insurance contracts from the 1977 UCTA, 
there is a general unwillingness to interfere in terms which are used to assess 
insurance risk. Consequently, it is submitted that these ‘risk’ terms do fall within the 
‘core exclusion’ provisions of the CRA 2015.  
Again, however, it is important to note that these will not be assessed for fairness 
if they are ‘transparent’ and ‘prominent’. As stated by the CRA 2015, a term is 
‘prominent’ if it is brought to the consumer’s attention in such a way that an average 
consumer would be aware of it. The CMA further states that awareness should be 
taken to, ‘denote awareness of it for practical purposes, so that he or she (the 
consumer) can make an informed purchasing decision’.738 Moreover: 
“Terms need to be brought to the consumer’s attention prior to the 
conclusion of the contract in a way that is likely to enable the average 
consumer to understand and appreciate the essential features of the 
bargain when making purchasing decisions”.739 
Similar to previous definitions within the CRA 2015, several factors are considered 
when determining prominence, including the consumer’s expectations, its 
relationship with other terms, and information given to the consumer pre-
contract.740 It is submitted that exclusion clauses relating to ‘use’ of the vehicle will 
meet the prominence requirements in the majority of policies made by respectable 
insurers, as they are careful to ensure that these terms are at the forefront of the 
average motor insurance policy and within the proposal forms. Moreover, as stated 
regarding transparency, consumers are expected to have at least read the policy 
and therefore, if the exclusion is brought to the attention of the consumer then this 
requirement is likely to be met.  
Overall, due to limited case law and interpretation of this Act, especially in relation 
to insurance and third parties, it is difficult to see exactly what effect this Act will 
have. The Act has clarified many issues involving key definitions; however, further 
clarification is needed in relation to core terms and its application to motor 
                                                          
737 Professor Merkin (n 23). 
738 CMA, (n 724), [3.23]. 
739 Ibid. 
740 Ibid. 
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insurance policies. The significance of this Act, however, should not be 
underestimated by the insurance industry as it bestows significant responsibility on 
the insurer.  
Consumer Insurance Contracts 
Insurance Conduct of Business Sourcebook (ICOBS) and the 
Financial Ombudsman Service 
 
ICOBS replaced the previous Statements of Insurance Practice and is currently 
managed by the Financial Conduct Authority (henceforth ‘FCA’) under the authority 
of the FSMA 2000. As confirmed by the FCA’s predecessor (the Financial Services 
Authority), ‘insurers’ conduct must towards third parties must comply with…the 
claims handling rules in chapter 8 of…ICOBS’.741 Consequently, insurers are 
obliged to comply with ICOBS towards both consumers and third parties.  
If there is failure of an insurer to meet its obligations contained within the 
sourcebook and a complaint is made by the consumer, the insurer is likely to face 
disciplinary action by the FOS.  The FOS does not deal with claims by third parties, 
and therefore could not rule against an insurer for repudiating third party claims 
where the Sourcebook is breached. Consequently, it is only if a consumer brings 
an action against the FOS in which relief can be sought. As a motor insurance 
policy will have a first party, ICOBS could still act as a deterrent to prevent insurers 
from breaching it in policies which have both first and third parties.  
The FOS will decide whether to uphold the complaint based on what is reasonable 
and fair in the circumstances and can award damages to the complainant.742 
Moreover, the sourcebook is binding upon the insurers and a civil action by the 
insured potentially exists for breach.743 This therefore, can lead to reputation 
damage and consequently loss of shareholder confidence, which is arguably more 
important for the insurer than any savings it could make by repudiating claims.744 
Moreover, as argued by the UK Law Commission, there is potential for the insurers 
                                                          
741 Cited in House of Lords by Lord Dubs, 1st February 2012, Col 1599 (Hansard). 
742 This phrase is always cited in FOS judgments. 
743 Parker and Parker v The National Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Society Limited [2012] EWHC 
2156 (Comm) [196]. 
744 Fisher D, “Third Party Assistance: Or Should I say capture?” (2011) J.P.I Law, 4. 245-248, 248. 
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to breach their statutory duty of good faith if they refuse to comply with the code, 
although this is questionable.  
In relation to exclusion clauses the approach taken by the FOS is different to the 
approach that is taken in the Courts. It does not question the classification of a 
term, as a condition precedent, an innominate term, or a warranty, and then apply 
the appropriate consequences of breach.745 Alternatively, it examines the potential 
effect of use of a clause and the effect it thinks it should have on the breach and 
then whether the complainant qualifies for the extra protection as a consumer that 
ICOBS provides.746 
The key provisions within the Sourcebook in relation to exclusion clauses is 
contained in ICOBS 8.1 which states that the insurer must, ‘handle claims promptly 
and fairly’ (ICOBS 8.1.1 (1)) and further must not ‘unreasonably reject a claim 
(including by terminating or avoiding a policy)’ (ICOBS 8.1.1 (3)). ICOBS 8.1.2 
states that the rejection of a claim is unreasonable, inter alia, ‘for breach of warranty 
or condition unless the circumstances of the claim are connected to the breach’ 
unless, ‘the warranty is material to the risk and was drawn to the customer's 
attention before the conclusion of the contract’ (ICOBS 8.1.2 (3) (C)). Causation 
between the claim and breach of the exclusion is best practice within the insurance 
industry. Consequently, it is unlikely that any reputable insurer would seek to rely 
on a defence unrelated to the claim. However, this rule aims to ensure that a high 
standard of protection is enforced across all insurers as it is clear especially from 
early cases that some insurers in motor claims were relying on exclusion clauses 
unrelated to accident cause.  
Although there is clearly potential for the FOS to provide the necessary safeguard 
to third party claims, there are very significant limitations. For example, the FOS 
cannot cross-examine witnesses,747 and cannot tell the courts how to resolve a 
dispute. 
                                                          
745 Judith Summer, Insurance and the Financial Ombudsman Service, (Informa Publishing, 2010), 
[14.13]. 
746 Ibid. 
747 DISP 3.3.4 R (10). 
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Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 
CIDRA was introduced in 2012 after the UK Law Commission introduced a 
programme of Consultations to examine various areas of insurance law both in 
relation to consumer and business insurance. The Act was not directly addressed 
to third party claims, however, particularly in relation to ‘Basis of the Contract 
Clauses’, the Act may have some relevance to motor insurance.  
Basis of the Contract Clauses Generally 
The most controversial exclusion clause used by an insurer in any insurance policy 
is the, ‘basis of the contract clause’, historically used in both first and third party 
claims to repudiate liability. The basis clause turns any error made in a policy 
proposal form748 into a warranty contained within the contract. An example of a 
‘basis of the contract’ clause, which was commonly inserted into an insurance 
proposal form was: ‘I declare that the particulars and statements made by me 
above are true, and I agree that they shall be the basis of the contract between me 
and the – Company’.749 It is clear, however, that as stated by Lord Wright in 
Provincial Insurance Co v Morgan,750 these clauses come in many variations. 
 Basis of the Contract in Motor Insurance 
Dawson’s v Bonnin751 is the most important case in relation to these clauses in 
all areas of insurance. In this case, a proposal form submitted by Dawson’s Ltd, 
contained the following incorrect answers. Condition 4 of the policy held that:  
“Material misstatement or concealment of any circumstances by the 
insured material to assessing the premium herein, or in connection 
with any claim, shall render the policy void”. 
The insurer therefore repudiated liability to the insured when a fire broke out at a 
garage, destroying the insured’s vehicle. The insured argued that as the incorrect 
answer to the proposal question was immaterial, and it was unlikely that it would 
have affected the insurers’ premium, they were entitled to be compensated. The 
                                                          
748 A form completed by a person seeking insurance, giving relevant details to allow the insurer to 
determine the risk and premium. 
749 Hasson R.A, “The "basis of the contract clause" In Insurance Law”, (1971) M.L.R., 34 (1), 29. 
750 [1933] A.C. 240, 251. 
751 [1922] 2 A.C. 413 
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insurers alternatively argued that the statement of the usual place to be garaged 
was a warranty in the sense in which that term is used with reference to contracts 
of insurance, and that if it was not correct the action must fail, whether the 
statement was material or not. The House of Lords held, on a majority of three to 
two, that it was irrelevant whether the incorrect statement made was material. 
Viscount Haldane stated:  
“If the respondents can show that they contracted to get an accurate 
answer to this question, and to make the validity of the policy 
conditional on that answer being accurate, whether the answer was 
of material importance or not, the fulfilment of this contract is a 
condition of the appellants being able to recover”.752 
This is a significant decision, as it shows that materially is irrelevant when it comes 
to misstatements in the proposal form if a ‘basis of the contract’ clause is present. 
Meaning, that insurers could avoid paying a claim, even due to a minor error, which 
would not have affected the granting of insurance, or if the error slightly reduced 
the premium.  
The Court in Provincial Insurance Company, Limited Appellants v Morgan and 
Another753 circumvented the use of these clauses. Here, a question in the proposal 
form asked the insured to, ‘State (a) the purposes in full for which the vehicle will 
be used; and (b) the nature of the goods to be carried’.754 The insured answered 
with ‘delivery of coal’.755 Similar to previous cases, the policy had a ‘basis of the 
contract’ clause which was subsequently used by the insurer to deny payment as 
the insured also used the lorry to carry timber. However, in this case the judges in 
the House of Lords found in favour of the insured, because the statements made 
were only statements of intention, and were not meant to be definitive.  
Very few cases exist where the insurer repudiates liability based on these clauses 
against a third party claim. A case which exists in relation to the use of these 
clauses against third parties is Sivers v Mainwaring,756 involving an accident 
                                                          
752 Ibid, 421. 
753 [1933] A.C. 240. 
754 Ibid. 
755 Ibid. 
756 Reported in the Times, 23rd March (1932). 
 192 
  
where a lorry injured a motorcyclist, the insurer refused to indemnify the lorry 
company due to the unsafe condition of the vehicle, hence potentially leaving the 
third party at risk of gaining no compensation.757 Moreover, a basis clause was 
contained in the proposal form and was also used by the insurer because the 
company withheld information in the proposal form in a ‘previous convictions’ 
question. The company failed to inform the insurers that two drivers had been 
previously convicted for the very minor offence of having ‘noisy silencers’. During 
pleadings, the insurers said that the defence of the use of basis clauses had been 
put before a Committee at Lloyds of London by the insurers, which was 
subsequently granted. This was greeted with surprise by the judge, Mr Justice 
Horridge. The Judge stated that, ‘this is as wretched a point as I have had to deal 
with and it is not the way, from my experience, that Lloyds’ underwriters treat these 
matters’.758 The Judge further stated that he would take care to let the public know 
what sort of defence was being used against them. After the Judge’s comment, the 
insurers again consulted the Lloyds Committee and withdrew the defence. 
Consequently, the insurer paid for all loses resulting from the accident including to 
the injured third party.  
The RTA 1934 then significantly amended the law in relation to third party rights 
and Section 10 (3) stated:  
“No sum shall be payable by an insurer under the foregoing 
provisions of the section, if, in an action commenced before or within 
three months after the commencement of the proceedings…he has 
obtained a declaration, that apart from any provision contained 
within the policy, he is entitled to avoid it on the ground that it was 
obtained by non-disclosure of a material fact”.759 
Shawcross interpreted this provision and the phrase, ‘apart from any provision 
contained within the policy’ as meaning that basis of the contract clauses could not 
be used against third parties.760 Moreover, whereas this provision requires 
                                                          
757 Although it is unclear in this case as to whether the third party would have claimed against the 
company or driver.  
758 Sivers v Mainwaring (n 760). 
759 emphasis added. 
760 Shawcross (n 74), 305. 
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materiality in cases of misrepresentation, basis clauses do not require materiality, 
meaning, it seems that these clauses do no fall within these parameters. It is 
submitted that this is a strong argument to make, although it is not altogether clear 
whether the intention of the provision was to prohibit these clauses. If Parliament 
intended to prohibit the use of basis clauses against third parties, it would have 
done so either in clearer express terms in Section 10 or within Section 12 
alongside other prohibited exclusion clauses.  
Additionally, it is arguable that ‘basis clauses’ are contained within the proposal 
form and not the policy, although the proposal form is considered part of the policy. 
Insurers have not challenged the interpretation of this provision, because of judicial 
consternation related to basis clauses. In fact, insurers have agreed to not use 
these clauses within their proposal forms at all, although recent cases exist which 
show that insurers have continued to use these clauses in some situations.761 It is 
notable that insurers were unlikely to challenge the prohibition of basis clause from 
the RTA 1934, because of limited practical importance due to the MIB requiring the 
insurer to pay under Article 79.762 Moreover, were these clauses to be used and 
subsequently challenged under EU Law then it is possible that they would be struck 
out by the Courts due to breach of Article 13 of the Sixth Directive.763 
Importantly, however, this issue was laid to rest, at least prospectively, in both the 
CIDRA 2012 as well as the Insurance Act 2015. These Acts are a consequence 
of the English and Scottish Law Commission’s consultation on insurance law, the 
Commissions, and majority of consultees agreed that these clauses should be 
prohibited. Consequently, CIDRA 2012 was introduced, and Section 6 states that 
in a Consumer Insurance contract, a representation in a proposal form ‘is not 
capable of being converted into a warranty by means of any provision’. This 
seemingly applies to both first and third party contracts. Having examined CIDRA, 
it is further important to examine the effect of the Insurance Act 2015, whereas 
CIDRA applies only to consumer insurance, the Insurance Act 2015 applies to 
business (and occasionally consumer insurance, whether a provision relates to 
consumer insurance is expressly noted in the Act). 
                                                          
761 Unipac v Aegon (1996) SLT 1197. 
762 For Article 79 see page 213. 
763 The proposal form is deemed to be part of the policy. 
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The Insurance Act 2015 
In 2015, after nine years of UK Law Commission consultations, the Insurance Act 
2015 was introduced, applying to both consumer and business insurance contracts 
(unless stated within the Act). Previous insurance law was governed by the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 and subsequent interpreting cases. Although this Act only 
governed marine insurance, the common law relating to general insurance 
contracts (including motor insurance) utilised most of its principles. The Insurance 
Act 2015 is a significant step in insurance law, as it provides the first major 
alteration in over a century. However, the Insurance Act’s effect on motor 
insurance, especially in relation to third party claims, is not entirely clear and there 
have been no decided cases on this point.  Professor Merkin and Dr Gurzes argue, 
that if interpreted broadly, the warranty and exclusion provisions of the Insurance 
Act in Sections 9 to 11, could affect liability to third parties.764 This chapter will 
now examine the Insurance Act’s effect on basis clauses, warranties, and 
exclusion clauses in motor insurance policies, in relation to third party claims.  
Basis Clauses 
The Insurance Act 2015 followed CIDRA, and consequently removed basis 
clauses altogether, by prohibiting their use in business insurance contracts 
(Section 9 (2)). Consequently, the use of ‘basis clauses’ to repudiate claims is now 
prohibited in all insurance contracts, and the insurer cannot rely on such a clause 
in a proposal form, contract, or accompanying document in relation to both first and 
third parties. This means that although it was questionable as to whether these 
clauses could be used since the 1934 RTA in motor insurance policies, there is 
now at least certainty in this area in relation to pre-contractual statements and basis 
clauses. 
General Warranties and Description of Risk 
Although the Insurance Act and CIDRA prevented the insurer from converting the 
insureds’ pre-contractual statements into a warranty through its prohibition of basis 
clauses, this did not prevent the insurer from relying on specific warranties in 
                                                          
764 The authors were examining the ‘loss of a particular kind’ provision when making this argument 
see Professor Robert Merkin and Ozlem Gurses, “Insurance contracts after the Insurance Act 2015” 
(2016) L.Q.R, 132(Jul), 445-469, 464. 
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policies so that they are treated as continuing warranties.765 Section 10 Insurance 
Act states that any rule of law which allows an insurer to discharge their liability 
under the contract is abolished. However:  
 “An insurer has no liability under a contract of insurance in respect 
of any loss occurring or attributable to something happening, after a 
warranty is breached but before the breach has been remedied”  
It is notable that under Section 10 (3), the insurer will not be discharged from 
liability: if there is a change of circumstance and the warranty ceases to be 
applicable due to circumstance of the contract (Section 10 (3) (a)), compliance 
with the warranty is rendered unlawful (Section 10 (3) (b)) or, if the insurer waives 
the breach of warranty (Section 10 (3) (c)). 
Defining Warranties 
It is submitted that it is unlikely that the alteration of the law on warranties is going 
to have a substantial effect on motor insurance. This is because, in the majority of 
circumstances, the courts have interpreted ‘warranties’ as ‘descriptions of risk’ 
within the confines of motor insurance policies. This alteration in definition, restricts 
the remedy open to the insurer.    
An example of this arose in Farr v Motor Traders.766 Here, the insured was the 
owner of two taxi-cabs. In the policies’ proposal, the insured stated that each cab 
was to be driven in one shift per 24 hours, which, at the time was deemed to be 
true. However, this was later broken as another driver was permitted to take the 
taxi-cab, which was subsequently damaged. The insurer therefore argued that as 
this was a warranty, as soon as it was breached, the policy ended. Whereas the 
insured argued that it was merely a ‘description of risk’. Bankes LJ summed up the 
differences in consequences between the two:  
“(the) question is whether we are to construe the…answer …as a 
warranty, the effect of which would be that …when the cab was 
driven in two shifts per day, the policy came to an end; or whether 
we are to construe them…as words descriptive of the risk, indicating 
                                                          
765 Professor Merkin (n 23), [2-97]. 
766 Farr (n 112). 
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that whilst the cab is driven in one shift per 24 hours, the risk will be 
covered, but that if in any one day of 24 hours the cab is driven in 
more than one shift, the risk will no longer be covered…until the 
owner resumes the practice of driving the cab in one shift only”.767 
Consequently, the Court needed to decide whether to merely ‘suspend’ the policy 
or bring it to an end. Bankes LJ preferred the former and stated that the term was 
a ‘description of risk’ due to the nature of the promise made.768 The honourable 
judge found that the answer to the insurer’s question was true when the policy was 
made, and remained true for the majority of time whilst the vehicle was on risk.769 
In Roberts v Anglo Saxon,770 a clause was inserted into the policy which stated 
that the vehicle was: ‘Warranted (to be) used only for the following purposes: 
commercial travelling’. At the time of the accident, the vehicle was not being used 
for commercial purposes. Scrutton LJ in finding that this was a warranty, examined 
the term carefully and stated that the term ‘warranted’ does not automatically mean 
that the term was a warranty.771 His Lordship stated that the term ‘warranted only’ 
was a, ‘promissory declaration as to risk… (the insurer) will only insure you in 
certain circumstances, but only in certain circumstances’.772 This then, highlights 
that the courts are willing to go further than the expression of the parties and the 
prima facie meaning of the words used.  
Alternatively, in Re Morgan and Provincial Insurance Co,773 the insured was 
requested to state the purpose for which the vehicle was going to be used and the 
nature of the goods which would be carried. Whereas the insured stated that he 
would carry coal only, the insured also used his vehicle to carry timber without 
stating this. The House of Lords declared this as a ‘description of risk’ rather than 
a warranty, as stated by Lord Buckmaster, ‘to state in full the purposes for which 
the vehicle is to be used is not the same thing as to state in full the purposes for 
                                                          
767 Ibid, 674. 
768 Ibid. 
769 Ibid 
770 Roberts v Anglo-Saxon Insurance Association Ltd (1927) 27 Ll. L. Rep. 313. 
771 This is generally the approach of the Courts, see for example the Canadian case of The Bamcell II 
[1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep 528, 533 where Mr Justice Lambert stated that “there is no magic in the word 
“warranted” which is frequently used with considerable ambiguity in policies.” 
772 Roberts v Anglo Saxon (n 758). 
773 [1933] A.C. 240. 
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which the vehicle will be exclusively used’.774 Lord Wright further stated that, ‘the 
question turns entirely on the construction of the contract’.775   
It is evident that the Courts often take a more interpretative rather than literal view 
to these clauses to construe them as ‘descriptions of risk’ rather than warranties, 
which consequently mitigates the effect of them.776 As stated by Saville L.J. in 
Hussain v Brown:777 
“It must be remembered that …warranty is a draconian term… if 
underwriters want such protection, then it is up to them to stipulate 
for it in clear terms”.778 
The courts are therefore not reluctant to construe clauses against the insurer if they 
deem them uncertain.  However, the courts no longer need to be concerned with 
mitigating the harsh effects of warranties, as the distinction between these terms is 
now largely irrelevant. The legislature has mitigated the effect of warranties by 
removing their most offensive features through the introduction of the Insurance 
Act’s provisions.779 
Section 11: Regulation of Exclusion clauses and Warranties 
The legislative intervention which will likely have some potential effect exclusion 
clauses and third parties, is within Section 11 Insurance Act, which deals with, 
‘Terms not relevant to the actual loss’. Section 11 states:  
"This section applies to a term (express or implied) of a contract of 
insurance, other than a term defining the risk as a whole, if 
compliance with it would tend to reduce the risk of one or more of 
the following— (a) loss of a particular kind, (b) loss at a particular 
location, (c) loss at a particular time. 
                                                          
774 Ibid, 247. 
775 Ibid, 251. 
776 UK Law Commission “Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurers' 
Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment” Law Com No 353. 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/lc353_insurance-contract-law.pdf [Accessed 
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777 [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 627. 
778 Ibid, 630. 
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(2) If a loss occurs, and the term has not been complied with, the 
insurer may not rely on the non-compliance to exclude, limit or 
discharge its liability under the contract for the loss if the insured 
satisfies subsection (3). 
(3) The insured satisfies this subsection if it shows that the non-
compliance with the term could not have increased the risk of the 
loss which actually occurred in the circumstances in which it 
occurred. 
(4) This section may apply in addition to section 10." 
This provision applies to both exclusion clauses and warranties due to Section 11 
(4). This chapter will now examine key aspects of this provision and whether it will 
have any significant effect on third parties in motor insurance.  
 ‘Terms Defining Risk as a Whole’ 
Potentially the most important part of this provision regarding motor insurance, is 
relating to ‘terms defining risk as a whole’, which are expressly excluded. As stated 
previously,780 clauses which ‘define risk’ are most prevalent in motor insurance 
policies, and are the clauses which are generally used to repudiate liability against 
third parties, because they fall outside the prohibited exclusion clauses in Section 
148 RTA. The difficulty with the Insurance Act, however, is that the boundaries 
and definition of the phrase used is elusive, with irreconcilable borderline decisions 
probable due to this uncertainty.781 However, the Law Commission (and later 
Lloyds Market Association) gave some indication as to the meaning of the phrase:  
“The clause is not intended to apply to contract terms which reduce 
the risk profile as a whole…These words are intended to exclude, 
for example, terms which set out: (1) the use in which the insured 
property can be put (2) the geographical limits of the property (3) 
                                                          
780 Pages 50-57 
781 Professor Merkin and Dr Gurses (n 768), 461. 
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the class of ship being insured (4) the minimum age/qualification and 
characteristics being insured”.782 
In relation to motor insurance, only the first of these is permitted against third 
parties, with the other three contained within the prohibited exclusion clauses under 
Section 148 RTA. This consequently puts the Insurance Act and third party 
provisions contained in the RTA 1988 in direct conflict. The Law Commission 
justified its approach relating to ‘use’ clauses by stating:  
“Insurance is based on the insurers’ ability to decide what risk to 
accept, and on what terms. The insurer must be in a position to 
calculate risks and to charge higher premiums on “riskier” risks, 
therefore keeping the premiums down in relation to low risk 
policies…it would frustrate the insurers’ risk assessment process if 
a policyholder could still recover for any loss not directly related to 
the …use”.783 
This is similar to the guidance from the 1937 Cassel Committee Report. The Report 
highlighted that insurers should be permitted to limit the risk via exclusion clauses, 
even against third parties, as this is key in the calculation of premium. The Law 
Commission has confirmed its approach in relation to motor insurance by relating 
this exception to the case of Murray v Scottish Automobile and General 
Insurance Co,784 which involved the valid use of a ‘commercial use’ exclusion 
when the vehicle was let out for hire. The Law Commission argued that insurers 
should not compensate those who take out the wrong type of coverage or ‘play the 
system’785 by breaching exclusion clauses, whilst paying a lower price. 
Consequently, in relation to motor insurance, the aim of the inclusion of ‘terms not 
relevant to loss’ is to ensure that insurers can design risk and determine premiums 
effectively. Thus, it is submitted that the eminent ‘use’ exclusion clauses in motor 
insurance policies come under this provision and are therefore valid.   
                                                          
782 Stakeholder Note: Terms Not Relevant to the Actual Loss, [1.8] emphasis added. 
783 UK Law Commission (n 764), [18.21] and [18.23]. 
784 (1929) SC 48. 
785 Ibid, [17.39]. 
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There is nevertheless some uncertainty within ‘risk’ clauses, with ambiguity being 
whether the insured could bypass this definition, and claim that a clause is an 
‘exclusion clause’ rather than ‘risk definition’. An example, as discussed by 
Professor Merkin and Dr Gurzes, is where an insurer could define the risk as 
‘driving’, but then have an exclusion clause relating to ‘business use’.786 In this 
case, the ‘business use’ exclusion clause could fall outside of being a ‘term defining 
risk’, and subsequently be interpreted as being an exclusion clause, and therefore 
be open to being struck out by Section 11. It is submitted, however, that this is an 
unlikely situation, especially as this would work in detriment to the insurers. It is 
likely that insurers would draft the clause in a way to ensure that the clause can 
only be interpreted as ‘risk definition’ to fall outside this provision.787 It is further 
questionable whether exclusion clauses fall within Section 11 at all. The authors 
in MacGillivray788 argued that as exclusion clauses do not require compliance by 
the insured, they would not fall within Section 11. Although this is contrary to the 
view of the UK and Scottish Law Commissions, by their comparison to the 
exclusion of shipping classes.789 
Another issue noted by Professor Merkin, is that the Law Commission have 
seemingly skewed the definition of risk, by classifying terms previously thought to 
be descriptions of risk, as exclusion clauses, which would therefore fall within 
Section 11. For example, the term ‘roadworthiness’ has always been thought as a 
definition of risk, even historically, which was noted in the 1930’s by Shawcross.790 
However, the Law Commission in its’ Consultation has stated that the 
roadworthiness provision will fall outside of risk definition.791 This is a difficult point, 
the traditional view of ‘roadworthiness’, as noted above, is that it is such an 
important clause for insurers to use against first parties to make it a risk defining 
clause (it is excluded against third parties under Section 148 RTA). An alteration 
of this to being thought of as an exclusion clause, is something that will likely 
continue to be debated, although this is of limited relevance here. Similarly, Lloyds 
                                                          
786 Professor Merkin and Dr Gurses (n 768), 458. 
787 Baris Soyer “Risk control clauses in insurance law: law reform and the future”, C.L.J. 2016, 75 (1), 
109-127, 121. 
788 MacGillivray (n 272), 282. 
789 UK Law Commission No.353 (n 780), 18.24. 
790 Shawcross (n 74), 496. 
791 UK Law Commission (n 780). 
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Market Association (henceforth ‘LMA’) have further argued that the distinction 
between ‘terms defining risk’ and ‘risk mitigation’ clauses is, ‘unclear and uncertain’ 
because, ‘the problem is that the concept of a term “defining the risk as a whole” is 
inherently unclear and uncertain, and is liable to be confused with a mere “risk 
mitigation”’.792 
The LMA has argued that whether Section 11 applies: 
“Seems to turn on the scope of cover provided: if narrow (i.e. only 
fire risks) then section 11 would apply, but if broader (such as an all 
risks policy), the exact same term might not be covered by section 
11, because in that context, it would only affect the particular risk of 
a specific type of loss”.793 
Essentially therefore, according to the LMA, terms will be interpreted on each 
individual case based on the scope of cover. This is an approach which would lead 
to significant confusion and need for significant judicial interpretation, leading 
insurers and claimants to not know where they stand with certain clauses. Motor 
insurance policies are generally much broader due to the need to ensure that all 
risks are covered, including third party risks. Thus, it is submitted under LMA 
guidance, terms are likely to be held as risk definition rather than risk mitigation. 
The issue is uncertain and will certainly be clarified by future courts.  
Loss of a Particular Kind, Location, and Time 
Under Section 11 of the Insurance Act, exclusion clauses relating to losses of a 
particular kind, at a particular location, and at a particular time, cannot be used to 
deny liability to the insured, if non-compliance with these terms by the insured 
would not have increased the risk of the loss. The issue with these terms is the 
breadth in which they are interpreted, and this has caused significant confusion 
and discussion. There is considerable overlap with the prohibited exclusion clauses 
in the RTA 1988, and this chapter will now examine possible interpretations and 
overlaps.  
                                                          
792 House of Lords, Evidence to the Special Public Bill Committee, HL Paper 81, December 2014, 36. 
793 Ibid, 37. 
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Time 
It is unlikely that the ‘time’ provision of Section 11 will influence third party motor 
claims, especially in cases where liability is required to be covered. This is because, 
‘the time at which…the vehicle has been used’ is already a prohibited exclusion 
clause under Section 148 (2) (e) RTA. However, if one took a broader 
interpretation of ‘time’ there are possible instances which would fall within the 
Insurance Act 2015 but outside Section 148 RTA. For example, excluding the 
insured at the time of accident from using the vehicle for ‘business purposes’.794 
Moreover, at the time of the accident, excluding the vehicle from going over the 
speed limit, would fall outside of the prohibited exclusion clauses in Section 148, 
but may fall within the ‘time’ provision. The first of these, of course, would depend 
on the interpretation by the Courts of ‘the risk as a whole’. However, it is submitted 
that using the ‘risk as a whole’ defence, is a weak argument, as it would require the 
Courts to manipulate clauses and interpret them in such a way to fall under the 
Insurance Act. 
Moreover, if this was simply due to the wording and the inclusion of the word ‘time’, 
then insurers would simply redraft the policy to ensure that it does not conflict with 
the provisions of the Act. It must be remembered, however, that Section 148 only 
applies to liabilities which are required to be covered.795 Hence, the Insurance Act 
would come into effect if an exclusion relating to location was used in a situation 
where compulsory insurance was not required, such as in cases of use of a vehicle 
on private land. 
Location 
It is evident that ‘loss at a particular location’ would also fall under the prohibited 
exclusion clauses in Section 148 (2), although the RTA 1988 refers to ‘areas within 
which the vehicle is used’796 rather than the term ‘location’ used in the Insurance 
Act. Certainly, it is argued that this is solely a difference in wording rather than 
meaning because as highlighted in case law ‘areas’ also encompasses 
‘geographical locations’.797  In relation to whether the term will confer a narrow or 
                                                          
794 An example used by Professor Merkin (n 23) 130. 
795 See page 74. 
796 Section 148 (e) RTA 1988 
797 See Chapter Three of this thesis and the case of AW&E Palmer v Cornhill Insurance Co Ltd (1935) 
52 Ll. L. Rep. 78. 
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wide meaning in motor insurance, Professor Merkin stated: ‘the word might be 
confined at its narrowest to geographical limits imposed upon the use of a 
vehicle’.798 The author concurs with Professor Merkin, especially in relation to the 
interpretation involving third party claims. This is because the courts would be 
obliged to look at the overall legislative framework especially Section 148 and see 
that the legislative intention is to prevent such clauses.  
Kind 
The final provision relating to ‘kind’ is less clear, as it is not contained within the 
prohibited exclusion clauses within Section 148 RTA and therefore not 
automatically void against third parties. Further, as stated in the House of Lord’s 
consultation, it is a term that is conducive of ‘satellite litigation’ which confers 
several different meanings and therefore its effect on third parties depends on a 
narrow or wide judicial construction.  
It is evident, from the above analysis of ‘location, time and kind’, that there is a 
significant clash between the RTA 1988 and Insurance Act, especially in relation 
to the first two clauses and the Insurance Act is of limited effect in those cases. It 
must be remembered, however, as explained above there will be circumstances 
where the Insurance Act will influence third parties, namely where the risk is not 
required to be covered and Section 148 is of no effect. Consequently, the next 
element, the ‘terms not relevant to the loss’ test needs to be examined.  
Causation and Terms Not Relevant 
The final test to be satisfied is whether non-compliance with the exclusion or 
warranty could have increased the risk of the loss, which occurred in the 
circumstances in which it occurred. The Law Commission recommended this 
provision rather than the causation test introduced in New Zealand through 
Section 11 of the Insurance Law Reform Act 1977. The New Zealand test is one 
which was open to interpretation and states: 
“The insured shall not be disentitled to be indemnified by the insurer 
by reason only of such provisions of the contract of insurance if the 
                                                          
798 Rob Merkin (n 23), 129. 
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insured proves on the balance of probability that the loss in respect 
of which the insured seeks to be indemnified was not caused or 
contributed to by the happening of such events”.799 
It is notable that the Courts in New Zealand have interpreted this provision most 
prominently in motor cases and largely in favour of the insured. For example, in 
New Zealand Insurance Company Ltd v Harris,800 a motor insurance policy 
excluded liability if a tractor was hired; the tractor subsequently caught fire when 
on hire. The New Zealand Court stated that the fact that it was on hire was not the 
cause of the damage and, therefore, the insured could recover. This result would 
almost certainly be the same if Section 11 was applied as non-compliance with the 
‘hire’ term would not have increased the risk of loss.  
The obvious area in which the key difference in the tests exists is in relation to 
unroadworthy vehicles. For example, in Jones and James v Provincial 
Insurance Company,801 a pre-1930 case, the insurer repudiated liability for a 
faulty footbrake, although the cause of the crash was held to be due to driver 
inexperience. Under the New Zealand test, the insurer could not use the exclusion 
because the footbrake was not the ‘cause’ of the accident, however, under the UK 
test, the use of an unroadworthy vehicle certainly increased the risk of loss and 
therefore could be used to repudiate liability. This case example demonstrates that 
the UK test is certainly the harsher of the two tests.  
The term, ‘in the circumstances in which it occurred’, seems to connote the need 
for a causal link between breach of the term and damage.802 However Clarke noted 
that the requirement in the Act of a ‘causal link’ was ‘surely unlikely’,803 especially 
as the Law Commission altered its approach from a causal to non-causal approach, 
‘on the grounds of increased investigation costs, complex litigation, uncertain 
                                                          
799 Section 11 Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 (nz), emphasis added. 
800 [1990] 1. Z.L.R. 10. 
801 Which was discussed previously on pages 44-45. 
802 Robert Merkin, Law of Motor Insurance (n 23) and also MacGillvray (n 272), 283. 
803 Malcom Clarke, “The future of warranties and other related terms in contracts of insurance”, in 
Malcolm Clarke and Baris Soyer, The Insurance Act 2015: A new regime for commercial and marine 
insurance law, (1st edition, Informa, 2016), 56. 
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outcomes, and difficulties of proof’.804 This, however, is an issue which will be 
required to be decided by the Courts.  
Contracting Out 
With the terms of the Insurance Act examined, it is important to note that, in some 
instances, there is potential for the insurer to contract out of the provisions of the 
Insurance Act, by inserting a clause into their policy explaining that certain 
sections of the Insurance Act would not apply. This would therefore mean 
reverting to previous insurance rules under the Marine Insurance Act 1906 and 
interpreting case law. Contracting out is regulated by Sections 15 to 18 of the 
Insurance Act. In relation to policies involving consumers, the contracting out 
provisions of the Insurance Act are clear. Section 15 states that any contracting 
out term which, ‘would put the consumer in a worse position’ is, ‘to that extent of 
no effect’. This is, therefore, to protect consumers who are the weaker party to the 
insurance contract, from insurers seeking to contract out of the safeguards under 
the Act. Due to the need to protect party autonomy805 businesses have more 
freedom to insert contracting out clauses within their policies against other 
businesses (Section 16 (2)). However, where such a term is ‘disadvantageous’, 
‘the insurer must take sufficient steps to draw the disadvantageous term to the 
insured’s attention before the contract is entered into’ (Section 17 (2)). Moreover, 
‘the disadvantageous term must be clear and unambiguous as to its effect’ 
(Section 17 (3)). It is clear therefore, that comparable to requirements for exclusion 
clauses in the CRA 2015, contracting out provisions in business insurance 
contracts are examined for transparency. However, as Section 16 (2) applies to 
disadvantaged consumers only, it is difficult to see what effect this would have on 
third party claims, although it is submitted that this is likely to extend to third party 
claims.  
Conclusion 
This Chapter has found that there are several potential avenues open to the third 
party outside of the RTA to prevent the insurer from relying on an exclusion clause, 
                                                          
804 Law Com No 353/Scots Law Com No 238, [14.24]. 
805 Baris Soyer, “Risk control clauses in insurance law: law reform and the future”, (2016), C.L.J.  
75(1), 109-127, 123. 
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these are uncertain and complex alternative routes which are rarely (if ever) used 
by third parties. It is submitted that the complexities surrounding some of these 
routes, particularly the Insurance Act, may provide a deterrence from using them, 
with the EU law route as discussed in Chapters Four and Five being slightly more 
certain. However, once the UK leaves the EU this may change, especially if the 
exclusion provisions in the RTA 1988 are relaxed. 
The provisions of the legislation shown throughout this chapter, are aimed primarily 
at first party consumers and businesses. Due to a lack of case law on the issue, 
their effect is unknown on third parties. It is submitted that the most likely avenue 
to strike a clause out lies in Section 71 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, and 
the obligation for the Court to strike out an unfair term. This does not need to be 
brought by any party and the Court are under a duty, whether argued, to examine 
the clause for transparency and prominence. This, therefore, acts as a disincentive 
for insurers to hide terms in their policies, and to ensure the first party is made 
aware of it. The insurance industry has attempted to resist regulation of their terms; 
however, it seems that through the ICOBS sourcebook and FOS complaints, they 
leave themselves open to claims. This does not apply directly to third parties. 
Recent legislation specifically targeted at the insurance industry through CIDRA 
and the Insurance Act may further have some effect on third parties. The removal 
of unjust and unfair basis clauses in both consumer and business contracts is 
welcome, especially as it was in motor insurance where they were used most 
prevalently. The Insurance Act has further restricted the use of both warranties 
and exclusion clauses, although as this a new Act and has only academic 
interpretation, there are uncertainties as to the scope of the provisions. It is 
submitted, however, that only a wide interpretation of the Insurance Act, would 
influence third party claims.  
This Chapter has contributed knowledge and interpretation of other potential, albeit 
uncertain, routes open to the third party to challenge the use of exclusion clauses. 
It is clear, however, that these are only secondary routes which are restricted and 
will depend on later interpretation by the courts.  As explained in previous chapters 
the main routes which could be taken, are through the RTA 1988, which prohibits 
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some exclusion clauses, or through EU Law which prohibits all exclusion clauses, 
although it has been interpreted narrowly. 
It is clear, however, that under the current position that the MIB may be called upon 
to compensate the third party victim where an exclusion clause is breached. It is 
therefore important to examine the MIB Agreements and the policy behind them to 
see the effect of use of an exclusion and whether the third party victim will gain 
compensation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 208 
  
Chapter Seven: Protection offered by The Motor Insurers’ 
Bureau 
 
Introduction 
We have so far examined the validity of exclusion clauses in relation to third party 
claims in both UK and EU law and have found that although EU law prohibits the 
validity of exclusion clauses against third parties, UK law has only limited their use 
in some circumstances through different statutory methods. This is mainly through 
the list of prohibited exclusion clauses in Section 148 RTA. Consequently, where 
an exclusion is used against a third party, the driver of the vehicle becomes 
uninsured, and liability falls on the MIB, who should pay for any claims. It is 
important to therefore examine, in practice, the MIB agreements and the nature of 
the MIB’s obligation.  
Both doctrinal and empirical research was undertaken in relation to this Chapter. 
Doctrinal research of the MIB Agreements, case law, and occasional academic 
opinion is crucial in gaining a first-hand understanding of the MIB Agreements and 
their limitations. The use of case-law relating to the MIB Agreements is particularly 
useful, as it provides examples of the defences used by the MIB to repudiate 
claims, and further assists in the Agreement’s interpretation.  
Qualitative empirical research was undertaken with the MIB via two interviews, first 
through a semi-structured face-to-face interview with representatives of the MIB at 
their Milton Keynes office in March 2015, and a second structured interview via 
email in July 2017. The first interview took place prior to the introduction of the UDA 
2015. Questions (available in the Appendix) were asked specifically on the MIB’s 
viewpoints as to certain parts of their Agreements, their approaches to certain 
issues relating to third party claims. This was to allow thematical analysis of their 
answers in the context of the research question as to the practical consequences 
of exclusion clause breach. The interviews intended to provide overall policy 
approaches of the MIB relating to the UDA, the MIB’s viewpoint on certain issues 
related to claims, and future challenges to be faced. Moreover, questions were 
asked in relation to the number of claims, the number of claims denied and the 
reasons behind these claims being denied. The data was analysed to examine the 
emergence of any patterns relating to where claims were being denied.  
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The second interview, which took place in July 2017, via email, was necessary due 
to numerous changes, including a new UDA, Brexit, and a Judicial Review. A 
second interview was therefore organised with specific questions to reflect those 
change (available in the Appendix). Similar questions were asked namely figures 
of claims which were denied, and further questions were addressed to the rationale 
behind any changes to the UDA alongside the consequences of Brexit.  
The empirical aspect of the research is of crucial importance since it provides a 
pragmatic and policy context which complements the doctrinal research. Given the 
practical application to exclusion clauses, combining those aspects is essential to 
provide an understanding as to whether the MIB’s UDA provide adequate 
protection. 
The chapter is in three parts. Part I will examine the MIB, its background and nature 
of its obligation with potential ways in which it could avoid liability alongside the 
1999 and 2015 UDA’s. Part II will examine the illegality defence in Clause 6 of the 
UDA, and the ex turpi causa defence. Part III will further examine whether the MIB 
provide adequate protection through combining the chapters’ findings on the 
Agreements and figures gained from the interview. The future of the MIB will also 
be examined in Part III, with the impact of the Judicial Review and Brexit analysed.   
This Chapter seeks to answer two questions, first, what is the practical effect of the 
use of an exclusion on a third party? In other words, does the existence of the MIB 
mean that the use of exclusion clauses has little practical effect? Second in what 
circumstances will the MIB try to restrict their liability?  This will help in answering 
the overall research question relating to the effect of exclusion use.  
Part I: The MIB: Scope, Nature of Obligations, and Agreements 
Background 
In 1937, the Cassel Committee Report recommended the introduction of a central 
fund due to the number of cases where injured victims were left without 
compensation. The motor insurance industry was thereafter under consistent 
pressure to act to remove instances of non-compensation. With the threat of 
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statutory intervention looming, the industry collaborated to form a ‘novel’806 piece 
of extra-statutory machinery known as the MIB. The MIB registered as a private 
company limited by guarantee on July 1st, 1946 and subsequently entered an 
agreement with the UK Government.807 The UDA was then introduced in 1946 and 
was subsequently revised in 1972, 1988, 1999 and 2015, with slight amendments 
in 2017. The MIB exists in the same form today, its obligations are not found in any 
Act of Parliament but rather in its’ extra-statutory agreements with the Minister of 
Transport. It is important to note, however, that MIB arrangements cannot simply 
be described as a contract with the Department of Transport, they have statutory 
backing and are part of an overall legislative scheme alongside the RTA 1988.808 
It is important to note that it is obligatory under Section 145 (6) RTA 1988 for a 
transacting motor insurer to be a member of the MIB and contribute to its funding. 
Any insurer who refuses to fund the MIB will be treated as unauthorised and 
insurance policies deemed non-compliant with legislation.809 Insurers’ funding of 
the MIB is in proportion to their premium income for motor insurance in the UK. 
Thus, with contributions from insurers to the MIB’s funding, it is the policyholder 
who indirectly funds the MIB with an average of £30 added on premiums per 
annum810. However, even though the policyholder ultimately bears the cost of the 
MIB, Shawcross noted, ‘The insurers have by this bold gesture taken upon 
themselves a great burden, in that they have agreed to shoulder the financial 
responsibilities of errant motorists in the absence of satisfaction by these 
wrongdoers’.811 
Nature of the MIB’s obligation: UK 
The MIB’s obligation under UK law is not absolute. A claim under the MIB 
Agreements does not guarantee compensation even with a valid injury from an 
uninsured or untraced vehicle and liability deemed against the driver or vehicle. 
                                                          
806 See comments made in Silverton (n 631). 
807 Named the “principle agreement”. 
808 This was discussed in the very recent case of Hussain [2017] EWCA Civ 366 [Sir Ross Cranston] 
[113]. 
809 This would lead to a criminal offence of the driver driving without insurance under Section 143. See 
Section 145 (6) in relation to this.  
810 Emma Wall, “Motor insurance: uninsured drivers cost us £2bn a year” 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/insurance/motorinsurance/7089965/Motor-
insurance-uninsured-drivers-cost-us-2bn-a-year.html [Accessed 29th August 2017] 
811 Shawcross (n 74), 379. 
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There are several defences that the MIB could use including limitation of liability, 
claims outside the RTA 1988 and privity to which we turn.   
 Privity 
As stated by Professor Rob Merkin QC,812 the MIB could potentially disregard their 
obligations to pay third party claims due to privity of contract. MIB Agreements are 
made between the MIB and the SoSFT, although third party victims are the 
intended beneficiaries of these Agreements, they are not legally a party to them. 
This point, however, has not been taken by the MIB to defend claims. As explained 
by Upjohn LJ in Coward v MIB,813 it is unlikely that the Court will ever take this 
point individually. Moreover, as stated in Carswell v MIB814 in relation to the 
Untraced Drivers Agreement:  
‘For some years before 2003, the MIB openly stated that it would not 
rely upon the lack of privity of contract between itself and an applicant 
to defeat court proceedings brought by an applicant against the 
MIB’.815 
 
Of course, third party rights were amended by the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Party’s) Act 1999 (henceforth ‘CRTA’), giving the third party the right to sue in 
certain insurance contracts.816 However, this would only apply to the rights of a 
named driver who is not a party to the contract.817 Moreover, this does not affect 
privity under the 1999 UDA due to the UDA preceding the CRTA 1999. It is unlikely 
that privity will ever be relied on by the MIB against a third party claim, as it would 
clearly be contrary to EU law which requires the Bureaux to provide adequate 
protection (Article 1 (4)). Moreover, it is clear from the decisions of earlier cases, 
                                                          
812 Professor Merkin argued this in Robert Merkin, Tolley’s Insurance Handbook (Tolley’s, 1st edition, 
1994), 181 and later Robert Merkin, Privity of Contract, (Informa Law, 1st Edition, 2013), 46  
813 [1963] 1 Q.B. 259. 
814 [2010] EWHC 3230 (QB). 
815 Also see Persson v London Country Buses and Another [1974] 1 W.L.R. 569, 572 “It is in 
accordance with the publicly declared policy of the bureau that the bureau does not rely on the 
absence of privity of contract, and that policy has been fully adhered to before us”. 
816 Recognised by Professor Merkin and Margaret Hemsworth (n 23), [7-10]. 
817 Ibid. 
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that the courts would take a negative view of such a defence to deny a perfectly 
valid claim818.  
Claims Outside RTA 
The MIB is, ‘not liable for any claim…. which is not required to be covered by a 
contract of insurance (within the RTA)’.819 This has major implications, because 
if the vehicle is used in a way which does not require insurance, the MIB are not 
required to cover the claim. There are several ways or places in which a ‘vehicle’ 
could be used which falls outside of this. For example, where accidents take place 
outside a ‘road or public place’, the MIB or Article 79 insurer820 can refuse to 
compensate the victim, as it is a liability which does not need to be covered by 
insurance under the RTA 1988. Of course, due to the Vnuk821 decision from the 
CJEU in 2014, the UK is certainly in breach of EU law regarding public and private 
property as the CJEU ruled that vehicle use must be covered anywhere.  
The ramifications from this case are, of course, not yet known. First, because of an 
impact assessment from the European Commission in June 2016 proposing a new 
solution away from Vnuk, and second, due to the uncertainty of Brexit. Of course, 
it is not only through location which would fall outside of compulsory cover, there 
are also restrictions under the RTA 1988 of the type of vehicle as well as the use 
of vehicle which require insurance coverage. For example, if a claim is made where 
the person in charge of the vehicle (such as repairing it) is not deemed to be ‘using’ 
the vehicle, this may fall outside the requirements.  
There are several examples822 in case law of the MIB being able to avoid liability 
through the ‘liability not required to be covered’ route. For example, in Buchanan 
v MIB,823 the MIB successfully argued that a dock did not fall within the meaning of 
‘road’ under the RTA 1988 and therefore the MIB could avoid paying the claimant.   
                                                          
818 See Gurtner v Circuit [1968] 2 Q.B. 587 “(we are) entitled to proceed on the assumption that the 
Bureau has, before action is brought, contracted for good consideration with the plaintiff to perform 
the obligations speciﬁed in the contract with the minister or has by its conduct raised an estoppel 
which would bar it from relying on absence of privity of contract.” [Diplock LJ], 598. 
819 Article 5 UDA 2015, emphasis added. 
820 Note these until recently were referred to as an ‘Article 75 Insurers’. Their role will be discussed on 
page 213. 
821 Vnuk (n 239). 
822 This was highlighted particularly in the Times, see Pryn J, “Caution! Car Park Prangs Can Cost 
Dear”, Times [London, England] 20 May 1995: 2[S1]. 
823 [1955] 1 W.L.R. 488. 
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 Claims with Fault 
The MIB are not liable for claims where there is no liability towards the third party, 
and can further restrict compensation based on the victim’s contributory 
negligence. This is to ensure parity between victims of insured and uninsured 
drivers. As stated by the MIB in interview, ‘you have to follow the rules of legal 
liability. So, if there is no legal liability, we won’t pay any more than the insurer 
would pay’. This, of course, is valid under European Law, so long as the MIB do 
not completely and disproportionately deny damages to the claimant.824 This 
includes the principle of ex turpi causa825 as shown in the case of McCracken v 
Smith,826 where the MIB attempted to use this defence to refuse payment to a 
teenager who was a passenger on a stolen motorcycle. The defence was permitted 
to be used and therefore the MIB could repudiate liability to the victim for his 
criminal conduct.  
Article 79 (“Domestic Regulations”) 
It is crucial to note that the MIB will only pay claims from its central fund if no insurer 
can be found. If an insurer can be found, who, at the time of the accident, was 
providing some insurance in respect of the vehicle, then under Article 79 of the 
MIB’s Memorandum of Understanding (henceforth ‘MOU’), the insurer is obliged to 
handle and pay the claim as an agent of the MIB.827828 Article 79 states 
“(1) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, a Member is 
the Article 79 Insurer notwithstanding that: (i) the insurance has been 
obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, non-disclosure of material 
facts, or mistake; (ii) the cover has been back dated; or (iii) the use 
of the vehicle is other than that permitted under the policy” 
The inclusion of ‘use of vehicle…other than that permitted under the policy’ within 
the MOU also clearly encompasses the use of an exclusion. However, unlike the 
RTA 1988 insurer who must pay claims under statute and contract, the Article 79 
                                                          
824 See the requirements set out in Candolin (n 217) on pages 137-138 of Chapter Four. 
825 This will be discussed in more depth later in this Chapter. 
826 [2015] EWCA Civ 380. 
827 This is subject to certain exceptions, namely if the policy is cancelled and the certificate is 
surrendered, for short term insurance and if the insurer can declare that the policy is void under 
Section 152. 
828 For more in-depth examination of Article 79 see Robert Merkin and Johanna Hjalmarsson, 
Compendium of Insurance Law (Informa,1st edition, 2007), 998-999. 
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insurer will pay claims under the MIB’s umbrella, and therefore under the terms of 
the MIB agreements rather than the insurance policy. This simultaneously protects 
the MIB’s funds and further acts as a deterrent for insurers who may want to 
repudiate a claim. Consequently, an insurer will not go to the expense and effort of 
defending a repudiation of liability, unless the UDA offers greater terms to the 
insurer than their own policy or if there are two or more insurers in which case the 
insurer could seek to downgrade its status to force the other insurers to pay who 
cannot downgrade.  
It is clear therefore, that breach of an exclusion clause in relation to a third party 
claim will most likely not be acted upon by the insurer, unless some benefit can be 
conferred to that insurer. For example, in Bristol Alliance v Williams,829 the motor 
insurer utilised an exclusion clause to repudiate liability to prevent a subrogated 
claim from the property insurer, which is excluded under the MIB agreements, and 
therefore conferred a benefit from its repudiation. This is in contrast with the recent 
case of Wastell v Woodward830 where it is apparent that the insurer defendants 
did not argue the case for use of an exclusion clause, as it was barely mentioned 
in the decision. The insurers instead chose to argue that the accident fell outside 
the ‘caused by or arising out of’ 831 requirement, which would absolve the insurer 
due to falling outside of the compulsory coverage of insurance under Section 143 
RTA 1988.  
 
Subrogated Claims 
The general rule in insurance law is that if the insurer compensates the insured, 
they are put in the shoes of the insured and can bring proceedings against the 
wrongdoer under the position the insured would have stood. However, Clause 6 
(1) of the 2015 UDA states that the MIB is not liable for any claim, ‘in respect of 
which the claimant has received, or is entitled to receive…payment or indemnity 
from any other person (including an insurer)’. Hence, the MIB is not required to pay 
for subrogated claims or claims made by an assignee of the insured. This gives a 
                                                          
829 [2013] Q.B. 806. 
830 Wastell (n 332) 
831 Section 145 RTA 1988. 
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motor insurer greater incentive to repudiate liability for breach of an exclusion 
clause, as they will not be required by the MIB to pay the claim under Article 79.  
An example of the use of this exclusion clause can be found in Bristol Alliance v 
Williams832 where the motor insurer argued that there was breach of an exclusion 
clause in the policy, and as this was a subrogated claim by the property insurer, 
they would not have been required to compensate for damage under the MIB 
Agreement. Ward LJ noted that the insurers’ use of subrogation would have no 
effect on the third party victim, because they would have had their building repaired 
and had the loss covered by the property insurer. Ward LJ stated, ‘one way or 
another the objective of the Directives, which seek to ensure that there is some 
compensation for losses caused by motor vehicles, is satisfied’.833   
This provision was challenged for breach of Article 10 of the Directives834 in 
McCall v Poulton835 concerning a subrogated claim against the MIB by an insurer 
for hire charges, which the MIB refused to pay. The MIB argued that it should not 
be required to compensate where the ultimate recipient of compensation will not 
be the accident victim, but rather a commercial organisation such as an insurer. 
The case was based on direct effect and the requirements for ‘emanation of the 
state’, rather than the specific issue of subrogation. The Court of Appeal 
subsequently referred the issue to the CJEU, however, the case was settled 
promptly, leaving the question unanswered. It is clear though, that if the provision 
was deemed to be breaching EU law and held to be directly effective, then it would 
leave the validity and legality of the subrogation provision in doubt. Leaving 
potential for less usage of exclusion clauses by insurers, knowing that they would 
be liable for subrogated claims.  
The Nature of MIB Obligation: EU Law 
It is important to note that the UK has several obligations under the EU Directives 
regarding Bureaux. Such obligations may change due to Brexit,836 although as a 
minimum, the EU will continue to have major impact on UK law for at least five 
                                                          
832 Bristol Alliance (n 15). 
833 Ibid, [70]. 
834 Provision relating to protection given by Bureaux. 
835 [2009] C.P. Rep. 15. 
836 As will be discussed in Part Four of this Chapter.  
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years, due to the Brexit implementation period and personal injury limitation 
periods. Similar to issues with compulsory insurance, it became clear across the 
EU, that differences regarding compensation paid to the victims of accidents from 
uninsured or untraced drivers, were causing major difficulties for those travelling 
across borders. 
With the absence of an arrangement in place in some jurisdictions and many 
compensation bodies placing significant obstacles to compensation, it was 
apparent that a harmonised approach was required across the EU.837 Obligations 
regarding Bureaux were introduced in the Second Directive under Article 1 (4) 
but are now contained in the Sixth Directive under Article 10, which states:  
“Each Member State shall set up or authorize a body with the task of 
providing compensation, at least up to the limits of the insurance 
obligation for damage to property or personal injuries caused by an 
unidentified vehicle or a vehicle for which the insurance obligation 
provided for in paragraph 1 has not been satisfied”.838 
Article 10 further conferred the victim the right to apply directly to the Bureaux and 
gave the Bureaux a responsibility to give a reasoned response. Unlike Article 13 
(1), there are no exclusion clauses which are listed as expressly prohibited within 
Article 10, although one exclusion clause is permitted which is where the 
passenger, ‘voluntarily entered the vehicle which caused the damage or injury 
when the body can prove that they knew it was uninsured’.  As with the permitted 
exclusion clause in Article 13 (1), there has been uncertainty as to whether this 
exclusion clause is exhaustive of the exclusion clauses that can be used.  
It is apparent from Bernáldez and subsequent ECJ and CJEU dictum, that it is 
unlikely that any exclusion clauses can be used by the Bureau or its Article 79 
insurer. For example, A-G Lenz in Bernáldez stated that, ‘member states are free 
to extend the competence of the ‘body’ by statute, provided complete protection 
is ensured for victims’.839 The then ECJ in Bernáldez, however, failed to 
specifically discuss Article 10. In Candolin, the ECJ omitted to mention Article 
                                                          
837 As discussed within Chapter three.  
838 emphasis added. 
839 Bernáldez (n 216), [51], emphasis added. 
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10, but stated in relation to exclusion clauses in Article 13 (1), that as it is a 
derogation from the general rule, the permitted exclusion clause in Article 13 (1) 
should be interpreted restrictively. It is clear from this reasoning, therefore, that as 
the exclusion in Article 10 is a derogation from the general rule, the exclusion 
clause would be interpreted restrictively. Meaning, that it falls within the general 
objectives of the Directives, and ensuring that significant protection is afforded. 
Farrell v Whitty840 concerned specifically the liability of the Motor Insurers’ Bureau 
Ireland (henceforth ‘MIBI’) in relation to a passenger sat in a vehicle not designed 
for seating which was excluded. The ECJ again decided that in relation to 
passengers, Member States cannot go beyond the limitations prescribed in the 
Directives and therefore the MIBI was forced to compensate the victim. It is clear 
therefore that the EU approach is that exclusion clauses (whether contractual or 
statutory) cannot be used by the Bureaux beyond the exclusion clause permitted 
in the Directive.  
Following this, in the UK case of Delaney,841 the Court ruled that an exclusion 
involving a passenger being in a vehicle in ‘course or furtherance of a crime’ in the 
1999 UDA was breaching EU law and the breach sufficiently serious enough to 
allow the parties to claim Francovich damages. In this case Jay J stated:  
“the victim cannot be permitted to fall between two metaphorical 
stools: the principal obligation under article 2(1) of Directive 84/5 rests 
on the insurer, but if that is not satisfied then the national body must 
step up to the plate…the ability of the national body to avoid paying 
the victim is constrained to exactly the same extent (as the 
insurers)”.842 
This is even if blameworthiness or criminal activity is apparent, Jay J noted the 
dicta of A-G Lenz in Bernáldez regarding blameworthiness843 and stated that 
although AG Lenz’s decision was ‘flawlessly coherent’, it did not mean that an 
exclusion could be used by the insurer or the Bureaux.844  
                                                          
840 Farrell v Whitty (n 383). 
841 Delaney (n 539). 
842 Ibid, [38] and [48], emphasis added. 
843 See Chapter Four for the full dicta of A-G Lenz. 
844 Delaney (n 539), [40]. 
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Direct Effect and State Liability 
As we established in previous EU chapters,845 the Directives are vertically directly 
effective, and therefore individuals can rely on them in their national courts against 
the state or its emanation. However, due to their imprecise nature, and the need 
for a Directive to be implemented by the Member States, Directives are cannot be 
used by individuals in private disputes against individuals or private bodies. Unless 
the body in question is classed as an emanation of the state.  
The criteria for a body to be classed as an emanation of the state were laid down 
in Foster v British Gas (henceforth ‘Foster’),846 which are that: the body has state 
control; the body provides a public service, and the body has special powers. The 
courts have found difficulty in determining whether the MIB can be classed as an 
‘emanation of the state’, particularly as the MIB is not under direct control of the 
State.  
In the joint cases of Mighell v Reading, Evans v Motor Insurers Bureau, and 
White v White,847 the Court of Appeal (particularly Hobhouse LJ) stated that the 
MIB could not be classed as an ‘emanation of the state’. This was because the MIB 
was a private company with private members, and acted based on its’ members 
interests. This is despite being a body to compensate individuals. Flaux J in Byrne 
v MIB848 then reaffirmed Hobhouse LJ’s dictum. His Lordship stated that the MIB 
was not granted any special powers by the State, and further that the MIB is 
governed not under statute, but rather its’ articles of association, making it a private 
agreement.  This seems to go against the UK interpretation of the Foster ‘control 
of the state’. As stated by Blackburne J in Griffin v South West Water Services 
Ltd,849 the legal form of the body as well as the fact that the body is an agent of the 
state, is irrelevant in deciding if it is an emanation of the state.  
Although the issue could have been cleared up by the then ECJ in Farrell v Whitty 
(henceforth ‘Farrell’). In relation to the MIBI,850 the then ECJ declined to answer the 
question. However, the AG stated that although state control and special powers 
                                                          
845 Chapters Four and Five. 
846 [1991] 2 W.L.R. 1075. 
847 [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 1251. 
848 Byrne v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [2008] 2 W.L.R. 234. 
849 [1995] IRLR 15. 
850 (Case C-356/05) [2007] 2 C.M.L.R. 46. 
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assigned to the Irish MIB are unclear, it could be deemed on equal footing to the 
state. This is because it is the authorized body for the purposes of the state’s 
Article 1 (4) obligations. The Directives could therefore be used against the Irish 
MIB.  
The case was referred to the High Court of Ireland, where Birmingham J stated that 
Flaux J in Byrne, was incorrect in using a ‘checklist’ type approach to interpreting 
‘emanation of the state’.851 Flaux J instead followed the approach in a case not 
concerning the MIB, The National Union of Teachers v St. Mary’s Church of 
England,852 where the Court stated the concept of emanation of the state was 
broader than the three requirements laid out in the Foster case. Consequently, in 
Farrell, Birmingham J stated that there was a substantial degree of State influence 
in the Irish MIB. His Lordship stated that although the MIB may not meet the three 
criteria laid out in Foster, its overall role as the body responsible under the 
Directives for providing compensation on behalf of the state, makes it an emanation 
of the state for the purposes of direct effect. Although Farrell is an Irish case, it is 
still pertinent to the UK, as the UK and Irish MIBs are identical in their overall roles 
and relationship with the state.  
It is clear therefore that there are substantial differences in opinion as to whether 
the MIB can be classed as an emanation of the state. It is unlikely that the MIB 
meets the requirement of state control, especially as it is a private body, however, 
as found in the National Union of Teachers, not meeting these criteria does not 
exclude a body from being classed as an emanation. Nevertheless, this is still a 
substantially important issue, because if the MIB agreements offer a lower standard 
of protection than EU law to the third party victim, then the victim can invoke EU 
law directly against the MIB. Of course, another potential solution is for the third 
party victim to sue the State for breach of EU law, this occurred in Delaney when 
the UK was sued due to an illegality exclusion in the Agreements.  
Having examined the MIB’s obligations generally, it is important to examine the 
UDA themselves, attention is paid to the UDA 1999 and 2015, as these are the key 
Agreements affecting third parties when an exclusion clause is breached.  
                                                          
851 Farrell v Whitty [2008] IEHC 124 
852 [1997] 3 C.L.M.R. 630 
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Uninsured Drivers Agreements 1999 and 2015 
The 1999 UDA was superseded by the 2015 UDA, which was later amended by 
the Supplementary 2017 UDA. The previous Agreements are still applicable to 
accidents that occurred before the subsequent Agreements were introduced. There 
is currently a limitation period of three years for personal injury claims, although for 
minors there is no limitation period and a claim can be made up until their 18th 
birthday. Thus, the 1999 UDA will continue to be relevant for several years, 
although the number of claims made under it will gradually decrease. 
An example of an Agreement being used for substantial periods after it was 
replaced can be found in Byrne, where the 1972 Untraced Drivers Agreement 
was being used for a claim for a minor in 2006 for an accident that occurred in 
1992, this is a rare case and the delay was due to the age of the minor at the time 
of the accident. Hence, both the 1999 Agreement and its successor both need to 
be examined.  
Procedural Limitations and Conditions Precedent 
The MIB Agreements contain numerous limitations with regards to procedure and 
conditions precedent. If the claimant breaches these then there is potential that 
payment of compensation would be denied. It is important therefore to examine 
these. 
 Information and Joinder Requirements 
Clauses 7 to 15 of the UDA 1999 contain several conditions precedent to the MIB’s 
liability. Clause 7 states that the MIB will not be liable for any claims unless claims 
are made in, ‘such form…giving such information…accompanied by such 
documents as may reasonably be required’. Similarly, under Clause 11, the MIB 
requires to be given any further relevant information, such as: the notice of the filing 
of any defence, any amendments to the claim or addition of a trial date.  Moreover, 
the MIB requires the victim to exercise their rights under Section 154 RTA 1988 
and to request the insurance or security details of the person responsible for the 
accident or to make a complaint to the police. The MIB further requires the victim 
to bring proceedings against the person responsible for the accident and that the 
MIB when it requests, is joined as a party to the proceedings and is assigned the 
unsatisfied decision.  
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Time Limits 
There are further several notice requirements for the victim to adhere to. For 
instance, Clause 9 requires ‘proper notice’ of the bringing of proceedings within 14 
days. The notice must be given alongside all correspondence, documents and any 
insurance policies which are relevant to the claim. This is clearly different to the 
obligation imposed on the victim under Section 152 RTA 1988, which requires 
seven days’ notice to be given to the insurer after the commencement of 
proceedings.  
Clause 11 requires seven days’ notice to be given to the MIB (or relevant insurer) 
after the filling of a defence in relevant proceedings, and any amendment to the of 
a claim, as well as any documents which would be required. The MIB further 
requires notice of the relevant proceedings to be given, in writing, once the 
proceedings have been commenced and within 14 days of when the service has 
been deemed to have occurred. Moreover, Clause 12 states that the MIB must be 
given notice of the application for a decision within 35 days.  
The MIB under its ‘notes for guidance’ has made several concessions to the time 
limits and information requirements imposed in the UDA. For example, the MIB will 
waive the requirement to request insurance of the person at fault for the accident, 
if the MIB application form is completed and signed by the victim. In respect of 
notice and the seven-day service of notice requirements, the guidance states that 
the MIB allow 14 days to receive notice.853 It is further important to note that the 
MIB will occasionally waive the notice requirements regarding the issue of 
proceedings, however, if the limitation period for bringing a claim has expired then 
the MIB will usually not do so.854  
An example of waiver can be found in Begum and Ullah v MIB855 where the Court 
failed to send through documents to the claimants in time to meet the MIB’s 
requirements, the MIB representative waivered the notice over the phone. 
                                                          
853 See Para 7 of the Motor Insurers’ Bureau ‘Notes for the Guidance of Road Traffic Accidents’ 
(1999) https://www.mib.org.uk/media/166947/1999-uninsured-drivers-agreement-england-scotland-
wales.pdf [Accessed 7th June 2017]. 
854As explained by Sir Ralph Gibson in Silverton v Goodall (n 631), 460, “No doubt in other cases, and 
in particular where the period of limitation has expired, the requirement has not been waived”. 
855 [1998] CLY 590. 
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However, after the limitation period had ended the MIB attempted to retract the 
waiver. The Court held that the MIB had waived its right to rely on the deadline. 
It is arguable, that the general rule is that where the MIB can gain an advantage 
and rely on a defence open to it, it will take that course of action856 especially in 
relation to procedural requirements. However, this is contradictory to the 
statements of the MIB in interview that, ‘some provisions were no longer relied on 
in practice e.g. some of the detailed provisions on notice of proceedings’. It is 
difficult to know whether this is the reality, as there is no evidence as to whether 
the MIB use these provisions.  
Although occasionally the Courts will take a negative view of their use. For 
example, in Dray v Doherty857 the Court held that the requirement for the MIB to 
receive an affidavit of service within seven days and the MIB’s repudiation of claim 
for missing this deadline was, ‘not necessary, appropriate or reasonable’.  
It seems, however, that the courts generally will uphold the MIB’s use of procedural 
requirements. For example, in Silverton v Goodall,858 the claimant failed to meet 
the proceeding’s notice requirement by a couple of days. The MIB did not instantly 
refuse to compensate, but rather allowed themselves to be added to the 
proceedings as a defendant, and then later repudiated liability due to notice breach. 
The claimant consequently argued that they had been ‘lulled into a false sense of 
security’859 by the MIB, and therefore the MIB were estopped from relying on this 
defence, especially as no harm had been done to the MIB by late notification. 
Finally, the claimant argued that limitation periods, and their use by the MIB, 
constituted a breach of EU law which prevents the compensation body from relying 
on any exclusions or contractual defences. The Court held that it is irrelevant 
whether the MIB was disadvantaged by the failure to give adequate notice and 
there is no requirement for the MIB to prove loss or disadvantage. Sir Ralph Gibson 
stated that there was: 
                                                          
856 See Nick Jervis and Judy Dawson, A Practical Guide to Handling MIB Claims (1st edition, 
Cavendish Publishing, 2002),14 
857 Unreported (1999) Current Law Cases, Ref 99/525. 
858 [1997] P.I.Q.R. 451 
859 Ibid, 456. 
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 “No basis for construing the agreement otherwise than by reference 
to ordinary principles of construction, having due regard to the 
language used and to the purpose of the agreement derived from the 
agreement as a whole”.860 
In relation to the EU law point, his Lordship stated that the UK scheme of protection 
offered to the victims of uninsured drivers was compliant with EU law and the 
Bernáldez decision. The Judge stated, ‘There is no real difficulty for a competent 
solicitor, or a layman who pays attention to the language of the agreement and the 
notes attached to it, to comply with the requirement of Clause 5(1)’.861  
This case demonstrates that the MIB can rely on contractual defences contained 
within the UDA in the absence of a waiver, and have done so to gain an advantage. 
It is evident from this case, with the judge noting this point also, that there is often 
little reasoning as to whether the MIB will use or waive a defence.862 In the first 
interview, the MIB recognised that it was unlikely that ‘every man on the street’   
would understand the 1999 UDA, and there was a need for ‘handholding’. This was 
because the UDA is a contract (between the MIB and SoSFT), and must be in legal 
form. This follows the comments above from the Judge relating to ‘a competent 
solicitor’, without legal advice it was easy for a claimant to fall through the 
procedural traps.  
The UDA 1999’s procedural requirements have been reduced significantly in the 
UDA 2015. The MIB noted in interview that this was because many of the 
provisions were not relied on in practice. Additionally, the MIB had altered process 
significantly through ensuring that it is added an additional Defendant to the 
relevant proceedings and provided with a copy of any court proceedings and 
evidence as is required. Finally, although the MIB argued in the first interview that 
their Agreements were mostly user friendly, there was suggestion that their user 
friendliness could be enhanced further. 
Some procedural requirements remain in the UDA 2015, such as the requirement 
to submit a claim: ‘(a) in such form, (b) accompanied by such signatures and 
                                                          
860 Ibid, 461. 
861 Ibid. 
862 Ibid, 463. 
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declarations, (c) giving such information, and (d) accompanied by such documents 
as MIB may reasonably require’ (Clause 12). Furthermore, the claimant is required 
to assign any unsatisfied decision or any future settlement to the MIB, and also 
take all reasonable steps to obtain a decision against those who may be liable. 
Finally, the notes of guidance863 advise claimants to undertake reasonable (but not 
exhaustive steps) to identify the insurer of the at-fault driver; to exchange names 
and addresses, vehicle registration numbers and insurance information, ideally at 
the scene of the accident. This therefore is to aide the MIB, as far as possible, in 
bringing a claim against the uninsured driver, to recover some of the costs paid to 
the third party.  
The MIB has significantly amended the time limits imposed from the previous 
agreement, by removing exact deadlines and introducing the term ‘reasonable 
timeframe’ in relation to making the claim by submitting any documents.  
The changes and removal of requirements from the UDA 2015 is seen as a 
beneficial step for victims, with Baker stating that, ‘it will present much less of a 
potential minefield for the unwary claimant representative’.864 Dr Bevan argues that 
this is a ‘welcome change’,865 although reflects that this is too late, especially as 
the 1999 Agreement continues to apply to claims pre-2015866. This important as it 
is evident that victims, who are relying on the MIB Agreements due to breach of an 
exclusion pre-2015, are continuing to need to comply with significantly greater 
procedural requirements than those who have been injured post 2015. The 
removed procedural issues are not necessary for the MIB to operate or they would 
continue to be included in the Agreements.  
 Exclusions of Liability  
The 1999 Agreement further included several exclusions of liability, specifically in 
relation to passengers. These ‘passenger exclusions’ occur where the passenger: 
                                                          
863 Motor Insurers’ Bureau “Notes for Guidance: MIB Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 2015” 
https://www.mib.org.uk/media/335237/2015-uninsured-drivers-agreement-notes-for-guidance-v20.pdf 
[Accessed 01/09/2017] 
864 Baker A “Uninsured Drivers' Agreement 2015” http://www.pibulj.com/content/law-journal-
summaries/news-category-2/3560-uninsured-drivers-agreement-2015-andrew-baker-horwich-farrelly-
solicitors [Accessed 27th June 2017]. 
865 Nicholas Bevan (n 19) 147.  
866 Ibid. 
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“at the time of use giving rise to the relevant liability was voluntarily 
allowing himself to be carried in a vehicle…and either before or after 
commencement (of the journey) he could reasonably be expected to 
have alighted from it, knew or ought to have known that: 
(i) The vehicle had been stolen or unlawfully taken 
(ii) The vehicle was being used without there being in force in relation to 
its use a contract of insurance complying with Part VI of the 1988 Act. 
(iii) The vehicle was being used in course or furtherance of a crime  
(iv) The vehicle was being used to avoid apprehension “ 
For the purpose of this thesis it is only (ii), (iii) and (iiii) which need to be examined 
in any depth. This is because, in the case of a stolen vehicle, there is not going to 
be a policy in place.  Prior to examining these clauses, it is important to examine 
the meaning of ‘known or ought to have known’ as these have been subject to 
significant interpretation and define how wide the clauses can be interpreted.  
Known or ought to have known 
The term ‘ought to have known’ is in direct conflict with the Motor Insurance 
Directives, which only utilise the term ‘knew’.867 The term ‘ought to have known’ 
seems to confer a lesser standard of knowledge, connoting the need to examine 
the objective idea of the ‘reasonable man’, than the term ‘knew’.  The House of 
Lords examined the issue in White v White,868 which concerned a claim by a 
passenger who was being driven by his un-licenced (and thus uninsured) brother. 
The passenger knew that his brother had driven unlicensed previously, but failed 
to question him in this circumstance. The MIB submitted that the passenger ‘ought 
to have known’ that the vehicle was uninsured.  
The House of Lords’, with Lord Scott’s dissent, stated that in absence of 
Marleasing869 being applicable to MIB Agreements, the legislature’s intention was 
to satisfy the Directives. Consequently, the words ‘ought to have known’ should be 
                                                          
867 See Article 10 (4) of the Sixth Consolidated Motor Insurance Directive in relation to Bureaux 
Obligations and Article 13 (1) in relation to Exclusion Clauses relating to the insurer.  
868 [2001] UKHL 9. 
869 Marleasing (n 422). 
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construed in the same way as ‘knew’, requiring actual knowledge rather than 
negligence. Lord Scott disagreed and stated that: ‘construction of “ought to have 
known” that excludes negligence would… be incomprehensible to the lawyers up 
and down the land who have to make our law work’.870 The Court, however, stated 
that despite the restrictive nature required by EU Law of exceptions, the term ‘knew’ 
did not just connote situations where the passenger was told there was no 
insurance or had ‘actual knowledge’. The term would also be satisfied where the 
passenger thought that the driver may be uninsured, but failed to ask because they 
would rather not know, this is referred to as ‘blind eye knowledge’. It therefore is 
clear, that the ‘ought to have known’ requirement fulfils little purpose and should 
be interpreted restrictively. This is positive for the victims as a wider meaning of 
‘knew’ could potentially have opened the MIB’s defences to a much greater number 
of victims. 
Vehicle Used Without Insurance in Relation to its Use 
Prima facie, the ‘vehicle used without a contract of insurance in relation to its use’ 
exclusion would not have any effect against third parties relating to exclusion 
clause cases, as there would be no contract (policy) of insurance for an exclusion 
clause to be contained. However, it is submitted that the phrase ‘in relation to its 
use’, if interpreted widely by the courts, could connote a situation where the 
passenger knew that the driver was driving outside of his policy terms or in breach 
of an exclusion. This is rather than there being no policy at all, as this would connote 
the absence of a policy specifically for the vehicles use. 
It is submitted that the Court would be very unlikely to use such an interpretation. 
This is because the exclusion permitted within Article 10 of the Directive871 only 
states that Bureaux must prove that, ‘they (the passenger) knew it (the vehicle) was 
uninsured’, rather than insured in relation to its use. As stated previously, any 
exceptions in EU law must be interpreted narrowly. Furthermore, it is proposed that 
this is not what was intended by the MIB, as there are no-known cases of the MIB 
attempting to utilise this defence.  
                                                          
870 Ibid, [55]. 
871 Article 2. 
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An examination of the rule of interpretation of general contract terms here highlights 
that it would be unlikely for a wide interpretation to be given. Lord Hoffmann in 
Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society872 
(henceforth ‘West Bromwich’) stated that the interpretative test of a contractual 
document is whether the interpretation would convey, to a reasonable person 
having all the background knowledge, which would reasonably have been available 
to the parties when they were at the time of the contract.873 It is clear that the MIB 
were using this exclusion to comply with EU law which would not permit this 
exclusion. This is comparable to the issue of the interpretation of ‘ought to have 
known’ above, where the interpretation of the phrase was based on the MIB 
attempting to comply with EU law, despite some dissimilarities with the wording of 
the Directive. Consequently, it is unlikely that the Court would give a wide 
interpretation that no reasonable person could have had, in the light of EU law. 
Finally, it is submitted that it would only be in very narrow occasions where this 
could be argued, as the standard of knowledge required in the term ‘knew’ was 
high and the passenger, short of being practising lawyer or having discussed it with 
the driver, would not know the policy terms and restrictions which are contained 
within the driver’s policy.  
 Avoiding Apprehension 
Avoidance of apprehension is an exclusion rarely used by the MIB for claims arising 
from accidents pre-2015. It is submitted that this is because this would usually fall 
within the crime exception. In Ashton v Turner,874 the MIB attempted to use this 
exclusion to prevent damages from being paid to the claimant who was committing 
a burglary. The Court in this instance used other means to deny the claim by stating 
that the driver did not owe a duty of care to the claimant or alternatively the claimant 
had consented to the risk. It has been submitted by Professor Merkin that this 
exclusion would be declared illegal under the Directives which are specifically 
aimed at protecting passengers.875 
                                                          
872 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896. 
873 Ibid, 912-913. 
874 [1981] 1 Q.B. 137. 
875 Professor Merkin and Margaret Hemsworth (n 23), 611. Also see Pages 110 to 113 of this thesis 
on the Third Directive which provides protection of passengers. 
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Part II: Illegality 
MIB’s Policy to Repudiate for Third Party Illegality 
When a claimant commits an illegal act, is he entitled to compensation beyond a 
potential reduction for contributory negligence? The MIB has two potential 
defences to a claim in this instance, namely through Article 6 of the UDA (for pre-
2015 accidents) and the defence of ex turpi causa. These put at risk the potential 
compensation available to the third party, including after breach of an exclusion 
clause by the driver. The law must be placed within the policy of the MIB and the 
context and rationale behind the use of this defence. The MIB were interviewed by 
the author of this thesis on the day that Delaney v Secretary of State for 
Transport876 judgment in the Court of Appeal was decided and concerned the 
issue of illegality. In relation to the Delaney case and the issue of illegality 
generally, the MIB stated:  
“we do things for organisations that don’t (sic) get passed to the 
public, these claims go through to the insurers which go through to 
your and my premium, there is a cost to this and we have to pay it. 
You empower the government on this. And if you Mr Public are happy 
that people taking n criminal offences should be ignored, then you 
will have to pay for it in your premiums… That’s why politically that is 
a bit sensitive that case (Delaney) because I think most of the public 
are not sensitive to that view, that is why there is a political 
perspective to that view, but not from ours, we are apolitical, it will be 
what it will be and what we have to pay and we will collect it from the 
insurers and that will then be put on your premiums that’s the way it 
works”. 
The MIB’s policy approach follows a comparable theme to the way in which 
exclusion clauses work, in that premiums are effected if cover is extended. This is 
because the MIB is funded by insurers, and insurers are businesses who make 
their money through premiums. It is therefore the average motorist who will 
compensate the person involved in the criminal use of a vehicle. This, then, brings 
the question as to whether the public would want to compensate a criminal injured 
                                                          
876  [2015] EWCA Civ 172. 
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during their criminal activity. The MIB’s argument is that the general public would 
not want to pay for the damages in their premiums to someone who has been 
engaged in a criminal activity.877 The difficulty with this is in the width of the term 
‘criminality’ and the circumstances of the accident. For example, the carrying of 
illegal drugs is completely different to not wearing a seatbelt. The width of illegality 
to permit a defence would have potentially major effects on the insurers’ use of 
exclusion clauses, if illegality is deemed to encompass the majority of criminal 
offences, then it is likely that insurers would utilise exclusion clauses in their policies 
all of the time, so they can refuse a third party claim due to illegality.  
Public perception surrounding these crimes are most likely to be very different, the 
public are of course likely to be more sympathetic to a person not wearing a 
seatbelt than a drug dealer. The MIB’s approach is analogous to an argument made 
during the Hughes-Chorley debate and something examined in a paper written by 
this author.878 Hughes stated, in relation to compensation paid to third parties that, 
‘It is…questionable whether justice will be done, or more importantly, if justice will 
appear to be done’.879 This is a very important point to make, the Delaney case will 
be discussed over next few pages, however, the difficulty with the case is that there 
was no causation, the injured parties drug dealing was nothing to do with the 
accident. However, the MIB do not want to be appearing to be compensating 
criminals, whether they were responsible for the accident.  
The defences available to the MIB offer a degree of latitude for the court to decide 
based on the circumstances. It is clear, however, that the courts are not always 
following the MIB and therefore public opinion, as stated in the Delaney judgment, 
‘The understandable reaction might be: there must be some rule of public policy, 
reflecting public revulsion, which bars such a claim, the answer is there is not (in 
this particular case)’.880 A difficulty with this, as will be shown below, is that there is 
lack of guidance for the courts to decide as to whether a claim should be prevented 
due to illegality.  
                                                          
877 The issue of ‘public perception’ was discussed significantly in the authors paper see Matthew 
Channon (n 24).  
878 See Matthew Channon (n 24) 
879 See Hector Hughes (n 178), 268. 
880 [2014] EWHC 1785 (QB) [123]. 
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The MIB, makes itself to be ‘politically neutral’ and has stated that if forced to do 
so by the government it will compensate for any claims that arise. However, the 
government has not provided any guidance to the Courts on this, allowing the MIB 
to push forward arguments of illegality in cases, which it would not do if corrected 
by the legislature. This has left significant confusion and a difficulty in 
understanding the defences available, to which we will now move.  
In-Course or Furtherance of Crime 
The exclusion of compensation within the 1999 UDA in relation to the victim’s 
activity in ‘course or furtherance of a crime’, is the most controversial exclusion 
within the Agreements. This is because there is no mention within the EU directives 
of this exclusion being available. The relationship between this exclusion and the 
defence of ex turpi causa is also obscure. 
The interpretation of the clause, and the seriousness of the ‘crime’  encompassed, 
was examined closely in Delaney v Pickett.881 This is the first case in the litigation 
involving a claim to the MIB by a passenger in a motor vehicle who was seriously 
injured whilst carrying a substantial amount of cannabis, which he was deemed to 
be dealing. The insurer refused to compensate the third party under the insurance 
policy due to the insured’s breach of Section 152 RTA 1988, as the insured made 
a false statement that he was not using drugs. The insurer was nevertheless joined 
as a party with the MIB under Article 79 UDA to defend the claim. The defending 
parties denied the victims’ claim due to the cannabis transportation under the 
maxim if ex turpi causa or the ‘course or furtherance of a crime’ exception.  
The Court of Appeal held that this fell outside of the ex turpi causa defence, as the 
claimant’s illegality did not cause the accident. However, the judges disagreed as 
to whether the defence in the MIB Agreements could be utilised. Ward LJ defined 
‘in course of’, as a motor vehicle being used, ‘in the process of committing the crime 
and as a subordinate part of the carrying out or carrying on of the criminal 
activity’.882 The words ‘In furtherance” meant that, ‘the vehicle is being used to 
advance or to help the commission of the crime’.883 
                                                          
881 [2012] 1 W.L.R. 2149. 
882 Ibid, [41]. 
883 Ibid. 
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The Court found it difficult to decide the breadth of the word ‘crime’, which, if taken 
literally, could encompass all illegal activities irrespective of seriousness, including 
driving in excess of the speed limit. Ward LJ stated that it would be ‘sad’ to say that 
compensation could not be given in such a minor offence.884 Consequently, in 
examining the full extent of the term ‘crime’, Ward LJ followed Lord Hoffmann in 
West Bromwich885 in stating that the background of the Agreement must be used 
in its’ interpretation. His Lordship stated that the Agreement must therefore be 
interpreted considering the EU Directives which require a narrow interpretation of 
exclusion clauses. Ward LJ stated therefore that ‘crime’ should not be interpreted 
as ‘any crime’ but rather must mean a ‘serious crime’, and the use of the vehicle 
for the intention of supplying drugs, ‘is not heinous enough to be the kind of crime 
covered by the clause’.886 
Both Richards LJ and Tomlinson LJ disagreed with Ward LJ on the interpretation 
of Clause 6 (although agreed on the non-application of the ex turpi causa defence). 
Richards LJ stated that although the term ‘crime’ should have its own de minimis 
exception, the judge was not willing to interpret it as narrowly as Ward LJ, as this 
would leave the clause with ‘little practical purpose’.887 His Lordship further stated 
that even if the definition of crime meant ‘serious crime’, drug dealing would fall 
squarely within it.888 Tomlinson LJ agreed that drug dealing should fall within the 
clause but differed slightly from Richards LJ by stating that he was, ‘a little 
uncomfortable with the notion that hard cases can be regarded as capable of being 
dealt with by a de minimis gloss upon the exception’.889 His Lordship stated that 
the Agreement and its’ provision has not been of any cause of concern, as the MIB 
generally does not utilise it to prevent compensation for minor crimes and would 
have little incentive in doing so, as it would be under pressure to amend the 
Agreement and remove the clause.890 
Consequently, the majority in the Court of Appeal held that Clause 6 of the UDA 
could be used against the drug dealing third party. Judicial inconsistency in the 
                                                          
884 Ibid [48]. 
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886 Delaney (n 869), [50]. 
887 Ibid, [68]. 
888 Ibid. 
889 Ibid, [79].  
890 Ibid, [80]. 
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extent of the word ‘crime’ demonstrates the difficulties faced by judges in illegality 
defences. A wider interpretation of the term ‘crime’ would give the MIB substantial 
discretion to repudiate even the most minor offences. This, it is submitted, is 
unlikely, as policy perspectives gained from the interview highlights a degree of 
‘public interest’ involved. In Delaney, the Court clearly considered that drug dealers 
would be those with which society would not wish to compensate. It is clear, 
however, that Clause 6 and the ‘crime’ defence are incompatible with the Motor 
Insurance Directives. The Directives only permit the Bureaux to have one exclusion 
from coverage, which is where the passenger knew that the vehicle was uninsured 
and from the ECJ decision in Farrell891 this is to be interpreted narrowly.  
The claimant in Delaney therefore undertook a Francovich892 action against the 
Secretary of State for Transport (henceforth ‘SoSFT’). The SoSFT argued that the 
claimant knew that the vehicle was uninsured at the material time because it was 
being used for the purposes of a joint criminal enterprise. They argued that the 
words in the preamble of the Directive that: ‘Member States should be given the 
possibility of applying certain limited exclusion clauses as regards the payment 
of compensation of the body’,893 could be interpreted as meaning that the Directives 
permit more than one exclusion. Additionally, they argued that the clause is 
permitted by Article 1(4) of the Second Directive, because everyone knows that 
a vehicle being driven in the course or furtherance of crime is uninsured and it is 
therefore a permitted sub-set of that exclusion. 
In the High Court, Jay J held that the MIB Agreement was in sufficiently serious 
breach of the Directives to allow Francovich damages for the claimant. The judge 
stated in relation to ‘certain limited exclusion clauses’, that:  
“the recitals do not bear this overly punctilious textual approach, nor 
can they be permitted to override the express provisions of the 
Directive, which must be pre-eminent”.894 
His Lordship further stated that the ECJ and CJEU jurisprudence were conflicting 
with the SoSFT arguments that the MIB were complying with the directives, and  
                                                          
891 Farrell v Whitty (n 383). 
892 Francovich (n 469).  
893 emphasis added. 
894 Delaney (n 539), [60]. 
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that this clause could not be a subset of the permitted exclusion because, ‘That is 
not how the draftsperson of the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement has approached the 
matter’.895 This is because if the draftsman intended differently, he would have 
added it as rebuttable presumption or to the avoidance of doubt provision.  
The matter was appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Department for Transport 
argued that Jay J erred by applying the EU law restrictiveness of exclusion clauses 
in motor insurance policies, to exclusion clauses from the MIB. Richards LJ in the 
Court of Appeal held that there was nothing in the text of the Directives to suggest 
that additional exclusion clauses were permitted, and the argument regarding the 
recitals was, ‘weak in the extreme’.896 Richards LJ further stated that although the 
ECJ and CJEU jurisprudence is complex in relation to exclusion clauses in 
insurance policies, Jay J had not erred in applying those cases to Bureaux 
exclusion clauses. This is because permitting exclusion clauses would: 
“run…counter to the aim of protecting victims which is stated 
repeatedly in the Directives …That aim is just as valid and important 
in the article 1(4) context as it is in the other contexts…To allow 
member states to introduce exclusion clauses additional to those 
specified would clearly undermine that aim”.897 
Richards LJ (along with Kitchin LJ and Sales LJ) held that the crime exclusion was 
breaching EU law. There was no dispute in this case that the Directives conferred 
rights on individuals, and that there was a causal link between the breach and the 
claimant’s loss.898 The only question was whether the breach was sufficiently 
serious to justify an award of damages. The Court of Appeal held that the breach 
of EU law was sufficiently serious for the SoSFT to be liable for Francovich 
damages. Richards LJ was particularly scathing with the MIB’s introduction of this 
exclusion in the 1999 Agreement, stating that it was, ‘unwise in the extreme to 
introduce an additional exclusion in 1999 without seeking advice as to the legal 
                                                          
895 Ibid, [70]. 
896 Delaney (n 539), [33]. 
897 Ibid. 
898 Which as noted on pages 172-173 are requirements for Francovich actions.  
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position’,899 and furthermore stated that although the breach of EU law was not 
deliberate, the risk of breach had been deliberately run.   
The crime exception was subsequently removed from the 2015 Agreement. As 
noted by the MIB in interview, this is because of the Courts’ decision in Delaney to 
permit damages against the State. However, despite the successful Francovich 
action in Delaney, the defence continues to be used to repudiate MIB liability in 
cases pre-2015. The MIB in interview stated that it would remove the exclusion if 
requested, but did not state that it would not stop using it (although this was not 
expressly asked). In Smith v Stratton,900 the MIB utilised the crime exclusion and 
the defence of ex turpi causa against the backseat passenger of a vehicle who was 
involved in dealing drugs. Laws LJ held that the crime exception could be used and 
that the Francovich action in Delaney was of no assistance to the claimant, this is 
because the clause continued to apply to pre-2015 cases. However, Laws LJ 
determined that the loss of damages could potentially be recovered by a 
Francovich action against the State. The case highlights, therefore, that the Courts 
are willing to apply the crime exclusion and that the MIB will continue to utilise it in 
cases of particularly serious crime such as drug dealing. Of course, an action can 
be brought against the State for breach of the Directive, which is more likely, since 
actions have been brought before, making breaches inexcusable.  
Ex Turpi Causa 
With the removal of the crime exception from the MIB Agreement, an alternative 
post-2015 defence for the MIB is ex turpi causa (illegality). This is a general 
defence open to other areas of law, with most cases coming within the laws of 
contract and unjust enrichment. In relation to tort law, the defence is often used by 
the insurer, or most often, the MIB, to refuse payment to a third party. The defence 
was first enunciated by Lord Mansfield in the 18th century case of Hollman v 
Johnson,901 who stated: ‘No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause 
of action upon an immoral or an illegal act’.902 Consequently, if one commits an 
                                                          
899 Delaney (n 540). 
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902 Ibid, [342]. 
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illegal act which founds a cause of action, the Court could repudiate the cause of 
action due to criminality.   
In relation to motor cases, the defence originates from almost a century ago in the 
cases of Tinline903 and James.904 Both cases involved the application of the 
defence in relation to the at-fault party of the accident claiming indemnification from 
the insurer to pay a third party claim. Tinline involved manslaughter due to 
dangerous driving, whilst James involved drunk driving. In both cases the defence 
of public policy was denied, with Roche J in James stating, ‘(there is) not, in my 
view…that degree of criminality which in the doing of a known unlawful act makes 
it against public policy that the perpetrator should be indemnified in respect of it’. 
905 These cases are slightly different to the current system in which ex turpi causa 
operates, as they involve paying an innocent third party compensation due to the 
act of a criminal driver rather than an illegal act of the third party. These are no 
longer of issue due to the MIB, who will pay innocent third parties for acts of a 
criminal insured, so long as the Agreements are complied with. However, as will 
be shown below, it seems that the precedent and theme of third party protection 
from James and Tinline go as far to protect criminal third parties.  
It is important to note, however, that the law is uncertain with the courts struggling 
to determine the rules behind the principles. Inconsistent policy based approaches 
and legal precedent have led to the law being labelled a ‘mess’.906 Motor insurance 
cases have often developed their own precedent with a mixture from other areas 
of law and illegality involved also, further adding to the confusion. This Chapter will 
now examine these complexities.  
Joint Enterprise and Causation 
A significant difficulty with ex turpi causa in a motor context is causation, with further 
causation issues in joint enterprise cases. Both are often intertwined and have 
caused the courts great difficulty. Where one party is involved in criminality, the 
causation approach can be found in the non-motor case of Vellino v Chief 
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906 Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [265] [Lord Sumption]. 
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Constable of Greater Manchester.907 In this case, Greater Manchester Police 
successfully utilised the defence against a defendant who was suing them for failing 
to take effective measures in preventing his escape. The Court of Appeal held: ‘The 
facts which give rise to the claim must be inextricably linked with the criminal 
activity. It is not sufficient if the criminal activity merely gives occasion for tortious 
conduct of the Defendant’.908 This case therefore gives the proposition that a clear 
linkage is needed for the criminal activity  
In relation to joint-enterprise cases, it is apparent that this test has not always been 
followed. In Pitts v Hunt (henceforth ‘Pitts’),909 the Court permitted the defence 
where a motor cycle passenger encouraged the rider to ride dangerously whilst 
both were intoxicated. The judges seemingly ignored the idea of a ‘causation’ test, 
and instead enunciated another test by stating that they should examine whether 
it is impossible to find a ‘duty of care’ between the claimant and the rider of the 
motorcycle. Without explaining much further the Court held that in this situation it 
was impossible to find any duty of care. This test of impossibility has been the 
leading test in relation to joint enterprise.910 
However, it seems that this test has recently been doubted, particularly in the cases 
of Gray v Thames Trains (henceforth ‘Gray’)911 and Delaney v Pickett.912 In Gray 
(a non-motor case), Lord Hoffmann stated that the question was whether the: 
 “criminal act in the causal relationship between the defendant’s 
breaches of duty and the damage of which he complains prevents 
him from recovering that part of his loss caused by the criminal 
act”.913  
Lord Hoffmann in answering this question gave both a wider and narrower rule. 
The wider rule is, ‘that you cannot recover compensation for loss which you have 
                                                          
907 [2001] EWCA Civ 1249. 
908 Ibid, [72]. 
909 [1990] 3 W.L.R. 542. 
910 Followed in several cases internationally, see for example Gala v Preston (1991) 174 C.L.R. 243; 
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suffered in consequence of your own criminal act’,914 with the narrower rule being, 
‘you cannot recover for damage which flows from loss of liberty, a fine or other 
punishment lawfully imposed upon you in consequence of your own unlawful 
act’.915 The term ‘in consequence’ elucidates a causative approach, rather than an 
approach based on duty which was found in Pitts. This is a significant contrast 
causing difficulties in finding a defence of illegality especially in motor insurance. 
In Delaney, concerning the MIB attempting to avoid compensating a passenger 
who was transporting cannabis for dealing, the MIB argued, alongside Article 6 of 
its Agreement, that the claimant should not be compensated due to the principle of 
ex turpi causa. Ward LJ held that the fact that carrying of cannabis did not cause 
the accident was the important point in relation to the defence, Ward LJ stated:  
“ It is not a question of whether or not it is impossible to determine 
the appropriate standard of care…(instead) the crucial question is 
whether, on the one hand the criminal activity merely gave occasion 
for the tortious act of the first defendant to be committed or whether, 
even though the accident would never have happened had they not 
made the journey which at some point involved their obtaining and/or 
transporting drugs with the intention to supply or on the other hand 
whether the immediate cause of the claimant's damage was the 
negligent driving”.916 
Hence, although the injury would not have happened if cannabis was not being 
carried, the carrying of the drugs was not the immediate cause of the accident and 
ex turpi causa could not be used.  
The potentially contradictory decisions in both Pitts and Delaney were then 
discussed by the Court of Appeal in Joyce v O’Brien.917 In this case, the claimant 
was hanging off the back of his uncle’s van after stealing ladders and was seriously 
injured.  The claimant argued that the uncle’s dangerous driving broke the chain of 
causation and therefore the defence did not apply. The Court examined previous 
precedent and Elias LJ found a middle ground and stated that the introduction of 
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the causation principle does not mean that the established jurisprudence on joint 
enterprise cases is of no continuing relevance.918 
The judge further held that, the courts must recognise the ‘wider public policy 
consideration’ which have previously led them to deny liability in joint enterprise.919  
Therefore:  
“the injury will be caused by, rather than occasioned by, the criminal 
activity of the claimant where the joint criminal illegality affects the 
standard of care which the claimant is reasonably entitled to expect 
from his partner in crime”.920 
Finally, the judge held that the principle to be established in joint-enterprise cases 
in most joint-enterprise situations is: 
“where the character of the joint criminal enterprise is such that it is 
foreseeable that… parties may be subject to…increased risks of 
harm as a consequence of the activities… in pursuance of their 
criminal objectives… the injury can properly be said to be caused by 
the criminal act of the claimant even if it results from the negligent or 
intentional act of another party to the illegal enterprise”.921 
This, therefore is a rather strict approach in relation to illegal acts, as it highlights 
that even if the negligent act of another causes the act, a foreseeable risk of harm 
because of activities will suffice to prove causation. The decision was confirmed, 
albeit reluctantly in Smith v McCracken.922 In this case, the MIB refused to 
compensate a teenage boy who was riding as a passenger on a stolen motorcycle 
and without wearing a helmet. The judge Richards LJ stated that even though there 
may be reservations about the principles in Joyce v O’Brien, the Court was bound 
by precedent and ought not try to backtrack.923 Consequently, although the 
negligent act was that of the driver, the passenger was jointly responsible for it in 
law, and could bring a claim for his own negligent act.  
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Breaking the Chain of Causation 
Where both the claimant and the defendant’s different actions are the possible 
cause of an accident with both having some causative effect, the court will weigh 
up the proportionality between their actions to see if the chain of causation had 
been broken. In Clarke v Clarke,924 the MIB repudiated liability where the claimant 
was attacking his sisters’ vehicle with a machete. His sister drove at the claimant 
severely injuring him. The Court in this case paid attention to the examination of 
the law by the editors in Clarke and Lindsell on Tort. The editors found at least 
three relevant factors for the Court to look at and in particular stated:  
“there has to be some proportionality between the claimant's conduct 
and that of the defendant. The defence does not apply where the 
defendant's conduct was an excessive response”.925 
Consequently, even though the claimant was acting illegally the response was 
disproportionate to use the defence of ex turpi causa and any excessive response 
would be enough to allow the ex turpi causa defence to be used. 
Criminal Act of the Claimant 
The above cases show that the degree of causation needed for a successful 
defence of ex turpi causa is high. However, it is apparent that this does not mean 
that all accidents, which are caused by the claimant, would fall within the ex turpi 
causa defence. ‘Minor’ crimes such as speeding, or even intoxicated driving would 
usually not permit the defence, as the criminality of the act is linked to public policy. 
As stated by Lord Sumption in Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc:926  
“The paradigm case of an illegal act engaging the defence is a 
criminal offence. So much so, that much modern judicial analysis 
deals with the question as if nothing else was relevant. Yet in his 
famous statement of principle in…Lord Mansfield CJ spoke not only 
of criminal acts but of ‘immoral or illegal’ ones. What did he mean 
by this? I think that what he meant is clear from the characteristics of 
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the rule as he described it, and as judges have always applied it. He 
meant acts which engage the interests of the state or, as we 
would put it today, the public”.927 
This, from Lord Sumption does not give much information as to the extent of the 
‘illegal’ acts covered, although when it comes to the term ‘public interest’, this 
connotes some severity. Lord Sumption’s dicta re-affirmed and agreed with the 
dicta of Lord Rodger in Gray v Thames Trains928 who referenced ‘trivial’ cases as 
those that would not fall within the ex turpi causa doctrine.929 Moreover, the judge 
in Vellino930 expanded upon this by stating that a crime in which the claimant would 
receive imprisonment would be expected to allow the defence.931 
An example of criminality, from an MIB perspective, which, inter alia, did not meet 
the test to deprive the claimant of damages is in Smith v McCracken.932 His 
Lordship, Richards LJ, in this case, held that this was not a case in which ‘judicial 
abstention’933 should be used, and therefore the claimant should recover damages. 
Instead, damages should be reduced under the claimant’s contributory negligence. 
This, therefore, shows inequality in precedent and difficulty in determining which 
‘crimes’ would permit the defence of ex turpi causa. 
It is apparent, however, that in motor insurance cases, reduction via contributory 
negligence can be a more favourable situation for example in Joyce v O’Brien,934  
if some fault of the injured party can be found. Reducing damages via contributory 
negligence is certainly a more proportionate response to illegal acts, by not 
depriving a remedy altogether. Moreover, this complies with the Motor Insurance 
Directives and the then ECJ decision in Candolin, which states that it is only in, 
‘exceptional situations’935 in which compensation can be limited in civil liability, by 
proportionately reducing damages based on conduct of the victim. Whereas the 
defence of ex turpi causa is plainly in contravention of EU law. 
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Patel v Mirza 
The most significant case in terms of illegality is Patel v Mirza,936 decided in the 
Supreme Court by all nine judges. This was contractual in nature, where the 
claimant had paid monies for insider trading (an offence under Section 52 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993) and did not receive the benefit. The Court with a 
majority of five judges to four, decided to change direction in relation to the defence. 
Lord Toulson gave the leading judgment and introduced a policy based test with a 
trio of considerations for the Court to examine to decide whether ex turpi causa 
should be applied, the considerations are:  
“(a) considering the underlying purpose of the prohibition which has 
been transgressed, (b) considering conversely any other relevant 
public policies which may be rendered ineffective or less effective by 
denial of the claim, and (c) keeping in mind the possibility of overkill 
unless the law is applied with a due sense of proportionality”.937 
Part b of this test is particularly relevant in a motor insurance context, as the 
principle of ex turpi causa clashes with the public policy of protecting the individual 
from harm caused by a motor vehicle, as discussed in  Hardy938 and Gardner.939 
Moreover, in relation to potentially relevant factors in examining proportionality, 
Lord Toulson stated that there was an infinite list of factors in determining this, 
these can include: 
“the seriousness of the conduct…whether it was intentional and 
whether there was marked disparity in the parties’ respective 
culpability”.940   
The above test from Lord Toulson seemingly replaces the causation test from Lord 
Hoffman in Gray v Thames Trains,941 with a much more flexible test. Lord Toulson 
noted the uncertainty surrounding the test, and this was commented upon by the 
dissenting judges. In relation to motor insurance, it is submitted that it is now more 
                                                          
936 [2016] UKSC 42. 
937 Ibid, [101].  
938 Hardy v MIB (n 251). 
939 Gardner (n 259). 
940 Patel v Mirza (n 909), [107]. 
941 Gray v Thames Trains (n 914). 
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difficult to use this defence, particularly as the courts must weigh up the different 
policy approaches, with the policy approach of motor insurance being third party 
protection. This is particularly in cases where there is some contribution to the 
accident from the illegal act of the third party, as it is submitted that it is likely that 
the courts would find the use of a total bar on claims disproportionate. However, 
with causation not needing to be proven, there is potential for those serious 
offences, such as drug dealing as in Delaney v Pickett,942 to fall within the defence, 
although there seems to be some degree of ‘culpability’ needed to satisfy criteria 
three.  
It is clear though that the overall theme is that the defence of illegality, either 
through the MIB Agreements or in using ex turpi causa, is interpreted critically by 
the courts. In the majority of cases it is evident that the courts have rejected this 
defence or substituted it for the defence of contributory negligence. Moreover, due 
to the amount of case law, it is apparent that the MIB use this defence frequently 
and in a variety of situations. Whilst it is clear that the MIB Agreements cannot be 
used, the ex turpi causa defence is still uncertain, meaning, that third parties who 
have committed a criminal act, cannot be sure that they will receive the 
compensation.  
Part III: Figures, Overall Protection and the Future of the MIB 
With the exclusion clauses contained within the Agreements, as well as illegality 
examined, it is important to bring this together to determine the consequences of 
exclusion clause breach (essentially whether the MIB provide an effective backup), 
to combine this with any figures available, and finally to examine the future of the 
MIB.  
It is first important to examine any figures given by the MIB in the number of claims 
denied. This would provide a good starting point in determining whether the MIB 
provide adequate protection. If the number of denied claims is minimal, then it 
matters little whether the exclusion clauses in the Agreement exist, as they are not 
being utilised. The author has requested the figures of claims, which was denied in 
both interviews. The MIB stated:  
                                                          
942 Delaney (n 869).  
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 “It is not something that we automatically, sort of record in a way, 
without deriving it from other bits of our data. But secondly when you 
get a bunch of claims in, so in 2014 we got 22,000 claims in the door, 
until you have closed the last one of those which might be in several 
years’ time, you can’t say exactly how many of those have been paid 
and how many haven’t. So, it’s not something that you say we got X 
thousand in and those were accepted and these aren’t”. 
The MIB reinforced this in the second interview by stating:  
“All claims that qualify under the terms of the agreement are 
accepted and all those that do not qualify are denied.  In that sense, 
if “MIB claims” are ones that qualify under the Agreements then none 
are denied…Claims that are “denied” would encompass examples 
such as those found to be fraudulent, those where the uninsured or 
untraced driver was not at fault, those made too late according to the 
rules etc.  A number of claims that are made and don’t qualify under 
the Agreements would be meaningless”. 
This shows the difficulty in segregating claims which are denied, not just because 
of the UDA, but also because of the law of liability, or through fraud. As stated 
earlier in this Chapter, where the third party is deemed at fault, their claim would 
be denied, which is, of course, in line with EU Law. It is nevertheless, disappointing 
that the MIB do not hold segregated figures as to claims denied due to breach of 
the UDA, or through illegality. This absence of transparency makes it difficult for 
the third party, or those advising them, to have some idea as to whether their claim 
will be effective.  
This also makes it difficult for us in determining the overall protection given to third 
party victims and thematical analysis of the data and ways in which the MIB 
repudiate claims. 
However, it is important to make some remarks overall, as to the MIB Agreements 
and protection offered by bringing together the research already discussed 
throughout this chapter. It is notable that much more of this research has come 
doctrinally rather than through the interviews, this is because very little in the way 
of themes through their answers could be found. The MIB provided some 
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interesting points in relation to the rationale behind certain issues such as the use 
of the illegality defence, but there was little discussion from the MIB regarding the 
exclusions within their Agreements, other than the user friendliness of them, 
making it difficult to find themes from their answers.  
In relation to the chapter overall, there are some themes which are evident. It is 
notable that the protection of third parties has certainly increased, especially with 
the 2015 UDA. The new Agreement is evidently an improvement on the previous 
Agreements, by removing many of the conditions precedent and exclusion clauses 
and further by making the Agreements more user friendly. However, pre-2015 
accidents continue to fall within these Agreements leaving potential for the victim 
to be uncompensated in these situations. However, the MIB have stated that many 
of the provisions, particularly with regards to time limits and procedural 
requirements, ‘are no longer used in practice’, this is clearly positive. 
It is submitted that if these provisions were used in practise to deny claims, then 
there would be some awareness. For example, cases concerning the use of MIB 
time limits are always considerably scrutinised.943 Moreover, it is notable the MIB 
is undergoing substantial scrutiny due to the Judicial Review, as well as authors 
writing critical pieces in several journals.944 However, these critical articles are 
broad generalisations of the MIB Agreements, and are not discussing recent 
instances of the MIB repudiating claims.  
The 2015 Agreements themselves are also not completely watertight. Victims may 
continue to fall through the gaps and need to be careful to ensure that they keep 
to the requirements of the UDA. This usually would be done by ensuring a 
competent practitioner handles a claim, as highlighted earlier in this chapter, ‘There 
is no real difficulty for a competent solicitor, or a layman who pays attention to the 
language of the agreement and the notes attached to it’.945 It is evident, 
nevertheless, as the MIB have noted in interview, that the 2015 UDA is significantly 
                                                          
943 See for example Silverton v Goodall (n 631), concerning the legality of time limits. This was 
scrutinised in – “Road traffic accident - uninsured driver - Motor Insurers Bureau - liability - 
construction of Clause 5 of MIB Agreement” (1998) Journal of Personal Injury Litigation, 150-152.  
Also, Robert Merkin “Time limits under the Motor Insurers Bureau Agreement” (1997) Insurance Law 
Monthly 9 (6), 11-12. 
944 See the works by Nick Bevan and James Marson (n 31).  
945 Silverton v Goodall (n 631), 461. [Sir Ralph Gibson]. 
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more user friendly than previous Agreements, and therefore navigating it is much 
less problematic.  
However, a significant gap continues to exist in the Agreements where insurance 
is not required, for example on private land, although this is something that goes 
beyond the Agreements, into UK statutory policy. Although Clause 6 relating to 
illegality has been removed, the MIB can still use the defence of ex turpi causa to 
deny a claim, although again this certainly has been narrowed due to the Patel v 
Mirza.946 
So, what is the overall effect of the utilising an exclusion clause on a third party 
claim? It is submitted that it is highly likely that the MIB will pick up a claim, as long 
as it fits within the law of liability and is made in good faith. The absence of figures 
cannot reinforce this viewpoint, however, the minority of recent cases specifically 
questioning the Agreements, provides a useful indicator that the MIB are rarely 
denying claims due to breach of the clauses of their Agreement. Moreover, the 
introduction of the 2015 Agreement provides a positive step in the protection of 
third parties by making it more user friendly and reducing exclusion clauses. 
The Future of the MIB 
Judicial Review 
The MIB has a complex future ahead, first because of an ongoing Judicial Review, 
for the MIB’s potential breaches of EU Law,947 second, because of the UK’s 
impending departure from the EU. The Judicial Review is currently in its later 
stages, with several breaches of EU law argued against the SoSFT and MIB. This 
is largely in relation to the MIB’s role to compensate for exclusion clauses, which 
as highlighted in Chapter Five, is not compliant with EU Law. Apart from this 
exclusion, the Judicial Review is not particularly relevant to this thesis, as the 
exclusion clauses involved are largely from the UtDA 2017 or would not effect a 
                                                          
946 Patel v Mirza (n 909). 
947 One of the key breaches, as discussed in the previous Chapter on page 245 relates to the role of 
the MIB. The rest of the breaches are mainly either in terms of the Untraced Drivers’ Agreement 
which goes beyond the scope of this thesis or other areas of the Agreement which go beyond this 
thesis.  
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claim from an individual who has had an exclusion clause used against them. It is 
worth briefly discussing the Judicial Review in the overall context of the MIB.  
Other exclusion clauses involved within the Judicial Review include the ‘terrorism 
exclusion’, which was where the MIB could refuse to compensate victims in case 
of a terrorist act. This exclusion was subsequently removed from the MIB 
Agreements, after the MIB conceded that this was illegal under the Directives 
during the Judicial Review proceedings.948 Moreover, the MIB’s non-application of 
the CJEU’s Vnuk949 decision is further subject to the Judicial Review proceedings, 
although the outcome of this is uncertain due to the EU’s current consultation on 
the decision.950Uncertainty exists as to whether the Judicial Review will succeed, 
however, it must be remembered these provisions will not be subject to Judicial 
Review for their use post-Brexit.  
The MIB, therefore have several significant challenges to face due to perceived 
breaches of EU law. As noted above, as the MIB are currently under the spotlight, 
it is submitted that it is unlikely that it will take any controversial actions where 
Agreements’ are breached, as this would increase attention further.  
Brexit 
The MIB noted in interview that the effect of Brexit on their Agreements is uncertain, 
as there is little indication as to what Brexit will look like. The MIB importantly noted:  
“The UK creation of a Guarantee Fund (to compensate victims of 
uninsured and ‘hit and run’ drivers) predates any EU obligations to 
create such an arrangement, by many years.  There is no reason to 
think that the arrangements will not be in place after we leave the 
EU”. 
This is an important point to make, the MIB’s obligations will not cease post-Brexit, 
however, it is the extent of their obligations, which will be of interest. Of course, the 
obligations of the MIB will be dependent on whether the EU Directives and CJEU 
                                                          
948 Motor Insurers’ Bureau, “The impact of terrorism on the motor insurance industry” 
<https://www.mib.org.uk/mib-insight/the-impact-of-terrorism-on-the-motor-insurance-industry> 
[Accessed 8th August 2017]. 
949 Vnuk (n 239). 
950 See Pages 142-143 which discusses this. 
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decisions are embedded into UK law. However, as stated previously, the UK 
Government is evidently sceptical of the Directives and there is potential for 
significant alteration when introduced in UK law post Brexit. It must also be 
remembered that the MIB’s Agreements are undertaken with the SoSFT, who 
appeared to have permitted exclusion clauses (such as the illegal use exclusion) 
which were later deemed unlawful. It was the SoSFT who fought for their validity in 
the courts.  
In the interview, the MIB have suggested that Brexit may allow them to re-introduce 
an exclusion which permitted the MIB to refuse paying for a claimant’s damaged 
vehicle when that claimant’s vehicle was itself not insured. The MIB stated:  
“If at some point in the future the UK is not bound by the Directive 
then that may present an opportunity to reintroduce this 
exclusion.  Bearing in mind it is doing no more than denying those 
illegally using a vehicle on the road, a right to recover the cost of 
damage to their vehicle at the expense of premium paying motorists, 
it is hard to envisage any objection”.  
The MIB referring to ‘premium paying motorists’ is enlightening, as this was 
comparably the rationale behind the utilisation of the ‘criminal use’ exclusion which 
we discussed earlier. This further emphasises that the MIB would potentially 
attempt to re-balance motor insurance towards consumers and away from the third 
party by focussing on pushing the premium lower, therefore potentially introducing 
exclusion clauses which are seen by the public as positive. There is, consequently, 
clear potential for the MIB to re-introduce other exclusion clauses post Brexit such 
as the ‘criminal use’ exclusion. This would weaken the rights of third parties 
significantly and with EU law not limiting the use of exclusion clauses, could allow 
the MIB to widen this defence significantly, through expressly stating in its 
Agreements, when it would be used.  
Conclusion 
As noted in previous chapters, the MIB Agreements are utilised by insurers, acting 
as agents of the MIB, where an exclusion clause is used. It is unlikely that an insurer 
would go to the lengths to repudiate liability under their insurance policy, if there 
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was nothing to be gained by utilising the MIB agreement. This Chapter has 
contributed to this thesis through seeking to answer the second research question 
in relation to the effect of exclusion clauses on third party claims, essentially 
questioning whether the MIB provides adequate protection.  
 
In this Chapter, we have found that this question cannot be answered categorically, 
particularly as the MIB has failed to provide figures as to the number of claims 
denied. However, we can make several conclusions.  
 
It is clear that neither the 1999 UDA nor the 2015 UDA are watertight, there 
continue to be some gaps in coverage. The 1999 UDA contains a number of 
procedural conditions, which if not complied with, could leave the victim without any 
compensation. It is apparent that the MIB or Article 79 insurer tend not to use these 
conditions and there is limited evidence that they do use them at present. However, 
it is clear that the 1999 UDA was not user friendly and required handholding, 
making it easy for claimants, without legal representation, to fall through these 
traps. The 2015 Agreement has improved by significantly reducing the number 
potential ‘traps’ for third parties but has not removed them altogether. This 
highlights that protection is not guaranteed although there is an improvement.  
 
Moreover, there is still potential for the MIB to use the illegality defence through the 
MIB Agreements (pre-2015) or through the defence of ex turpi causa, it is apparent, 
however that this has been narrowed significantly due to the narrow judicial 
interpretation. It is clear, however, resulting from the MIB interviews, that the MIB 
are focussed on public opinion and lower premiums when it comes to the illegality 
defence, believing that the average motorist would not want to pay for illegal acts. 
The defence, however, is still potentially available resulting in another gap in 
compensation.  
 
The MIB’s obligations are likely to change in the future, however the extent of this 
is uncertain. It is apparent, however, with the potential removal of protection 
provided by the EU Directives, the MIB could remove protection for third party 
victims, something that it is submitted, is a backwards step. 
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Chapter Eight: Overall Conclusions 
Protection for third party victims has undoubtedly increased since the introduction  
of compulsory motor insurance over 80 years ago. The EU has spurred much of 
this by ensuring a very high level of protection is available in every Member State, 
whilst attempting to ensure certainty for victims. Although it is fair to say that the 
UK has followed this in some respects, we have discovered that the UK’s approach 
is littered with uncertainties, both in the application of EU law, and also of the 
interpretation of national legislation and MIB Agreements.  
The aim of this thesis was to answer three research questions. First, to what extent 
are exclusion clauses valid in third party motor insurance policies against third 
parties? Second, what is the effect of the use of exclusion clauses on third party 
claims? In answering these questions, we sought to combine the theoretical and 
practical issues in relation to exclusion clauses and third party claims in motor 
insurance. Third, how should the law in this area be reformed? 
The enquiry began by laying out the legal context of the UK’s approach to exclusion 
clauses in Chapter Two. This was important not only to provide the rationale and 
historical context, but also as it was, surprisingly, never done before. This was 
followed and expanded in Chapters Three, Four, and Five, which were all important 
in relation to the first research question, the validity of clauses against third party 
claims. Together, these chapters provide a comprehensive evaluation of the 
validity of exclusion clauses. In Chapter Three we examined the law as it currently 
stands in relation to the RTA 1988 and the list of prohibited exclusions in Section 
148. We further discussed the extent to which exclusions are permitted beyond the 
list of prohibited exclusions. This was further added to by examining other potential 
legislation which could influence exclusion clauses, and in Chapters Four and Five 
we compared UK’s approach with the EU’s approach.  
The second research question, the effect of exclusion clause use on third parties, 
was answered through the examination of the MIB in Chapter Seven. The approach 
of this Chapter was to combine doctrinal and empirical research. Given the role of 
the MIB and its’ importance in relation to the practical application of exclusion 
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clauses, this method allowed an approach the problem from a policy, practice and 
academic angle, necessary in the circumstances. 
The third research question will be answered through an overall examination of 
potential reform in the conclusion through bringing together research within this 
thesis to propose a solution.  
The overall findings of the thesis, and the contribution to this area, are threefold. 
First, the rationale of exclusions and the need to balance the objectives of motor 
insurance law in protecting the third party whilst keeping premiums low. Second, 
that exclusion clauses can be used against third parties, subject to a case by case 
evaluation by the courts. Third, the effect of exclusion clauses is that the MIB will 
usually pick up claims, however, this is not a guarantee and some gaps exist, 
depending on the time in which the accident occurred. It is important to examine 
these points in more detail and to finish with a look at the future of the area and 
potential reform to tie together the results of this thesis. 
The Rationale behind Exclusion Clauses: Balancing Objectives 
 
It is crucial, as explained in Chapter Two, to understand the rationale behind 
exclusion clause use and prohibition, since it provides insight into the policy 
approaches, a point often discussed by the courts. Surprisingly, the matter has 
never been explored in any depth in  academic study before. In doing so, the thesis 
is filling a crucial gap. 
The rationale behind use of exclusion clauses is located in the Cassel Committee 
consultation responses. First, to ensure that risk can be determined effectively by 
the insurer, second, to provide lower premiums for the insured, allowing the insured 
to cater their premiums, and third, to provide some deterrence to the insured in 
using their vehicle dangerously or for passengers committing illegal acts which 
would potentially allow lower premiums.  
Of course, a difficulty with the above rationales is their relation to third party claims. 
As the Insurer would pay in the majority of circumstances anyway due to the 
existence of Article 79, these rationales do not ring completely true, as the third 
party will, in the majority of cases, be compensated in the same way as if an 
exclusion clause is breached.  
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There are, however, a couple of arguments in relation to deterrence for the driver 
which would only work without the MIB acting as the last resort. First, by refusing 
to pay the third party when an exclusion clause is breached and therefore 
transferring the obligation to compensate to the insured (who breached the 
exclusion), there is a potential deterrent on the insured as they will be put under 
significant financial strain to compensate. However, this goes back to the ‘man of 
straw’ argument that the insured may not always be in the position to compensate. 
Moreover, there is already power under Section 148 (4) for the insurer to recover 
from the insured any sums that they pay out to the third party if a prohibited 
exclusion is breached. This means that by recovering the money from the insured 
through the legislation (where they are not a ‘man of straw’) there would be a 
potential deterrent through the legislation, which is also beneficial in providing lower 
premiums due the insurer recouping any pay outs.  
Second, by permitting exclusion clauses in relation to blameworthy passengers (for 
example in relation to drunk passengers as in Candolin) there may be a potential 
deterrent effect in preventing the insured from driving outside of the policy, with the 
blameworthy passenger not being compensated and in the position to prevent the 
insured from driving outside of the policy. The EU have noted previously951, 
however, that this would not provide a deterrent particularly in intoxication cases 
as the passenger would not always be in the position to judge this. Moreover, there 
is already a deterrent through the criminal liability of the driver if they breach an 
exclusion clause in the policy, because they would be driving uninsured, whether 
criminal sanctions is an adequate deterrent is unknown and should be subject to 
further study.  
 
Of course, as noted in Chapter Seven, a significant finding of the interviews is that 
the MIB have attempted to reduce premiums whilst providing a deterrent by 
refusing payment to those who commit a criminal act, either via the UDA (Clause 
Six, removed from the UDA in 2015), or ex turpi causa. The MIB state that it would 
be unpopular amongst insureds if they are forced to compensate injured third 
parties who are committing a criminal act. However, in this author’s view this would 
                                                          
951 As discussed on page 114 of this thesis.  
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be inequitable if the illegal act was not a cause or contribution to the accident. This 
comes back to the difficulty with regards to balancing premiums and deterrence 
and has caused the courts great difficulty in determining what counts as an illegal 
act, with which they are evidently cautious. Unlike in cases involving the insurer’s 
use of exclusion clauses, the MIB’s repudiation has much greater effect as there is 
no backup for the injured party when their claim fails.  
 
It is important to note, in relation to the rationale of providing lower premiums, there 
is evidently a difficulty in balancing the rights of third parties to gain compensation, 
whilst trying to ensure a lower premium for the insured. This was noted in the 
Hughes-Chorley debate in Chapter Two and was a significant theme of this thesis. 
This can be demonstrated in the width of the term ‘accident’, discussed in Chapter 
Three (and as noted above, in relation to deterrence). A wider interpretation of 
‘accident’, would include deliberately caused damage (expanding policy scope 
significantly), whereas a narrower interpretation would mean less third parties are 
covered. This, however, is beginning to lose some significance, as noted above, 
due to the role of the MIB.  
Overall therefore, this thesis highlights major challenges. The question of balancing 
lower premiums and the rights of third parties to gain compensation is something 
that has been overlooked in motor insurance law both academically and often in 
practise, it is submitted that further discussions should be had in the future as to 
where this balance should lie.  
The Validity of Exclusion Clauses 
 
The thesis sought to answer the question regarding the extent to which exclusion 
clauses are valid against third parties. As seen in Chapters Three to Six, the answer 
to this question in relation to UK law is tentative and largely uncertain, whereas the 
EU provides greater certainty.  
The only certainty in UK law is that there is a list of prohibited exclusion clauses in 
Section 148 RTA which cannot be used against a third party and these are 
interpreted widely. These exclusion clauses were chosen due to being the most 
prevalent prior to the introduction of the Section 12 RTA 1934.  
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As seen in Chapter Three, the vast majority of exclusion clauses beyond Section 
148 RTA have been permitted within case law due to Section 151 RTA which 
states that insurers are liable only for claims which are, ‘covered by the terms of 
the policy’. However, it is evident that judges have found difficulty in coming to this 
conclusion, because of the conflicting policy approaches within the Act, which is 
focussed on compensating the third party. Some of the leading cases have found 
difficulty in balancing these approaches.952 Judgments are made slightly easier by 
the fact that the MIB provides a back-up if the insurer utilises an exclusion. For 
example, Ward LJ in Bristol Alliance953 was focussed on the fact that the ‘real 
victim’, the damaged shop, gained compensation despite an exclusion clause 
being used.  
Chapter Three identified, in relation to the validity of individual exclusion clauses 
that ‘limitation of use’ clauses are looked upon favourably by the courts. The 
authoritative judgments in Sahin954 and Bristol Alliance both stated that these are 
permitted. There is uncertainty as to the validity of other exclusion clauses, and it 
is likely that these will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. However, it is 
submitted that it is probable that the RTA 1988 only prohibits exclusion clauses 
contained within the prohibited exclusion clauses list. The legislature has set out 
clearly those exclusion clauses which are deemed to be prohibited, and the courts 
have so far stuck to this list.  
Chapter Six found that it is likely that the CRA 2015 and ICOBs will have some, 
albeit indirect, effect on exclusion clauses. It is expected that insurers will be more 
careful to ensure that they draft their policies in a transparent and fair way, which 
will have a beneficial effect on both first and third parties. It is submitted that the 
Insurance Act 2015 is more likely to have a direct effect on the validity of exclusion 
clauses. The relationship between the Insurance Act, the RTA 1988 and EU law 
is uncertain and is yet to be tested. However, the effect that the Insurance Act has 
on exclusion clauses in motor insurance is dependent on the interpretation that the 
Courts give to Section 11.955 A wide interpretation of ‘loss of a particular kind’ has 
                                                          
952 Hardy (n 251), Gardner (n 259) and Charlton (n 262). 
953 Bristol Alliance (n 15). 
954 Sahin (n 208). 
955 Insurance Act 2015. 
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the potential to incorporate ‘limitation of use’ exclusion clauses, which could 
substantially restrict insurer’s use of these clauses.  
Chapter Four found that the EU’s regulation on exclusion clauses contrasts 
significantly with the UK’s, with the EU providing greater certainty. The EU 
Directives are vague because they contain a list of prohibited exclusion clauses, 
with only one exclusion permitted. However, the CJEU has clarified beyond doubt, 
that exclusion clauses cannot be used against third parties, and therefore, the 
insurer is responsible for compensating third parties. This is even in cases where 
the ‘victim’ is partially to blame for the accident. However, one slight uncertainty in 
EU law is in relation to civil liability rules and the relationship with insurance law 
rules, this is likely to be clarified by the CJEU in the future.  
Chapter Five observed that the UK’s interpretation of EU law and particularly the 
Bernáldez decision is conflicting. Moreover, the RTA 1988, in permitting exclusion 
clauses, is clearly incompliant with EU law.  The two authoritative UK cases from 
the Court of Appeal on exclusion clauses Bristol Alliance and Sahin, both 
interpret Bernáldez narrowly, as only prohibiting exclusion clauses relating to 
intoxicated drivers, rather than a blanket prohibition. However, this is in contrast to 
the judgment of Jay J in Delaney,956 who interprets Bernáldez widely, but later 
contradicts himself by stating that the UK is compliant with respect to exclusion 
clauses.  
The Sahin judgment is perhaps the most surprising, as it arose after the CJEU 
decision in Csonka957, which re-affirmed previous CJEU decisions. The Supreme 
Court later denied the claimants an appeal in Sahin, meaning that all routes to 
utilising the full extent of Bernáldez were impeded. However, with the very recent 
CJEU decision in Fidelidade,958 clarifying that the insurer must pay when an 
exclusion clause is breached, it is unlikely that the Bristol Alliance and Sahin 
interpretation will survive and the UK’s Section 148 provision would need 
amending to bring it in line with EU law or face Francovich actions. Moreover, if a 
case goes to the Supreme Court concerning the validity of exclusions, and the 
                                                          
956 Delaney (n 539). 
957 Csonka re-affirmed Bernáldez by stating that the insurer must pay when an exclusion clause has 
been breached.  
958 Fidelidade (n 452). 
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Supreme Court fails to refer to the CJEU or misinterprets EU law, there could be 
case for Kobler liability providing a potential remedy against the State, a Kobler 
claim which would stand a greater chance of succeeding due to the Fidelidade 
decision. 
The first research question can be answered by tentatively stating that, ‘limitation 
of use’ clauses which fall outside of Section 148, can be utilised against third 
parties due to UK courts’ interpretation of the RTA 1988 and Bernáldez. It is 
submitted that the validity of other clauses beyond Section 148 would need to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, subject to future change in the law, this will 
be addressed below. 
The Effect of Exclusion Clause Use on Third Parties 
This thesis has determined that when an exclusion clause is breached, the insurer 
will be forced to pay the third party compensation under Article 79 of the UDA and 
not the insurance policy. The thesis has therefore examined the scope of the UDA 
along with potential exclusion clauses, to determine whether the third party is likely 
to gain compensation. 
Chapter Seven observed that the 2015 UDA generally provides protection to the 
third party claimant, subject to liability and scope issues. Protection has 
significantly increased because of the 2015 Agreement. However, there are some 
limitations to the UDA such as through procedural requirements, meaning that third 
parties can continue to fall through the gaps in protection. However, the extent and 
likelihood that this occurs is not determinable, due to the absence of figures from 
the MIB as to claims denied for this reason. It is further submitted that it is unlikely 
that the MIB will, in future, succeed in being able to utilise defences of illegality, 
first because of the removal of the defence in the Agreement and second because 
of the narrowing of the ex turpi causa defence. It is clear, bringing all of this together 
that the protection offered to third parties has substantially increased.   
Consequently, the thesis has found that result of use of an exclusion post-2015, is 
that the insurer will continue to pay in the vast majority of instances through Article 
79.  
However, as the UDA 1999 continues to apply to accidents pre-2015, the answer 
in respect of these accidents is different. The thesis has shown that the 1999 
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Agreement is littered with exclusion clauses, particularly relating to procedure to be 
followed. Although the MIB has argued that these exclusion clauses will not be 
used, this is not certain, as there are no figures available to determine this and 
earlier cases have found that these exclusion clauses have been used. Moreover, 
the illegality exclusion continues to apply for these accidents pre-2015, meaning 
that more severe crimes could be caught. It is submitted that the accident victim is 
vulnerable to falling through the gaps of the 1999 Agreement and could be 
uncompensated.  The only way to prevent this from happening, as noted in 
Silverton v Goodall,959 is to gain legal advice in helping to fill out the forms 
correctly. The 1999 Agreement, it is submitted is inadequate, and the result of the 
use of an exclusion clause for accidents pre-2015, leaves a greater possibility of 
being uncompensated.  
The answer to the second question is therefore that effect of exclusion clause use 
is dependant on the individual circumstances, and there is potential for victims to 
be uncompensated due to breach of the Agreements. The number of claimants 
who are left uncompensated, however, is uncertain due to the absence of figures 
from the MIB.  
A Look to the Future/Some Recommendations 
Motor insurance law has changed more in the last five years than it had in the 
preceding 80 years, with numerous new cases, an EU REFIT exercise, and new 
MIB Agreements. There are more substantial changes to come due to the recent 
Fidelidade decision from the CJEU, the Judicial Review, and of course Brexit.  
Fidelidade is likely to have a significant impact on the UK’s interpretation of EU 
law, and could expose the illegality of the RTA 1988’s acceptance of exclusion 
clauses, meaning, that the exclusion clause provisions of the RTA 1988 could be 
annulled or subject the UK to state liability actions. This would significantly modify 
the situation of third parties, as the insurer would be forced to pay under their 
insurance contract, rather than the UDA.  
However, it is less than two years until this could change again due to Brexit, 
although this could be greater due to the potential for a Brexit implementation 
                                                          
959 Silverton v Goodall (n 631).  
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period. There is significant uncertainty as to what Brexit, and the UK’s 
implementation period, will eventually look like. Although there is potential for the 
UK to be required to follow EU law and CJEU decisions in the implementation 
period with no say in how they are formed. Moreover, it is likely once this period is 
passed that EU Directives and CJEU decisions could be entrenched in national law 
with the opportunity to repeal them later. 
The government’s generally negative outlook of the Directives and consistent 
breaches, increases the uncertainty surrounding this area of law further, making it 
impossible to predict how the law will look in five years or ten years. Moreover, as 
suggested by the MIB in interview, there is potential for exclusion clauses under 
the Agreement’s to be re-introduced. This, it is submitted, would be damaging for 
the rights of third parties, leaving potential vulnerabilities in the future. Judging by 
the MIB’s reluctance to remove potentially illegal exclusions, this is certainly 
possible post Brexit.  
At the beginning of this thesis, it was noted that motor insurance is the most 
significant area of insurance law due to the numbers involved, yet despite the 
importance that motor insurance has in every-day lives, the area is extremely 
complicated and there is no sign that this is going to end anytime soon.  
As a result of this thesis, the following proposals could be made which would 
remove some of this uncertainty, whilst ensuring that victims are protected. It is 
submitted that new legislation should be introduced providing that no exclusions 
can be used. It should not be left to the courts to interpret this area on a case-by-
case (and often inconsistent) basis which is the current situation. Moreover, this 
new legislation should replace the current outdated RTA 1988 (which is based on 
the RTA 1934). This new legislation would further remove the need for the 
Insurance Act or CIDRA to regulate exclusions in motor insurance which are 
further causing uncertainty.  
New legislation would allow the UK to follow the EU’s current approach. However, 
it should be recognised that the UK should not simply replicate the wording of 
Article 13 of the Sixth Directive. This is because the Directive has caused 
confusion due to being comprised of a narrow list of prohibited exclusions rather 
than an overall approach of prohibiting all exclusions. Instead, the UK should 
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enshrine in legislation the EU’s judicial approach in Bernaldez, Csonka, and 
Fidelidade, that all exclusion clauses are prohibited (except for the stolen vehicle 
exclusion) and that liability is with the insurer and not the Bureau. This would 
remove any uncertainty whilst ensuring a high level of protection and compatibility 
with the EU’s approach.  
Moreover, EU law should be mirrored in relation to the MIB, which cannot use 
exclusions. It is clear that the MIB Agreements, as found in Chapter Seven, are not 
watertight, potentially allowing victims to fall through the gaps in protection. The 
effect of Brexit on third party claims both in the RTA 1988 and the MIB Agreements 
is uncertain. It is finally submitted that Brexit should not be used to further reduce 
protection offered to victims, any reduction in protection, it is submitted, would 
undermine the purpose of motor insurance and could cause significant injustice.  
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Appendix 
Questions from the First Interview with the MIB  
Part I: Claims  
1. (a) How many claims do you receive yearly? And (b) how many out of those 
claims are accepted?  
  
2. What is the greatest basis in which claims are declined?  
  
  
3. (a) Are fraudulent claims a big issue for the MIB? And (b) How many fraudulent 
claims do you estimate that you receive yearly?  
  
4. Do you believe that your agreements are user friendly?  
 
Part II: European Union 
5. I am sure you are aware of the Delaney v Secretary of State Case awaiting 
appeal; do you think that Clause 5 of the MIB agreement which specifies that 
liability is excluded in ‘furtherance of a crime’ breaches European Union Law?  
  
6. Do you believe that the exclusion clauses in Clause 6 are fair and reasonable?  
   
7. What is your view as to the opinion that the concept of the ‘Article 75’ insurer is 
illegal under European Union Law?  
  
8. (a) Do you take the view that it is not permissible for insurers to exclude liability 
in any circumstances where a third party has been injured? (b) What is the MIB’s 
view of the Bernáldez decision, which appears to indicate that exclusion clauses 
are not permitted?  
  
9. Do you believe that the MIB agreements currently conform to European Law?  
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10. Do you believe that the MIB should continue to compensate where the third 
party contributes to the accident or knowingly accepts and increased risk (such as 
where the driver is drunk)?   
  
11. How do the MIB approach claims whereby the driver commits an illegal act? 
(Such as intoxication or deliberately caused damage)?  
 
12. Do you believe that the MIB agreements and the Road Traffic Act correctly 
balance the needs of society and commercial interest? And why?  
  
13. Will the MIB’s agreements change in light of the Vnuk Judgment?   
  
14. Do you believe that the MIB has a ‘good’ relationship with other Bureaus?  
 
The future  
15. What reforms do you see in the future?  
  
16. How would you further reform this area of law?  
  
17. What are the greatest challenges facing the MIB in the future? 
 
Questions for the MIB Interview Two 
 
1.What do you envisage the likely effect of Brexit on your Agreements to be? 
 
2. What is the rationale behind the introduction of the MIB Agreement in 2015 and 
why amend it again in 2017? 
 Specifically, why remove the following exclusion clauses? Removing provisions 
on Conditions Precedent to MIB Obligations in the 1999 Agreement, the exclusion 
clauses under Article 6 of the 1999 Agreement and the terrorism exclusion from 
the 2015 Agreement. 
 
3. Would it be possible for you to tell me the number of MIB claims that are 
denied 
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